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Introduction
The Wrath of Capital
Jeffrey R. Di Leo and Uppinder Mehan
Since the 1970s, the US has seen a dramatic transformation of its eco-
nomic and cultural landscape: the wage inequality gap between the 
middle class and the upper class has dramatically widened; at least two 
attempts have been made to privatize public schooling, the voucher sys-
tem in the 1980s, and the Charter School movement in the 2000s; manu-
facturing jobs have fled the country; service jobs have been outsourced; 
membership in labor unions has declined from 34% to 8%; women’s 
rights and the ERA are increasingly under attack; and labor by illegal 
immigrants has steadily risen while attempts to naturalize them have fal-
tered. During the same period, corporations and private business inter-
ests have made substantial gains both monetarily and politically. Over the 
last thirty years the cultural and economic gains solidified by the middle 
class in the 1950s and 60s, largely through the development of the New 
Deal consensus reached in the 1930s, have slowly dissipated.
None of this happened by accident or came to be as the working out 
of a natural process. Legislators moved by the demands, pressure, and 
financial gain offered by business enacted a series of decisions designed 
not only to make it easier for corporations to move capital and labor 
around the world as needed, but also for financial companies to social-
ize risk and privatize profit as well as offer the commons for sale. Ronald 
Reagan may have cut the top income tax rate from 70% to 28%, and broke 
the Air Traffic Controllers strike and the union; Bill Clinton may have 
signed NAFTA into law, ended welfare as we know it, and repealed the 
Glass-Steagall Act also known as the Banking Act of 1933 that restricted 
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banks from engaging in securities activities, but all politicians have felt 
the pressure of the Powell memo of 1971.
While the Washington Consensus and its blatantly neoliberal eco-
nomic policies did not appear until the late 1980s, it was in the early 
1970s that neoliberal capital’s social and cultural work got under way. 
Two months before his nomination to the US Supreme court by Nixon, 
Lewis F. Powell drafted a memo for the Director of the US Chamber of 
Commerce in which he famously stated that the business community 
needed to engage in “careful long-range planning and implementation, in 
consistency of action over an indefinite period of years, in the scale of 
financing available only through joint effort, and in the political power 
available only through united action and national organizations.”1 The 
American economic system was under attack and Powell wanted to urge 
the usually mild-mannered businessman to fight back. For too long, 
Powell argued, the forces of socialism and statism had been gaining 
ground in the US and the Chamber of Commerce had to act before it was 
too late. In addition to the usual Communist groups and sympathizers 
who were behind these forces, Powell identified “the college campus, the 
pulpit, the media, the intellectual and literary journals, the arts and sci-
ences, and politicians.”2 
The many enemies of the American economic system, as Powell 
understands it, have been working for a number of decades in molding 
public opinion and business should do likewise. While Powell’s pre-
scriptions for taking on the media have been commented upon quite 
frequently, few have remarked on how he also provided a blueprint for 
much conservative action with regard to higher education. Social science 
faculties across the country hold inimical attitudes to business according 
to Powell, and he singles out Herbert Marcuse as a “Marxist faculty mem-
ber [then] at the University of California at San Diego” as an example 
of the powerful writers and magnetic personalities that turn the best and 
brightest young minds against free enterprise. He sees such faculty mem-
bers as having an influence that far exceeds their numbers and urges the 
Chamber to pursue measures designed to restore the qualities of “open-
ness” “fairness” and “balance” to academic freedom (quotation marks in 
the original suggest that Powell would not be surprised by the ironic use 
of those same words by Fox News). The Chamber of Commerce can get 
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started by having a staff of senior business executives to “articulate the 
product of the scholars.” The scholars would produce not only speeches 
and policy papers but also evaluate social science textbooks in terms of 
restoring the “balance” that the civil rights movement and labor unions 
have biased. The Chamber should insist on equal time on campus with 
the “avowed Communists” and “leftists and ultra liberals” who regularly 
speak at various events. Boards of trustees and alumni should be made 
to understand that the left-leaning faculties at American campuses need 
to be balanced, and perhaps most obviously graduate schools of business 
should be encouraged to train executives correctly.3 
Increasingly so over the last decade, left-leaning commentators, politi-
cians, and academics have looked for reasons behind the success conser-
vatives have enjoyed in pushing their agenda. They have been surprised 
over and again by the willingness of voters to endorse policies that are 
clearly against their best economic and social interests. Many politicians 
and commentators such as Kevin Drum, who often writes for the “leftist” 
magazine Mother Jones, point to the concerted efforts of rightwing and 
conservative think tanks as outlined by Powell to promote a pro-business 
agenda as the norm.4 Scholars such the cognitive linguist George Lakoff, 
turn to the use of metaphorical language used by the two major US polit-
ical parties. The Republicans, and conservatives in general, use language 
that reflects the image of the strict father; whereas, the Democrats, and 
liberals in general, use imagery associated with the nurturant father.5 
While both Drum and Lakoff are correct, they miss the most power-
ful appeal used by the supporters and promoters of neoliberal ideology: 
individualism. Neoliberalism describes the conditions of labor in lan-
guage deeply connected with the myth of the American individual who 
stands tall and fights alone against all manner of injustice. Positive words 
such as responsibility, efficiency, flexibility, autonomy, and responsibility 
are used to describe labor and the market. As an aside, the “market” itself 
has taken on almost reverential tones—it is a force beyond the limited 
understanding of those of us who do not operate in the world of high 
finance, and it can do no wrong. The notion of a “flexible” workforce, one 
where it is much easier to hire and fire someone, is conflated with the 
notion of a flexible person. Who, after all, would want to be seen as being 
rigid? At the same time, one cannot be too flexible for “responsibility” is 
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a prized moral attribute. Responsibility also easily turns to blame with 
the individual bearing more and more of it. “Autonomy” is easily a code 
word for anti-collective and anti-union preferences, and “efficiency” 
is a measure of how more labor can be extracted from fewer workers. 
Individualism, though, is different from individualization, which means 
in neoliberal practice that “the individualized subject is held responsible 
for the unintended consequences of their chosen action…. Nobody 
else is to blame. There is no safe haven.”6 The neoliberal appropriation 
of the rhetoric of the individual combines with preferences for privatiza-
tion, free trade, unrestricted flow of capital, and austerity measures for 
middle and lower classes to produce an understanding of the self as an 
entrepreneur. 
From Serf to Entrepreneur
The term neoliberalism is one of the stars that make up the constellation of 
terms central to contemporary discourse. Neoliberalism joins globaliza-
tion, hegemony, cosmopolitanism and imperialism as a renewed focus of 
inquiry in post 9-11 debates about the shape of the world. As is the case 
with its partner terms, neoliberalism too has become a varied and vari-
able term. It might prove beneficial to sort out two major senses of the 
word: ideological and economic. The economic sense of neo-liberalism 
is simple enough and refers to the “shift from fixed to floating exchange 
rates, the elimination of capital controls, and the liberalization of trade 
and investment rules.”7 The ideological sense of neo-liberalism and its 
social and cultural work threatens to dissipate the term into everything 
and nothing.
Neoliberalism has a varied history depending on its variant as well 
as its historian. For some, neoliberalism begins with the work of Adam 
Smith and the classical political economists such as David Ricardo and 
James Steuart. For others (Foucault and Stuart Hall for example), neo-
liberalism proper starts in the 1970s or 80s.8 An important early link 
between the economic and the cultural is the nexus of free trade and 
peace. Nineteenth-century economists explicitly argued that the develop-
ment of free trade could lead to the replacement of mercantilist relations 
that depended on war by capitalist relations of commerce that depended 
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on peace. The same argument in favor of free trade has been consistently 
voiced with each episode of globalization and neoliberalism.9 
At the heart of capitalism is the Marxian “free seller of labor-power.” 
As Marx points out, since the laborer “could only dispose of his own 
person after he had ceased to be attached to the soil and ceased to be 
the slave, serf, or bondman of another” there is a kernel of truth to the 
neoliberal utopian fantasy of the individual free entrepreneur engaged 
in entering contractual relationships most beneficial to himself or her-
self. But Marx goes on to say that “these new freedmen became sellers 
of themselves only after they had been robbed of all their own means of 
production.”10 
Marx begins his definition of a commodity as an “object outside 
us, a thing that by its properties satisfies human wants of some sort or 
another,”11 and soon includes labor power as a commodity. The centrality 
of the commodification of labor to Marx’s analysis is underscored by his 
claim that “the capitalist epoch is … characterized by this, that labour-
power takes in the eyes of the labourer himself the form of a commodity 
which is his property; his labour consequently becomes wage labour.”12 
It is but a short step from seeing one’s labor power as a commodity to 
seeing oneself as a commodity, which is how the entrepreneur may be 
understood who sells his or her intellectual power. Neoliberal thought 
would extend this even further and say that the individual entrepreneur 
sells not a particular skill but responds to the needs of the market and 
fashions himself or herself accordingly. Going back to homo economicus, 
the entrepreneur according to Foucault under neoliberalism is “for him-
self his own capital, being for himself his own producer, being for himself 
the source of [his or her] earnings.”13 
For the promoter of neoliberal ideals the entrepreneur—the new 
homo economicus—always has his or her own means of production: 
intellectual power and thus intellectual property. An entrepreneur can 
be defined as “someone who specializes in taking judgmental decisions 
about the coordination of scarce resources.”14 The entrepreneur depends 
on privileged access to information in order to secure an advantage in a 
financial transaction. Few people are exempt from the seduction of see-
ing themselves as intelligent, savvy, individuals ready to become high-
rolling wheelers and dealers if only government would get out of the way.
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From Community to the Individual Consumer
The neoliberal notion of democracy prefers consumers over citizens, 
shopping malls over communities.15 Capitalism, in general and neoliber-
alism in particular, prefers the public to be spectators rather than engaged 
citizens. In a 1996 essay “Consent without Consent,” Noam Chomsky 
concisely traces the history of the desire and attempts to keep the public 
disengaged in the US from the founding fathers to contemporary times. 
Over the centuries, two tools have been used to keep the public at bay: 
trade treaties that favor the already wealthy and corporations, and propa-
ganda by the wealthy and corporations (by the mid 1990s over $1 trillion 
was being spent annually on marketing, one-sixth of the GDP).16 
David Harvey’s analysis reveals that a major component of the propa-
ganda undertaken by the wealthy pits individuals against regressive and 
oppressive government.
By capturing ideals of individual freedom and turning them 
against the interventionist and regulatory practices of the 
state capitalist class interests could hope to protect and even 
restore their position. Neoliberalism was well suited to this 
ideological task. But it had to be backed up by a practical strat-
egy that emphasized the liberty of consumer choice, not only 
with respect to particular products but also with respect to 
lifestyles, modes of expression, and a wide range of cultural 
practices. Neoliberalization required both politically and 
economically the construction of a neoliberal market-based 
populist culture of differentiated consumerism and individual 
libertarianism.”17 
Harvey’s larger thesis is that a focus on the individual is counter-produc-
tive to effective social cohesion and mobilization; neoliberalism is at its 
best when it promotes an emphasis on individual freedom which comes 
at the price of class and group interests. New York City in the 1970s and 
1980s is a good case in point. In an ideal neoliberal labor market, 
the individualized and relatively powerless worker … con-
fronts a labour market in which only short-term contracts are 
offered on a customized basis. Security of tenure becomes a 
thing of the past … A ‘personal responsibility system’ … is 
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substituted for social protections (pensions, health care, pro-
tections against injury) that were formerly an obligation of 
employers and the state. Individuals buy products in the mar-
kets that sell social protections instead. Individual security is 
therefore a matter of individual choice tied to the affordability 
of financial products embedded in risky financial markets.18 
The Mark﻿et is All
The contemporary deification of the market would have surprised the 
patron saint of neoliberalist thought, Adam Smith, whose warnings 
about the dire consequences of the completely unfettered market are 
conveniently ignored. The cultural effects of such an attitude is readily 
visible in the dictum that the government is the problem and privatiza-
tion is the answer. No formerly public sphere is considered out of bounds 
for corporatization including healthcare and education. It is surely not 
coincidental that the rise of for-profit schools has come at the expense of 
reduced funding for community colleges and public universities. A recent 
social and political furor over the provision of insurer-paid contraception 
in the US serves to underscore the transformation of neoliberalism from 
its roots as primarily an economic philosophy to the major worldview 
that it has become today. 
In late February, 2012 conservative talk-show host Rush Limbaugh 
called a woman a “slut” for testifying on behalf of a new law that will pro-
vide insurer-paid contraception to women. Limbaugh has made any num-
ber of misogynistic comments before, but three factors make this incident 
especially noteworthy: one, he continued his personal attacks on Sandra 
Fluke, the Georgetown University Law Center law student over the next 
few days; two, Limbaugh has increasingly come to be seen as an influ-
ential broker in the Republican party; and three, a leading Republican 
contender for the Republican nomination for the Presidential candidate, 
Rick Santorum, attacked contraception a few months earlier as a practice 
that leads to “unnatural” acts.
Santorum had given an interview to CaffeinatedThoughts.com 
on October 19, 2010 during which he held forth on the dangers of 
contraception: 
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One of the things I will talk about that no president has talked 
about is, I think, the dangers of contraceptives in this country. 
The whole sexual libertine idea. Many in the Christian faith 
have said, “Contraception’s okay.” It’s not okay. It’s a license to 
do things in the sexual realm that is counter to how things are 
supposed to be.
And, a few days before his attack on Sandra Fluke, Rush Limbaugh had 
endorsed Santorum’s position calling it exactly right.
A brief timeline might help to contextualize the controversy that 
played itself out over social media and the news networks. On January 20, 
2012 the Obama administration announced that under the Affordable 
Healthcare Act a new provision would come into effect in August of 2012 
providing women free contraceptives. Religious-affiliated employers 
such as hospitals, schools, and charities would have an additional year to 
work out the logistics; churches and other houses of worship would be 
exempt from the requirement. Republican politicians, conservative com-
mentators, and some Catholic religious leaders decried the measure as an 
attack on religious freedom. The Obama administration responded with 
a compromise on February 10, 2012: 
Under the rule, women will still have access to free preventive 
care that includes contraceptive services—no matter where 
they work. So that core principle remains. But if a woman’s 
employer is a charity or a hospital that has a religious objec-
tion to providing contraceptive services as part of their health 
plan, the insurance company—not the hospital, not the 
charity—will be required to reach out and offer the woman 
contraceptive care free of charge, without co-pays and with-
out hassles.19 
A few days later, February 16, 2012, Representative Darell Issa (R-CA) 
organized a House Oversight panel on the new contraception rule that 
excluded women. The Democrat committee members who had fought 
for women to be included on the panel and were denied by Issa held 
another committee hearing the following week to which women were 
invited, including Sandra Fluke, the student whom Issa had prevented 
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from speaking. It is with the testimony of Georgetown University Law 
student Sandra Fluke that Rush Limbaugh re-enters the fray.
Were we to leave the contraception “debate” at this point it would 
serve as another instance of the resurgent culture wars that the incidents 
of 9-11 were supposed to have moved us beyond, yet one more episode 
of the increasingly polarized discourse of US politics. Limbaugh, how-
ever, extended his attack and connected morality to economic ideas that 
have come to be seen as key components of neoliberal thought.
Rush Limbaugh went on to make a proposition to Sandra Fluke. He 
told her that since she was receiving taxpayer money in the form of sub-
sidized contraception that allows her to engage in sexual activity without 
the risk of pregnancy, then she should offer the customer, the taxpayer, 
something in return: she should record her sexual activity and make it 
publicly available by posting it online. Limbaugh displayed his economic 
logic on a radio broadcast on March 1, 2012: “So, Ms. Fluke and the rest 
of you feminazis, here’s the deal. If we are going to pay for your contra-
ceptives, and thus pay for you to have sex, we want something for it, and 
I'll tell you what it is. We want you to post the videos online so we can 
all watch.”20 
However, recasting an issue central to women’s health as a question 
of entrepreneurial activity, a key idea in neoliberal thought, inadver-
tently reveals a fault line in the cultural work of neoliberalism. Aside from 
making his sympathetic listeners into voyeuristic purchasers of a prosti-
tute’s services (the taxpayer pays Fluke to have sex and receives in turn 
from Fluke the video), Limbaugh also forces them to shift from offering 
moral condemnation to being complicit in the triangle of sexual activ-
ity. Neoliberal thought has the capacity to reduce all cultural activity to a 
matter of financial relations. 
Critical Economics
The tide of neoliberal thought seems to have swept away all in its way or, 
to change metaphors in the case of the US, neoliberalism has defined the 
agenda of American politics. The center has moved substantially to the 
right, so much so that the Democrats find themselves more in line with 
the policy positions of Republicans from two decades earlier. A case in 
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point is the Affordable Healthcare Act; the measure is so vilified by the 
Republicans that they have tried to repeal it over thirty times in the past 
year. Ironically, the central idea and many of the provisions of the act was 
first proposed by a Republican think-tank and was supported by major 
Republican politicians. It is telling that under the AHA patients are still 
cast in the role of consumers who will freely choose an insurance pro-
vider from among others in an exchange. 
Not all is bleak though. The austerity measures that have been enacted 
by neoliberals in several European countries recently, and promoted in 
the US, have shown to be a failure. Riots in Greece and Italy, continu-
ing high unemployment in Portugal and Spain, and lackluster economic 
growth in Ireland and England have raised serious doubts about the 
neoliberal narrative of less social spending, fewer government regula-
tions, and greater labor and financial flexibility as the royal road to eco-
nomic prosperity. It may be the case that neoliberal policies are driving 
us toward the narrowing of opportunity and concentration of power that 
Acemoglu and Robinson offer in their analysis Why Nations Fail (2012). 
Nations that fail tend to make it easier for elites to extract wealth from a 
country; nations that are inclusive in their political institutions, and that 
open economic and governing opportunities to as many as possible suc-
ceed. According to them:
Countries such as Great Britain and the United States became 
rich because their citizens overthrew the elites who con-
trolled power and created a society where political rights 
were much more broadly distributed, where the govern-
ment was accountable and responsive to citizens, and where 
the great mass of people could take advantage of economic 
opportunities.21 
It may be that Acemoglu and Robinson overstate the importance of 
political institutions over economic policies but there are emergent signs, 
however, of new ways of thinking about economics and government. 
A number of groups have recently started producing work centered 
around the concept of New Economics. The New Economics Institute, 
On the Commons, the US solidarity Economy Network, and the Capital 
Institute, among others, have begun to research and promote policies that 
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“create a fair economy, a clean environment and a strong democracy.”22 
A number of grassroots organizations are looking to start discussions 
that bring together climate, sustainability, and labor issues. Some groups 
have recommended that measures other than the GDP or the health of 
the stock market be used in pursuit of policy planning, i.e., metrics other 
than those that measure the flow of capital. 
Alternative measurements have long been used by the UN, which 
includes gross national income per capita as only one of four indicators 
in its Human Development Index (life expectancy at birth, mean years 
of schooling, and expected years of schooling are the other three). A 
group centered around the work of economist and philosopher Amartya 
Sen (also one of the developers of the Human Development Index) 
has focused on a conception of the standard of living as the freedom to 
achieve well-being in terms of people’s capabilities. According to the 
capability approach, not only are opportunities important but so are the 
conditions that make the opportunities realizable. Although Sen himself 
has shied away from providing a list of capabilities, preferring to leave 
it to particular communities at particular times, others have elaborated 
capability based on participation, freedom from domination, and justice.
The combination of failed austerity measures, an understanding of 
the importance of inclusive political and economic institutions, and the 
research and advocacy of alternate ways of understanding and measuring 
success may be of some aid at the brink.
Overcoming the Wrath of Neoliberalism
“Neo-liberal discourse is not like others,” warns the French sociologist 
and philosopher Pierre Bourdieu. “Like psychiatric discourse in the 
asylum, as described by Erving Goffman,” comments Bourdieu, “it is a 
‘strong discourse’ which is so strong and so hard to fight because it has 
behind it all the powers of a world of power relations which it helps to 
make as it is, in particular by orienting the economic choices of those 
who dominate economic relations and so adding its own specifically 
symbolic-force to those power relations.”23 The essays in the first section 
of this book, “Race, Violence, and Politics,” demonstrate Bourdieu’s point 
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well but also reveal some of the ways in which neoliberalism intersects 
with racism, devastation of the environment, and police violence.
In “Neoliberalism and Violent Appearances,” Paul A. Passavant argues 
that under neoliberalism “disciplinary power has become weaker, and 
that control technologies functioning through communication systems 
are displacing patterns of order premised on disciplinary power.” Under 
the conditions of what he terms “communicative capitalism,” “an expe-
rience of infinite communicative possibilities and the communicative 
equivalence of all opinion indicate the loss of modernity’s meta-narra-
tive of gradual progress realizing norms of human dignity and democ-
racy.” Within these conditions, the “First Amendment jurisprudence has 
become reshaped in a neoliberal form that allows a demonstration to be 
zoned to a location far from (or invisible to) what one seeks to protest.” 
Similarly, “repeated acts of police using excessive violence against dem-
onstrators in news reports or captured on YouTube videos do not com-
pel normative outrage or changes in police practices the way they did in 
the 1960s.” As such, communication of police violence within neoliberal 
society and culture does not inspire a strong sense of public outrage. 
“The Turn to Punishment: Racism, Domination, and the Neoliberal 
Era” by Noah De Lissovoy is an inquiry into the “meaning and logic of the 
turn to punishment within the context of neoliberalism, and the harden-
ing that this turn marks in the cultures of law enforcement, education, 
and public discourse.” De Lissovoy maintains that the “prevailing polit-
ical-economic and biopolitical accounts” of this conjuncture “should be 
enlarged to include a phenomenology of domination itself and its com-
plex dialectics of subjection and resistance.” Drawing from the historical 
Black radical tradition, De Lissovoy argues that “in order to adequately 
make sense of the turn to punishment, and neoliberalism more broadly, 
we need to foreground the fact and logic of racism.” For him, the legacy 
of racism is “the secret determinant of the carceral turn in neoliberal cul-
ture.” Consequently, for De Lissovoy, neoliberal society’s carceral turn is 
“a specific and exceptional conjuncture within” the “broader history and 
logic of domination.”
In “Neoliberalism, Environmentality and the Specter of Sajinda 
Khan,” Robert P. Marzec explores some of the connections between 
neoliberalism and environmentalism—two areas that have developed 
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relatively autonomously over the past fifty years. According to Marzac, 
“although many environmentalists have made the connection between 
neoliberal economic policies and the destruction of specific environ-
ments,” neoliberals “have proceeded apace without concerning them-
selves too much with ecological concerns.” However, the advent of sci-
entific evidence of global warming may mark “the coming of the end of 
neoliberalism, a decisively different change in its essential character.” For 
Marzec, this “change can be defined as a new idea of ecological neces-
sity or eco-empiricism, one that has begun to draw attention away from 
economic production and development towards matters of national 
security.” This eco-empiricism, argues Marzec, should “be understood as 
a new type of ontological machine, one energized by state, military, and 
scientific authorities buttressing their activities on the futural event of 
environmental catastrophe.” In turn, this “environmentality” “is the force 
now confronting the neoliberal State, and it is beginning to transform 
this reigning state formation into a new, more complex political appara-
tus”—one Marzec terms “the Accidental State.” 
Jennifer Wingard’s “Rhetorical Assemblages: Scales of Neoliberal 
Ideology” reveals and aims to disrupt the “othering” power of neolib-
eral rhetoric through an examination of two specific sites of othering: 
post-Hurricane Ike Houston and the US national anti-immigration cam-
paign of 2004. According to Wingard, both of these events use “other-
ing” to “define a community during a time of perceived jeopardy.” In 
addition, both of these sites “produce said jeopardy,” argues Wingard, by 
“occlud[ing] the material conditions of neoliberal culture.” Her aim is to 
“create a counter narrative wherein the other can be seen not as a tool 
of neoliberal culture, but rather a symptom from which we can begin to 
analyze its material conditions and rhetorical deployments.” 
The final essay in this section, “Neoliberalism, Autoimmunity and 
Democracy: Derrida and the Neoliberal Ethos” by Zahi Zalloua argues 
that the neoliberal ethos both dominates the public sphere and struc-
tures our very mode of being. In addition, it has “thoroughly naturalized 
itself—appearing to its defenders and dissenters alike as the only game in 
town.” Some, like Žižek, blame postmodernism “for fostering an intellec-
tual climate wholly compatible with neoliberalism.” Furthermore, Žižek 
implicates the philosophy of Derrida in the rise of neoliberal. Zalloua, 
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however, challenges Žižek’s reading of Derrida by showing how he offers 
a powerful critique of the neoliberal ethos in his reflections on the auto-
immunity of democracy.
The next group of essays continues to examine the damage wrought 
by neoliberalism though focuses more on the changes it has brought 
regarding concepts of the self and agency. In addition, whereas the first 
group of essays dealt more broadly with society and the environment, the 
second group contends more specifically with the intersections of popu-
lar culture, literary studies, and publishing with neoliberalism.
According to Jodi Dean, “neoliberalism reconfigures elements of mul-
tiple discourses” including “frontier myths of heroic individuals, new 
media celebrations of fast and fluid networks, fantasies of free markets, 
misplaced critiques of collective ownership and government regula-
tion, as well as confusions between the economic concept of competi-
tion and competition understood as a rivalry or contest.” In her essay, 
“Complexity as Capture: Neoliberalism and the Loop of Drive,” however, 
two additional components of the neoliberal atmosphere—reflexivity 
and complexity—are examined through the psychoanalytic category of 
“drive.” Her aim is “to illuminate some of the specific ways neoliberal-
ism captures its subjects and thus formats the terrain of contemporary 
class struggle.
In “Neoliberalism, Risk, and Uncertainty in the Video Game,” 
Andrew Baerg argues that “the contemporary video game naturalizes a 
neoliberal decision-making process that is increasingly characterized by 
an approach grounded in risk and risk management.” As such, Baerg’s 
essay reveals one of the ways in which the discourse of neoliberalism 
has become such a strong one. Video games are one of the most glob-
ally popular forms of entertainment, and to regard them as a means of 
disseminating and promoting a neoliberal approach to risk is particularly 
discouraging to opponents of neoliberalism.
“Neoliberalism in Publishing: A Prolegomenon” by Jeffrey R. Di Leo 
argues that the ascent of neoliberalism in the publishing world is one 
of a gradual intensification of market considerations over aesthetic or 
scholarly ones—a story that holds to varying degrees both within the 
corporate publishing industry and now within the university and small 
press publishing world. However, it is not one that has been widely 
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considered—though it needs to be. The aim of his chapter is to provide a 
broad overview of neoliberalism in publishing and to encourage others to 
consider the connections between the publishing world and the legacies 
of neoliberalism. “The hope,” writes Di Leo, “is that an understanding of 
the destructive powers of neoliberalism within the publishing world will 
empower and encourage authors and scholars to work to disrupt its fur-
ther development and continued ascent through acts of resistance.”
Christopher Breu’s “The Post-Political Turn: Theory in the Neoliberal 
Academy” examines the impact of neoliberalism on the academy over 
the past the last thirty years. For Breu, although this impact “has taken a 
number of different forms and provoked a number of different responses,” 
he focuses on one particular aspect: the expansion and contraction of 
politicized scholarship in the academy. In particular, he tracks theory 
for its politicization of culture and language in the 1990s to its current 
emerging depoliticization. However, rather than worrying about the cur-
rent depoliticizing trend, Breu offers in its place a hopeful message of the 
emergence of a “counter-trend of newly materialist scholarship that takes 
up the political engagements of the long nineties, but in a more materi-
alist direction that holds the potential to challenge the dematerializing 
ideology of neoliberalism itself, with its emphasis on financialization and 
what Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri term “biopolitical” or so-called 
“immaterial” labor (i.e. affect, service, and intellectual labor).”
The final essay in this collection, “Neoliberalism, Post-Scarcity, and 
the Entrepreneurial Self ” by Uppinder Mehan, problematizes the self-
constructed by neoliberalism by reflecting on the gap between the neo-
liberal ideal of the autonomous entrepreneur and the realities of the crea-
tures who live under neoliberalism. Drawing on science fiction, Mehan 
speculates as to qualitative differences of life after “singularity,” that is, 
in the words of Ray Kurzweil, “a future period during which the pace of 
technological change will be so rapid, its impact so deep, that human life 
will be irreversibly transformed.”24 For Mehan, the post-singularity world, 
which is also a time where we will have all but certainly finally “moved 
into a post-scarcity world,” is one where we may finally be able to fully 
“realize the self promised by neoliberal rhetoric: an autonomous, entre-
preneurial self, free to make rational choices about every aspect of life.”
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Together, the ten essays in this collection reveal the pervasiveness, 
destructiveness, and dominance of neoliberalism within American soci-
ety and culture. They also suggest points of resistance to an ideology 
wherein, to borrow Henry Giroux’s comment from our epigraph, “every-
thing either is for sale or is plundered for profit.” The first step in fighting 
neoliberalism is to make it visible. By discussing various inroads that it 
has made into political, popular, and literary culture, we are taking this 
first step and joining a global resistance that works against neoliberalism 
by revealing the variety of ways in which it dominates and destroys vari-
ous dimensions of our social and cultural life.
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IRace, Violence, and Politics
Chapter 1
Neoliberalism and Violent Appearances
Paul A. Passavant
Forty years ago, civil rights activists who marched to protest racial segre-
gation and to demonstrate in favor of the right to vote were met by police 
and mob violence. Acts of violence by police officers shocked the nation’s 
conscience, creating pressure for stronger enforcement of not only the 
Constitution’s Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, but of the First 
Amendment as well. More recently, demonstrations at events such as the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) Meetings hosted by Seattle in 1999, 
the anti-war protests in New York City in 2003, the Republican National 
Convention (RNC) in 2004, demonstrations at the 2009 G-20 meetings 
in Pittsburgh, and the Occupy! movement, have been met by intimidat-
ing and torturous treatment by police. There have been internal reviews 
of police practices, reviews of police practices by civilian review boards, 
reports issued by civil liberties organizations, police departments have 
been sued, and there have been monetary settlements. Yet intimidating 
and violent policing of peaceful demonstrators and innocent bystand-
ers continues to occur (and videos of these incidents circulate widely 
on YouTube). 
This chapter argues that with contemporary society’s reflexive under-
standing of infinite communicative possibilities and the communicative 
equivalence of all opinion, evidence of institutional efforts to prevent 
people from exercising their rights of speech and assembly simply adds 
one more frame to a universe of infinite communicative possibility. The 
communicative equivalence of all opinion indicates the loss of a metanar-
rative of commitment to improving the material recognition of human 
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dignity or democratic strength. This “decline of symbolic efficiency,” to 
use Slavoj Žižek’s terminology, indicates the weakened hold upon us of 
the horizon to which non-violent civil disobedience must be oriented.1 
It also indicates a weakened sense that police brutality is wrong, as it 
no longer shocks the public’s conscience. It merely appears. Some are 
not shocked by its appearance, responding with a cynical, bemused, or 
slightly bored, “whatever.” Others enjoy it.
Modernity and Subjectivity
As feudalism ended and modern nation states began to displace feudal-
ism, a number of transformations occurred. In addition to the emergence 
of a conception of the public, and a sensibility of “society,” there was a 
transformation in subjectivity. The social theorist Norbert Elias describes 
this joint process of social transformation and subjective transformation 
in The Civilizing Process. With the end of the high status of knights, as 
knights were brought in from the outside, they had to learn new forms of 
self-control. Seated at a general table before the eyes of many, they were 
reduced in stature from the hierarchies of honor and battlefield accom-
plishments to simple equality vis à vis each other, and non-knights (such 
as the emerging bourgeoisie). All were equal before the watchful eyes of 
the king at the table. This contrasts with aristocratic society. Aristocrats 
feel no shame before the eyes of their servants because servants are 
unequal to them—the latter do not register before the former as worthy 
of the kind of concern that would result in a sense of shame. According 
to Elias, the change in subjectivity (emerging consciousness of how one 
appears before the eyes of others and engaging in forms of self-discipline 
as one internalizes the gaze of “everyone”) corresponds to a deeper social 
transformation: the creation of the modern state and modern society.
Elias explores the transformation in subjectivity through man-
ners manuals published in the Middle Ages and early modern era. He 
describes a conversation between the poet Delille and Abbé Cosson, 
a Professor of Belles Lettres at the Collège Mazarin, in which Abbé 
Cosson related his recent dinner with some court people at Versailles. 
Delille asserts to Abbé Cosson that he undoubtedly “perpetrated a 
hundred incongruities,” which perturbed Abbé Cosson greatly, leading 
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Abbé Cosson to insist that he “did everything in the same way as every-
one else.” Delille suspects otherwise, and so asks him what he did with 
his napkin, how he ate his soup, how he ate his bread, and so forth. In 
each response, Abbé Cosson begins by stating that he “did the same as 
everyone else,” but Delille lets him know that in fact he did not, though 
he failed to be self-conscious about his shortcomings. No one fixes his 
serviette into a buttonhole, one keeps it on his knees. No one uses a fork 
to eat soup. One breaks bread, one does not cut it into little pieces with 
a knife. Finally, how did Abbé Cosson drink his coffee at the conclusion 
of the meal? “Like everyone, to be sure. It was boiling hot, so I poured it 
little by little from my cup into my saucer,” he replies. “Well,” says Delille, 
“you certainly did not drink it like everyone else. Everyone drinks coffee 
from the cup, never from the saucer….”2 
Delille’s questions for Abbé Cosson, and Abbé Cosson’s responses, 
pivot around what “everyone” does—what is the norm for using a nap-
kin? For eating one’s soup? For eating one’s bread or drinking one’s cof-
fee? Moreover, Delille helps Abbé Cosson to see himself through the 
eyes of “everyone,” encouraging him to regulate his behavior in front of 
others in accordance with the norms of what “everyone” does and what 
everyone expects others to do. Delille is facilitating Abbé Cosson’s inter-
nalization of the gaze of “everyone” when he is in public. In sum, with the 
transformation from feudalism to modern society, with the emergence of 
“public” and “private” spaces, there is a corresponding transformation of 
subjectivity as subjects come to internalize the normative gaze of “every-
one,” or, adjusting social theorist George Herbert Mead slightly, subjects 
learn to internalize the normative gaze of a generalized other.3 
Michel Foucault’s Discipline and Punish describes the institutional 
processes whereby the normative gaze of the other—a prison guard, a 
factory manager, a teacher, a military commander, or the norms of the 
human sciences and the helping professions—becomes progressively 
installed within subjects. Discipline bears on the “soul.”4 According to 
Foucault, punishment in disciplinary society “acts in depth on the heart, 
the thoughts, the will, the inclinations.”5 Discipline is the “technical trans-
formation of individuals.”6 Through repeated exercises and observation, 
the individual gains useful habits. Discipline is a set of double relations. It 
produces docility, on the one hand, and increased utility or capabilities, 
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on the other.7 Discipline creates a common social plane—it fixes norms 
for a given population and creates a “social body.” Discipline also mea-
sures and differentiates individuals with respect to this social norm.8 In 
other words, there is individualization, but in relation to a broader con-
ception of the “social.” The shift away from sovereign vengeance with 
the Enlightenment and modernity is therefore described by Foucault 
as a shift to the “defence of society.”9 According to Foucault, the histori-
cal transformation of modernity is one where the disciplines “spread 
throughout the whole social body.”10 
Foucault reminds us that the “‘Enlightenment’, which discovered 
the liberties, also invented the disciplines.”11 For Foucault, disciplinary 
power is the “dark side” of a “formally egalitarian juridical framework.”12 
We should recall, however, that the generalization of disciplinary power 
is coeval with the emergence of parliamentary democracy. In contrast 
with Foucault’s exposition in Discipline and Punish, I explore here a dif-
ferent, more positive aspect of this co-relation between discipline and 
the concept of equal human rights: discipline’s relation to continuous 
improvement with respect to humanitarian purposes and the purposes of 
self-government. 
Foucault states that the “ideal point of penalty today would be an 
indefinite discipline: an interrogation without end … a procedure that 
would be at the same time the permanent measure of a gap in relation to 
an inaccessible norm and the asymptotic movement that strives to meet 
in infinity.”13 To be sure, Foucault means this critically. A literal interro-
gation without end would be torturous. Yet, isn’t this the very horizon 
of the Enlightenment? The Enlightenment project and the project of 
democracy are a constant interrogation of present circumstances in rela-
tion to norms of human dignity, democracy, and justice. In other words, 
the Enlightenment project is one that grapples with a “lasting hiatus” or 
“incommensurability” between norm and the reality of human behav-
iors, between a rule and its application.14 This incommensurability is also 
the horizon of Marxism. Marxism exploits the gap between norm and 
reality: it is the space of critique.
Marxism is a philosophy and a revolutionary praxis of progress. As 
Étienne Balibar argues, the “question of historicity is one of the most 
open questions of the present time.” In addition to moralizing religious 
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discourses, there seem to be two dominant tendencies today: the return 
of a Hobbesian “‘war of each against all,’ which requires the creation of an 
external power of constraint.” We could call this first option authoritarian 
neoliberalism, which encloses so much thinking and political action in 
the United States since the early 1970s. The second option is “to plunge 
historicity into the element of nature (which seems to be an emergent 
tendency in the current revival of vitalist philosophies).”15 We could 
broadly designate this second option as one that subsumes politics and 
critique to biopolitics and affect, keeping analysis and advocacy occupied 
with ontological or immanent concerns. 
The third possibility, however, is to think “for and against Marx,” to 
“think the change of historical institutions … the ‘change of change’ … 
on the basis of the relations of force which are immanent in them in a 
way that is not merely retrospective but, above all, prospective,” to think 
the articulation of a “problematic of modes of production,” and a “prob-
lematic of the mode of subjection.” As opposed to models of linear evo-
lution, “we would have to liberate the … notion which gradually took 
shape within his writings: the notion of tendency and its internal con-
tradiction.”16 Marx, according to Balibar, is poised between philosophy 
and politics, between “theoretical knowledge of the material conditions 
which constitute the present,” and “action in the present,” between “liber-
atory, egalitarian insurrection,” and “science.”17 What stands in the way of 
such prospective, liberatory, and egalitarian thinking and action? Among 
other challenges lies one particularly deep barrier. Today, we are experi-
encing “the decay or ‘the decadence’ of the idea of progress.”18 
In sum, the transformation from feudalism to modernity correlates 
with a transformation of subjectivity, as subjects are encouraged to 
understand themselves and their relation to society from the perspec-
tive of social norms that demand a certain manner of being in public. 
Foucault’s discussion of disciplinary power describes how this process of 
subjectification was institutionally disseminated, and how this process of 
subjectification was at the same related to what came to be referred to 
as “the social.” Foucault suggests in Discipline and Punish a kind of tor-
turousness to the perpetual interrogation of the present with respect to a 
norm as the gap between present and norm can never be closed. 
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Although it is not hard to think of examples of “Foucauldian tortur-
ousness,” I contend this irresolvable gap between norm and actuality 
constitutes the possibility for critique.19 Marx, for example, exploits this 
gap in The Communist Manifesto when he argues that under capitalist 
conditions, the representative state represents the power of capitalism. 
Thus the first step to revolution is “to raise the position of the proletariat 
to the position of the ruling class to win the battle of democracy.”20 This 
gap between norms of justice or democracy and present circumstances 
is where we can find the possibility of liberatory and egalitarian futurity, 
and of progress: there are these possibilities when there are acts of deci-
sion and critique occurring in this gap of discontinuity, inspired by and 
faithful to those norms, while refusing to be submerged into what merely 
is, by seeking to improve upon aspects of our existence that measure up 
poorly to norms of human dignity, democratic egalitarianism, and justice. 
Today, however, we are experiencing the decay of the orientations to futu-
rity that underwrote, gave credit to, and invested the meaning of reform 
and revolution. We are experiencing the decay of disciplinary power, the 
normative gaze of the generalized other, and the faith in a better future. 
According to some, we are experiencing the “death of the social.”21 
Societies of Control and Communicative Capitalism
According to Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, today, the disciplin-
ary institutions of civil society are everywhere in crisis and are wither-
ing. This means not only that these institutions cannot mediate between 
social forces and the state, or transmit grievance upwards towards the 
state for resolution, but that these institutions cannot produce legitimacy 
for state policies in society. Because they are withering, they fail to shape 
subjectivities in the way that these institutions once did.22 
Hardt and Negri find that there has been a transformation from disci-
plinary society to “societies of control.” Civil society’s disciplinary institu-
tions have become eviscerated, and control technologies have taken their 
place. Control technologies operate through new communications tech-
nologies and digitalization. DVDs, for example, are encoded so that they 
will operate on DVD players in one region, but not in others. Control 
operates through barcodes, RFID chips, digital passcards coding bodies 
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to spaces, biometrics, passwords, and surveillance built into the technol-
ogies we use in our everyday lives, from mobile phones and hand-held 
communication devices assuring that we never leave work when we go 
home or go on vacation, to electronic book readers that control how long 
we can choose to lend a book to a friend or prevent us from re-selling that 
book to a used book dealer.23 
Significantly, these control technologies do not bear on the “soul.” 
One’s “soul” remains untouched when one is digitally enclosed. Control 
technologies do not require subjects to internalize the normative gaze of 
the generalized other. Regardless of one’s good habits, intentions, or pur-
poses, the technology will not allow one to lend a book to a friend for too 
long or to sell it to a used book dealer if we only “possess” the book in an 
electronic format. For the exercise of “control,” one does not police one-
self; one is policed through a code that functions in accordance with its 
own logic, and irrespective of any self-reflection or training of the subject. 
Control technologies provide a substitute for disciplinary training. 
With the weakening of disciplinary power, and the erosion of disci-
plined subjectivities, a process of de-subjectification is unleashed. For 
Hardt and Negri, bodies and minds are now freed to become a biopo-
litical unity of multiplicities and singularities. This biopolitical unity 
would be undisciplined, hence ungoverned and ungovernable by sov-
ereign power.
For Hardt and Negri, passage to societies of control has consequences 
for revolutionary potential and for strategies of revolt. In terms of revo-
lutionary potential, there are advantages to the evisceration of civil soci-
ety institutions from Hardt’s and Negri’s perspective. They can no lon-
ger manufacture consent the way that they could in Gramsci’s day. They 
have lost their disciplinary grip, and they no longer have the capacity to 
produce disciplined subjectivities that can be incorporated within the 
hegemonic bloc.24 In terms of strategies, Hardt and Negri reject Antonio 
Gramsci’s strategy of counter-hegemonic struggles through civil society 
institutions like the media, political parties, or labor unions. Because 
these institutions are withering, they can no longer channel demands to 
the state. Nor can advances in popular consciousness become inscribed 
in state policies because mediating institutions linking social forces to the 
state have become so weakened. 
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Moreover, because these representative institutions are weakened, 
antagonistic interests cannot be so easily mediated or absorbed by the 
state. Antagonistic forces confront each other directly. Or, the state with-
draws from the task of mediating and re-incorporating antagonistic inter-
ests, substituting forceful police functions for a lost capacity to medi-
ate conflict. For Hardt and Negri, President Reagan’s firing of air traffic 
controllers during the PATCO (Professional Air Traffic Controllers 
Organization) strike, rather than finding a negotiated solution to the 
labor dispute, is symptomatic of the withering of the mediating role of 
civil society institutions and a state that has lost the capacity to represent 
or resolve divergent interests.25 The state persists, but, from the perspec-
tive of liberal democracy, in a post-legitimacy form.
Hardt draws a connection between the ontological experience of 
control societies and Giorgio Agamben’s concept of “whatever being.”26 
According to Hardt, control “functions on the basis of ‘the whatever,’ the 
flexible and mobile performance of contingent identities, and thus its 
assemblages or institutions are elaborated primarily through repetition 
and the production of simulacra.”27 Hardt translated Agamben’s Coming 
Community into English, which is where Agamben develops the idea that 
the coming community is “whatever being.” There, Agamben describes 
whatever being as singularity exposed “as such.”28 Whatever being is 
a “perfect exteriority” of humans experiencing “their own linguistic 
being—not this or that content of language, but language itself, not this 
or that true proposition, but the very fact that one speaks.”29 It is the com-
munication of communicability and the exhibition of mediality as such.30 
This communication of communicability, this sharing of linguistic expe-
rience in itself occurs without presupposition. Communication without 
presupposition, foundation, or condition of belonging. This is communi-
cation without revelation.31 It is a communication of … whatever.
The endless texting our students enjoy, clicking “like” on Facebook, 
or the YouTube video that gets circulated for a quirky, singular ges-
ture, lead us to realize that content is not what is being communicated. 
Whether we are talking about a viral video of a UCLA student’s screams 
as he is getting tasered or the techno remix of his screams that can also be 
accessed on YouTube, whether it is the torture or the funky remix of the 
torture, they both share the common denominator of communicability. 
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We realize that anything can be remixed and recirculated, and we com-
municate this if we take a cue from the website that assembled the “top” 
remixes of Howard Dean’s 2004 scream that killed his campaign dead 
in Iowa or the website that has assembled the “top” remixes of Andrew 
Meyer’s “Don’t Tase Me, Bro,” screams, and post yet another link to the 
mashup.32 Or remix the remix. Whether it is a person screaming because 
he is being tortured, or a danceable remix of the tortured screams, they all 
share the common denominator of communicability.33 
Today, there is the communication of communicability. Television 
news, for example, invites us to “tell them what we think” by “logging on 
to our website” or by sending text or twitter messages (which are then 
read on air or scrolled ceaselessly at the bottom of the screen). Anderson 
Cooper invites us to blog our immediate reactions to the show in prog-
ress (though we are advised to “keep it short” since they don’t have 
time to “read a book”). In addition to valuable marketing data, we give 
them “content,” and “reaction” when we participate in the production of 
communication. This is the potentially infinite productivity of commu-
nication, of communicative capitalism. We are entering a condition of 
reflexivity without normativity and the experience of the communicative 
equivalence of all opinion.
What drove this transformation? For Hardt and Negri, as well as 
for Agamben, transformations in capitalism led to these developments. 
Hardt and Negri describe a shift from capitalism’s Fordist phase of disci-
plined industrial production on a factory assembly line to a post-Fordist 
phase. Under conditions of post-Fordism, automation allows for pro-
duction with fewer workers, making capital less reliant on labor. New 
communications technologies allow for goods to arrive “just in time,” 
allowing capital to employ workers only when necessary. Production 
occurs through networks, and computer networks are embedded within 
production processes. In other words, production is not limited to the 
enclosures of a factory’s walls for an eight-hour workday. By occurring 
within communications networks, productive activity occurs wherever 
we happen to be when we get the email, phone call, or text message. 
Though Verizon says “we never stop working for you,” actually it is their 
communications technologies that have the consequence that we never 
stop working. 
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Today, production is communicative in nature. We live under condi-
tions of “communicative capitalism.”34 Communicative speculation is no 
longer confined to a distinct financial sector of the economy. Even “man-
ufacturing” corporations like General Motors now make most of their 
money not from producing automobiles, but from financial services.35 
Production comprises the communication of affect, entertainment, code, 
and the communication of communicativity. We are connected and con-
stantly participating in the neoliberal communicative networks.36 
There is a double movement to neoliberalism and the emergence of 
communicative capitalism. On the one hand, neoliberal subjects must 
become “flexible” and open to whatever. As sociologist Zygmunt Bauman 
notes, under conditions of neoliberal globalization, the “pressure today is 
to dismantle the habits of permanent … regular work.”37 In this respect, 
those potentially capable of work have become post-disciplinary in a way 
that is homologous to the openness to the whatever of viral communi-
cative remixes sharing the common denominator of communicability: 
both are responsive to whatever. 
On the other hand, at the level of a specific job, specialization has 
become more intense under communicative capitalism. According to 
media theorist and activist Franco “Bifo” Berardi, while Fordist factory 
workers were essentially interchangeable, “attorneys, computer techni-
cians and mall vendors all sit in front of the same screen and type on the 
same keyboards: still, they could never trade places.”38 This is homolo-
gous to the experience created by the increased personalization of digital 
media. Based on our digital profiles created and stored by the trackable 
traces of our prior choices, amazon.com can tailor its marketing to us, 
websites can individualize the appearances of webpages (and their adver-
tising) to us, and Google can personalize “information” to our interest 
profiles when we use its search engines.39 In this way, we are increasingly 
digitally enclaved and enclosed. (And this, in turn, is homologous to the 
increased segmentation and segregation of lived geographic space.40) 
Subjective experience under neoliberal conditions, and amplified by 
communicative capitalism, is increasingly narcissistic, enclosed, and self-
referential. Like a market niche.
Berardi explores the psychic costs of the “new economy,” finding 
that depression is “deeply connected to the ideology of self realization 
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and the happiness imperative.”41 With our personal communication 
devices, we are plugged into digital networks that function at the speed 
of light, and we are constantly on call for when the production process 
needs us. Depression, then, can be a defense mechanism of the organism 
against this excessive flow that overwhelms what a human can bear, as it 
detaches from the network for self-preservation.42 Berardi also suggests 
that depression is linked to the consequences of neoliberalism that “many 
are called but only a few are chosen,” yet neoliberalism cannot acknowl-
edge the necessity of widespread entrepreneurial failure without put-
ting the fundamentals of the system itself in ideological jeopardy.43 The 
popularity of reality television in the United States, however, trades on 
viewers who enjoy watching the prevalence of competitive failure, from 
The Apprentice or Celebrity Apprentice (You’re Fired!) to the extended 
period of time American Idol devotes to showing those who try out for 
the singing competition and yet who clearly cannot sing whatsoever so 
the viewer can laugh at them and then enjoy the pleasure of watching the 
judges laughing at them as well.44 Therefore, it seems more accurate to 
say that there is affective pleasure in enjoying neoliberalism’s failures as 
long as it isn’t me, though subjects may experience the stress that it could 
be me, and this can manifest itself in anxiety, insecurity, or the depression 
Berardi documents. 
Or anger and resentment. Some reasonably do not want to become 
more “flexible,” or open to “whatever.” Some are angry at becoming 
“redundant” and “unnecessary” from the perspective of global capital. 
With neoliberalism’s embrace of competition, this means that inequal-
ity is fundamental (some are winners, others are losers; some have more, 
others less; someone got the job, others did not), as opposed to the 
Enlightenment’s orientation to equality. For some, this is appealing. They 
are attached to inequality and enjoy it. They enjoy their anger with the 
Enlightenment’s equal rights or with unromantic modernity’s orientation 
to social democracy and cultivate it. Under post-disciplinary conditions 
of communicative capitalism, one is encouraged not to discipline one-
self, but to express oneself.45 So while some open to whatever are click-
ing “like,” others are attached to expressing their anger, which they do by 
watching Fox, by reading the New York Post, or by logging onto breitbart.
com. Or worse.
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Whatever being, then, is shadowed by a doppelganger that shares a 
post-disciplinary responsiveness to the injunction of expression, as well 
as a post-truth relation to new media. Suspicious of professional norms 
and affectively incited, whatever being’s doppelganger calculates that if 
general social norms are lacking, and if everyone is biased, then my affec-
tive attachments are as good as anyone else’s. Who’s to say they are wrong 
or bad? So if I enjoy this, if I am affectively attached to it, then I should 
express this and no one has grounds to criticize me. Whatever being does 
not check these tendencies of its doppelganger, it accommodates them 
because it concedes the condition of interpretive multiplicity without 
normativity that its doppelganger seeks to exploit. To emphasize: cri-
tique has become displaced.46 What we have instead of antagonism is 
either an openness to whatever or affective expression that appears in a 
narcissistic niche of communicative capitalism.
Let’s bring this back to the field of crime and punishment—the 
centerpiece of Discipline and Punish. The criminologist David Garland 
describes how, in the late 1960s, public policy relating to crime and pun-
ishment was not politicized. The politicians of both political parties in the 
United States were content to defer to the experts, and the experts sought 
to implement the “correctionalist” policies that were the subject matter 
of Foucault’s scholarship published in the mid-1970s. Correctionalism 
was critiqued by radical criminologists for not working—a critique that 
resonated with fringe rightwing politicians and the position papers of 
rightwing think tanks. In the late 1960s, correctionalism was hegemonic. 
Beginning in the 1970s, however, its institutional structure collapsed 
with devastating speed, “like a house of cards.”47 As Garland puts it, no 
one “could have predicted such an outcome, and no one did.”48 He finds 
the demise of correctionalism and its rehabilitative ethos not to be driven 
by “reasoned criticism” and “adjustment to negative findings,” but a “col-
lapse of faith” that was “something akin to a stockmarket crash.”49 
Foucault notes that neoliberalism is hostile to planning or state inter-
vention to correct anti-social developments because of its distrust of 
knowledge: intervention is pointless because of spontaneous order, and 
it is dangerous because of the limits of knowledge—by intervening, you 
can make things worse because you may not know what you think you 
know.50 Under the current neoliberal formation in the field of crime and 
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punishment, with the demise of professional credibility or faith in the use 
of social science knowledge in public policy making, we do not merely 
have pro-market advocacy, which Foucault attributes to neoliberalism, 
or an actuarial focus on risks of crime or crime statistics.51 Additionally, 
the United States experience with neoliberalism indicates an affective or 
expressive dimension to state policies regarding crime and punishment. 
That is, with the politicization of criminal justice policies through righ-
twing populism, politicians seek to express moral outrage by voting for 
ever-more severe criminal punishments. With the demise of credible 
knowledge, instead of the control of passion in the interests of self-gov-
ernment, state policies now express affect or passion, such as outrage at 
evil. In this vein, conservative legal scholar Walter Berns describes one of 
the benefits of capital punishment in 1979 as “the pleasure arising from 
… exacting revenge.”52 Symbolically, criminological and penal practices 
are now forms of government marking certain populations as undeserv-
ing of social inclusion, equality, or human dignity.53 
The rehabilitative ethos had been supported by a social mentality 
of mutual trust and social solidarity.54 Today, the prison is correctional 
only in name as its functionality is to contain evil monsters indefinitely 
as an extension of “zero-tolerance” and preventative policing crime men-
talities. These practices are completely antagonistic to a governmental-
ity of social solidarity, and there is no need for knowledge since radical 
evil defies rational comprehension and explanation.55 What have been 
the consequences of this collapse of faith in criminological expertise? An 
increase of those incarcerated in the United States by a factor of over 500 
percent, which has produced a devastating impact on communities, fami-
lies, the human rights of those incarcerated, and state and federal bud-
gets. How should we describe this “collapse of faith” that Garland likens 
to a “stockmarket crash”? It is the collapse of the horizon of social democ-
racy, of the Enlightenment, and of modernity—the collapse of faith in a 
meta-narrative of progress and social improvement. 
Norms and Futurity
We can compare planned protests by the civil rights movement in 
the 1960s seeking enforcement of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
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Amendments, as well as non-discriminatory treatment, to more recent 
demonstrations, in terms of public reaction to police violence against 
the demonstrators. The civil rights movement received sustenance from 
a normative gaze of the generalized other, and faith in future progress. 
Although repetitive police violence against contemporary left-oriented 
demonstrations could be understood as a sign of state impotence in terms 
of garnering liberal democratic legitimacy for its policies, it is also a sign 
of a weakening in the norm that the state should not treat its people like 
“the enemy,” or that it is not “criminal” to exercise democratic rights.56 
We cannot count on a collective social judgment based on the norm that 
police violence against demonstrators is wrong. With the weakening of 
the normativity of trying to make human dignity more effectual, then, it 
becomes increasingly difficult to have faith in progress towards moder-
nity’s ideals, or hope for a better future. 
It is commonplace to discuss the helpful role of the media regarding 
the civil rights movement. I would like, however, to distinguish an issue 
that might be, incorrectly, conflated with “the role of the media,” the sig-
nificance of a general social norm against torturous or brutal state acts. I 
will do so, in large part, by returning to Aldon Morris’ classic case study 
of the civil rights movement. 
Morris’ The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement is a well known in 
the literature on social movements as an example of resource mobili-
zation theory. Resource mobilization theory is an approach to social 
movements that emphasizes the significance of organizational measures 
to overcome free rider incentives and to turn discontent into a political 
mobilization that can be sustained in order to achieve political or eco-
nomic improvements that ameliorate the conditions that were the source 
of widespread discontent.57 Therefore, Morris’ study is dedicated to 
bringing forward evidence that contradicts two familiar approaches to 
the civil rights movement. One is a liberal narrative that describes the 
Montgomery bus boycott, for instance, as spontaneously emerging when 
Rosa Parks was too tired to move to the back of the bus one day. The other 
is the approach of Francis Fox Piven and Richard Cloward, Poor People’s 
Movements, that argues movements win most of their gains before they 
are formally organized, and that formal organizational efforts tend to pac-
ify and depoliticize the movement.58 By contrast, Morris is unrelenting in 
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his emphasis on the significance of the organizational efforts to mobilize 
large numbers of people, to engage in strategic planning, formulate goals, 
and sustain the movement until goals were met. Because of his emphasis 
on organization, the fact that evidence can be found in his text for the 
importance of ideological structures and symbols lends them even more 
significance since Morris’ methodological argument should lead him to 
downplay these elements.
Morris criticizes studies of the civil rights movement contending 
that the reason civil rights leaders chose to target Birmingham, Alabama 
was the presence there of Eugene “Bull” Connor, who could be counted 
on to overreact with police brutality against civil rights demonstra-
tors, thereby generating favorable media coverage for the movement. 
According to Morris, Birmingham was chosen because of the organiza-
tional strengths of the SCLC affiliate there.59 Morris also argues that if 
the goal was to “provoke white racists to beat blacks, then no economic 
boycott was needed.”60 
Yet on the very next page after Morris criticizes scholarship empha-
sizing symbolic reasons for choosing Birmingham as a demonstration 
site, he notes that Birmingham “symbolically stood as the racist capital 
of America,” and that “SCLC leaders reasoned that if racism could be 
defeated in Birmingham it could be defeated throughout the South.”61 
When Bull Connor ordered fire hoses be turned onto the protesters, and 
unleashed billy clubs and dogs on them as well, the photos that “cap-
tured the cruelty were distributed around the world.” Morris describes 
how these photos made the crisis in Birmingham into the “top prior-
ity of the nation and the government.” When violence broke out again 
in the following days, President Kennedy sent the head of the Justice 
Department’s Civil Rights Division, Burke Marshall, to “press economic 
elites to reach a settlement” with the movement. Kennedy, according to 
Morris, also “made contact with Northern capitalists who owned most 
of Birmingham’s businesses to use their influence over the local busi-
ness leaders of Birmingham.” In other words, as photos of police brutal-
ity were published nationally and globally, the Kennedy administration 
intervened on behalf of the movement’s economic boycott. Morris also 
quotes Martin Luther King, Jr., who summarized the gains made by the 
economic boycott: “the white business structure was weakening, under 
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adverse publicity, the pressure of our boycott, and a parallel falling-off of 
white buying.”62 The organizational efforts of an economic boycott were 
supported by public outrage at the brutality practiced by Connor’s police 
against the civil rights demonstrators.
Morris encapsulates the event of the civil rights demonstrations 
in Birmingham:
The nation was being treated to the spectacle of an American 
city practicing totalitarian behavior against some of its own 
citizens. The world, including countries that had long main-
tained that the United States’ rhetoric about democracy was 
in fact a lie, watched “American justice” being displayed in 
Birmingham by television and satellite. At home many citi-
zens were shocked by the oppression existing in Birmingham 
and looked to a President whose image epitomized liberalism 
and fair play. Kennedy had little choice but to act.63 
Morris’ analysis anticipates later scholarship discussing the role of 
the Cold War and the battle between the United States and the Soviet 
Union over which path to modernity other countries of the world should 
take (capitalist or socialist), and which path better realized democratic 
norms.64 During the Cold War, the Soviet Union could point to racial 
segregation as proof that the practices of the United States did not match 
the norms of democracy they preached—racial segregation contradicted 
norms of democracy, and the United States government felt the sting of 
these criticisms deeply. For instance, when the Supreme Court decided 
racial segregation was unconstitutional, it was widely publicized through 
Voice of America around the world.65 Domestically, Morris finds that 
Kennedy was forced to act by the visible contradiction between demo-
cratic norms and the police practices in Birmingham. When the nation 
was confronted with such clear evidence of police violence, the denial of 
civil rights, and the violation of democratic norms this demonstrated, the 
ideological contradiction was such that Kennedy could not do otherwise 
than to address it.
To be clear, I am not underplaying the important role of organization 
to the civil rights movement. I am, however, indicating the importance 
of a hegemonic norm and the significance of internalizing the gaze of a 
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generalized other—how does one appear to others—for the success of 
these demonstrations. As King argues with respect to the Selma march 
on behalf of voting rights, the “goal of demonstrations in Selma, as else-
where, is to dramatize the existence of injustice and to bring about the 
presence of justice by methods of nonviolence. Long years of experience 
indicate to us that Negroes can achieve this goal when four things occur.” 
King then lists the following four factors:
1. Nonviolent demonstrators go into the streets to exercise their 
constitutional rights.
2. Racists resist by unleashing violence against them.
3. Americans of conscience in the name of decency demand fed-
eral intervention and legislation.
4. The administration, under mass pressure, initiates measures of 
immediate intervention and remedial legislation.66
Here again, one can see the compelling force of the norm against 
police and mob violence, and the force of seeing democratic norms being 
contradicted for “Americans,” and the way the administration feels this 
democratic pressure and is forced, normatively, to act. The movement 
could count on public judgment and organize around that social norm. 
Being involved in the civil rights movement had very high costs for 
participants. The risk that if one were seen trying to register to vote, one 
might lose one’s job, the risk of being beaten, the risk of being beaten to 
death. What could sustain this movement? According to King, referring 
to students involved in freedom rides and lunch counter sit-ins, they “had 
faith in the future…. [T]he movement was based on hope.” What was 
this hope? According to King, “this movement had something within it 
that says somehow even though the arc of the moral universe is long, it 
bends towards justice.”67 This is the horizon of modernity, faith in prog-
ress towards justice, and the hope that human dignity could be more 
adequately realized. When Garland describes the early 1970s “collapse of 
faith” in correctionalism as the organizing presupposition of crime and 
punishment policies as akin to a “stockmarket crash,” he is describing one 
aspect of the horizon of modernity’s collapse. 
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Policing Protest in the Post-Fordist City
The post-Fordist political economy of urban redevelopment has made 
the policing of disruption imperative. Over the last twenty years of the 
twentieth century, cities reoriented services and infrastructure away from 
residents and towards those who might visit the city as a tourist or shop-
per. Cities entered a global inter-urban competition for tourist dollars 
and conventions. They responded to their urban fiscal crisis by trying 
to remake themselves as places of fun (rather than danger or disorder), 
brand themselves to carve out particular niches in the global market for 
visitors, and to market themselves to potential tourists, conventions, and 
as suitable locations for global capital, by hosting “mega-events.” As pro-
ducers of entertainment and manufacturers of simulacra—where enter-
tainment, marketing, and the FIRE industries (finance, insurance, real 
estate) meet—when a city hosts a mega-event, the event must occur with-
out disruption for the city’s branding and marketing strategy to work.68 
The fate of the mega-event and the fate of the city are intertwined. 
New York City, known for its “zero-tolerance” crime policies, had rea-
sons rooted in post-Fordist political economy to assist the Republican 
National Committee’s (RNC) goal of successfully staging the Republican 
National Convention in 2004.69 While the RNC sought to use New York 
City’s landscape as theatre props to reproduce a political mentality rooted 
in September 11, 2001, New York City, to show that it had recovered and 
was “back” after those attacks, needed to be able to prove it could host a 
successful mega-event. Though the RNC has political interests in keep-
ing demonstrators opposed to Bush administration policies far away 
from the convention site, the City also had an interest in doing so rooted 
in the neoliberal logic of marketing and placebranding urban space.70 
The Supreme Court reacted to the civil rights demonstrations of the 
1960s with a number of important legal decisions that enlarged upon the 
“concept of a public forum” under the First Amendment.71 According 
to the Supreme Court’s public forum doctrine, places like public parks, 
streets, and sidewalks are where one’s First Amendment rights of free-
dom of speech and assembly are on the strongest grounds. At midcen-
tury, the Supreme Court recognized that the possibility of disruption or 
caustic attacks were likely when First Amendment rights were exercised 
in a democracy.72 
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The neoliberal, post-Fordist logic of urban governance has been 
reflected in significant developments in First Amendment law. In a 
growing number of more recent lower level court decisions, courts have 
allowed cities hosting mega-events such as World Bank/ International 
Monetary Fund (WB/IMF) meetings, meetings of the G-20, or major 
party conventions, to zone protests away from convention sites in order 
to prevent disruption to the event, or to prevent conventioneers from 
even seeing protesters. For example, when New York City hosted the 
RNC in 2004, organizations seeking to host a major rally were prevented 
from doing so on the Great Lawn of Central Park. They were told that 
they could either have a smaller rally at another location in Central Park, 
or the city offered the organizations two alternative sites which were not 
on the island of Manhattan, for a rally of the size that the organizations 
were seeking to host. The City of Boston, where the Democratic National 
Convention occurred in 2004, created a “Demonstration Zone” (DZ) 
with opaque fabric (and wire mesh) so that protesters and dignitaries 
could not see each other. Located underneath elevated railroad tracks, 
even the judge who sustained the legality of the regulation conceded that 
the “pen” reminded him of a prison. Today, courts deem it sufficient if 
demonstrators can express themselves or voice their opinion while zoned 
to remote locations. These appearances are sufficient for the neoliberal 
reconfiguration of the First Amendment occurring in lower courts.73 
These emergent legal changes are homologous to the post-Fordist 
experience of society’s self-reflexive understanding of infinite communi-
cative possibility. Expression is the means and the end. It is pure means. 
You can choose to watch the video of protesters on YouTube. Or not. 
You choose. Whatever. This is why it “suffices” for a right of expression 
to locate the demonstration far from its object of dissent. The rights of 
speech and assembly have been disarticulated from the politics of democ-
racy—where there might be disruption—in the neoliberal juridical 
order. These legal developments correspond to an experience of commu-
nicative multiplicity without normative contradiction. This is communi-
cative participation in the absence of democratic practices or sensibilities. 
Without the norms of disciplinary society, with the weakened hold of the 
normativity of human dignity or egalitarianism, antagonism and critique 
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are increasingly foreclosed, and the mere expression and the experience 
of infinite communicative possibilities remain. 
Unfortunately, these “cultural” developments also have consequences 
for expressions of police violence as well. Looking back over the last 
decade or so at the way protests have been policed, we can see that a 
post-democratic, neoliberal form of protest policing has emerged and is 
becoming institutionalized through repetition. Urban sociologist Alex 
Vitale reminds us that New York City was developing post-democratic 
forms of policing in the late 1990s when a riot squad rushed the stage at 
the Million Youth March the instant time expired on the rally permit.74 
At the anti-WTO protests in Seattle, 1999, the Seattle Police Department 
(SPD) attacked peaceful practices of civil disobedience and used tear gas 
and pepper spray unjustifiably—sometimes to get a crowd to disperse 
or even just to move people back a few feet. The ACLU of Washington 
state, in addition to finding that the city’s declared “no protest zone” 
violated the First Amendment, noted the overreaction of the SPD, inap-
propriate use of chemical weapons against peaceful crowds, and acts of 
abuse by individual officers in a report prepared in the aftermath of the 
protests. It also issued numerous recommendations for future police 
practices that would be more consistent with the constitutional rights of 
demonstrators.75 
The Citizens’ Panel on WTO Operations issued a report to the Seattle 
City Council Committee on WTO Accountability, which, in addition 
to complaining about problems with cooperation by the SPD, roundly 
criticized the SPD’s use of chemical irritants. The “Report of the Citizen’s 
Panel on WTO Operations” found, on the one hand, a failure on the part 
of the SPD to deploy adequate numbers of officers before demonstrators 
arrived at WTO sites, which necessitated use of less-lethal force weap-
onry. On the other hand, when the numbers of the SPD were bolstered 
by the deployment of several hundred mutual aid officers from surround-
ing areas, “chemical irritants remained in use.”76 The City of Seattle has 
settled lawsuits and claims for the violation of speech and assembly rights 
stemming from its policing of WTO protests, such as mass arrests with-
out probable cause, for sums totaling approximately $1.8 million.77 
John Timoney worked in the New York Police Department (NYPD) 
before becoming the Police Chief first of the Philadelphia Police 
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Department and then the Miami City Police Department. While in 
Philadelphia, he was in charge when Philadelphia hosted the RNC in 
2000. Groups faced significant difficulties applying for permits to march 
or demonstrate because of the agreement between former Philadelphia 
Mayor Ed Rendell and the Republican party that gave the Republicans a 
right of first refusal to most of the city’s major gathering places.78 Police 
treatment of demonstrators was criticized for violating their civil rights 
because of tactics such as baseless charges, preemptive arrests, exorbi-
tant bails, and abusive treatment of those detained.79 Many demonstra-
tors sued the city (which had taken out an insurance policy for the 2000 
RNC that included liability protection for claims of false arrest, wrongful 
detention, malicious prosecution, and assault and battery), and the city 
settled the suits in some cases for tens of thousands of dollars, and in oth-
ers for undisclosed sums.80 
When Timoney moved on to Miami, the city hosted the Free Trade 
Area of the Americas (FTAA) talks. Police, dressed in riot gear and 
often without identification, used percussion grenades, rubber bullets, 
and tear gas against protesters. Among those who follow the policing of 
protest, Miami’s response to the FTAA protesters became known as the 
“Miami Model.” Ultimately, the City of Miami settled lawsuits for violat-
ing the civil rights of demonstrators and a filmmaker for $340,000 and 
the County paid about $300,000 to settle lawsuits arising from police 
violence.81 
On February 15, 2003, in cities around the world, millions of people 
demonstrated opposition to a United States-led invasion of Iraq. In New 
York City, headquarters to the United Nations, Mayor Bloomberg and 
NYPD Commissioner Raymond Kelly refused to allow a protest march 
being organized by the anti-war organization United for Peace and Justice 
(UFPJ). The NYPD cut off access to the permitted stationary rally. They 
used pepper spray to back demonstrators away from barricades or against 
those who failed to retreat quickly enough. Mounted police drove their 
horses into the massive crowds, knocking people to the ground, while 
officers on foot used their batons. Videotape of the mounted police 
captures officers telling the demonstrators to “go home.” Police used 
interlocking barricades to “pen” protesters. Those who sought to leave a 
pen were generally required to leave the area, and officers did not allow 
Neoliberalism and Violent Appearances 51
those who left a pen to reenter. This became especially problematic due 
to the fact that the temperature that day in New York City was approxi-
mately 15 degrees Fahrenheit and the City prohibited public restroom 
facilities at the rally site. Those arrested complained they were not given 
reasons for their arrest and they were not advised of their rights.82 At an 
anti-war demonstration later that spring, the NYPD unlawfully arrested 
protesters, detained them for excessive periods of time, and denied them 
access to their lawyers. The City of New York settled the suits in 2008 for 
$2 million.83 
New York City hosted the RNC in 2004, and made approximately 
1,800 arrests in connection with maintaining security for this event, 
including about 1,200 on the second day of the convention. Most of 
those arrested were charged with minor offenses that are not generally 
considered “crimes,” but “violations.” Usually, those charged with vio-
lations are given an “appearance ticket” or a “summons,” which means 
that they tend to be released within a few hours. When someone is 
“arraigned” under New York law, they are usually presented to a judge 
within 24 hours. During the RNC, New York City sought to hold virtu-
ally all of those arrested for arraignment, and they did not arraign those 
arrested in a timely manner. Hundreds of those arrested were held longer 
than 24 hours and some were even held prior to arraignment for up to 
three days. Those arrested at the RNC were held in custody at an old bus 
depot known as “Pier 57” which had holding cells topped with razor wire. 
The floors were covered with grime and oil, and therefore likely hazard-
ous. There was no access to running water, blankets, and many in custody 
were forced to relieve themselves out in the open.84 
After the anti-war protests of February, 2003 and the documented 
New York Police Department (NYPD) abuses of the rights of those dem-
onstrators, the NYCLU obtained a court order prohibiting the NYPD 
from closing streets and sidewalks without informing the public of alter-
native routes, and requiring the police to allow people to move freely in 
and out of any pens set up by police. Although there were some reports 
of police using metal barricades, the NYPD used plastic mesh netting 
to rush into crowds and conduct mass arrests during the RNC of 2004. 
Additionally, there were numerous reports of plainclothes officers on 
motor scooters driving into groups of protesters. Many arrestees were 
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bystanders unconnected with political demonstrations, and many of 
those targeted by police were observers (such as legal observers).85 The 
NYPD also conducted mass arrests without individual probable cause 
in violation of the Fourth Amendment.86 The City of New York has paid 
more than $1.5 million to settle over 140 lawsuits arising from NYPD 
misconduct against demonstrators, while another class action has been 
certified against the City and is still outstanding.87 
Again, there were preemptive arrests, baseless searches, baseless 
charges, and excessive detentions when St. Paul hosted the 2008 RNC. 
Journalists Amy Goodman and Sharif Abdel Kouddous, and producer 
Nicole Salazaar, were among those targeted by law enforcement when 
they were assaulted and arrested by law enforcement at the Convention. 
The journalists sued various agencies and the municipalities that cooper-
ated for this event, reaching a settlement that includes $100,000 in com-
pensation from the Minneapolis and St. Paul police departments as well 
as the Secret Service. There have been numerous other settlements for 
civil liberties violations by various agencies that policed the 2008 RNC. 
These include a settlement for $27,000 against the Ramsey County 
Sheriff ’s Department for confiscating the constitutionally protected liter-
ature of six individuals, a $50,000 settlement against the FBI and the City 
of Saint Paul for a preemptive raid they conducted on the home of vegan 
activists, and a $5,000 settlement for the wrongful arrest and detention 
of a man handing out leaflets in June to promote a rally that would take 
place during the RNC later that summer at the Xcel Center (the conven-
tion center that hosted the RNC in St. Paul).88 St. Paul, however, negoti-
ated a deal with the RNC host committee requiring the host committee 
to purchase insurance covering damages and legal costs for police accused 
of “brutality, violating civil rights, and other misconduct.”89 Considering 
that the host committee is funded by private donations, and the virtually 
unlimited flow of money on the part of corporations and wealthy indi-
viduals seeking to influence elections, any financial check through civil 
litigation against police abuse of force seems lost with this development.
Three investigations have also been launched to investigate the City 
of Pittsburgh for its handling of demonstrations when the city hosted the 
2009 G-20 meetings.90 The investigation of the Citizens Police Review 
Board was impeded, however, because of the refusal of police to release 
Neoliberalism and Violent Appearances 53
documents normally public, such as arrest reports.91 The ACLU of 
Pennsylvania filed a federal suit on behalf of those swept up in a mass 
arrest contending that they were falsely arrested and that the police used 
pepper spray and fired pepper balls unnecessarily and without provoca-
tion. At least three other cases have also been filed against the City of 
Pittsburgh and the United States Secret Service.92 In these four cases, the 
city of Pittsburgh was ordered to pay attorney fees to groups seeking to 
hold demonstrations in the city; it settled a second case by agreeing to 
pay $72,000 to a bystander whose hearing was permanently damaged by 
Pittsburgh’s deployment of an LRAD; the city settled a case by agreeing 
to pay $143,000 to two environmental groups whom the city persistently 
harassed, intimidated, and ultimately prevented from exercising their 
First Amendment rights; and the city of Pittsburgh has reached settle-
ments with some, though not all, plaintiffs who sued the city as a result of 
a mass arrest at the G-20 Summit.93 
The NYPD’s sometimes violent harassment of Occupy Wall Street! 
(OWS)—to say nothing of the harassment of the Occupy! movement 
across the country, most notoriously the Oakland Police Department’s 
attack on Occupy! protesters in Oakland—has resulted in several reports 
condemning police for violating the rights of protesters. It has also 
resulted in several settlements with the City of New York, and more likely 
to come in the future. These settlements include $50,000 in a case in 
which the NYPD arrested three individuals officers believed might attend 
a protest; $25,000 to a woman after she was booted to the head and hit 
with a baton on her shins; and the NYPD’s raid on OWS and its destruc-
tion of the OWS library has led to a $350,000 settlement.94 These sums 
are likely to increase dramatically once pending cases of those involved 
in a mass arrest on the Brooklyn Bridge, and cases involving those pepper 
sprayed and sucker punched, are resolved.
What are we to make of this pattern of repetitive abuse? After the shock 
and outrage over the way that police treated those who demonstrated in 
favor of civil rights in the 1960s, the policing of protest developed into 
a system described as “negotiated management.”95 With negotiated man-
agement, police keep open lines of communication with demonstrators, 
and public order is balanced by a recognition that protesters have consti-
tutional rights of assembly and speech in places known as “public fora.” 
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The use of force by police should only be considered as a last resort and 
should be proportionate to the threat. This is a model of policing based 
in tolerance, and social solidarity. Therefore, it can be understood as the 
institutional response to the outcry against acts of visible police brutality 
against demonstrators exercising their First Amendment rights. 
Beginning in the late 1990s, however, a pattern of police violence 
against non-violent demonstrators, particularly when the city is hosting 
a “mega-event,” has emerged. The system of negotiated management has 
been superseded. Police aggressively use violent tactics against demon-
strators, committees or boards conduct reviews and publish findings. 
Legal organizations like the ACLU or the Lawyer’s Guild issue reports. 
Cities are sued. And in a number of cases, the results of civil litigation 
involve significant financial awards to plaintiffs. Yet there is no “learning 
curve.” Instead, the acts of police violence are repeated. 
Why has the system of negotiated management been superseded? 
Some suggest that cities have become hypersensitive to any signs of dis-
order, and policing today reflects a “zero-tolerance” mentality generally 
toward any sign of disorder.96 This does not, however, explain certain 
“irrational,” excessive, or indeed expressive aspects to the contemporary 
policing of protest. Widely circulated examples of abuse, such as plain 
clothed NYPD officers driving scooters into groups of people to create 
chaos, “pop-up” plastic mesh pens trapping any who happen to be inside 
the mesh—protester or passerby, pro-active use of less lethal weaponry 
against non-violent demonstrators, and police departments not seem-
ing to care about the potential financial liabilities of these violent forms 
of policing (or having purchased insurance to protect against potential 
financial liabilities), indicate something more than an aversion to disor-
der is at work.97 
The normative value of human dignity and egalitarianism made 
possible the institutionalization of negotiated management within law 
enforcement. Today, police are expressing an affective antipathy to dem-
onstrations of support for human dignity and egalitarianism. In the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in the American South, pub-
lic torture lynching was a spectacle that expressed rebellion against the 
principles of equality, due process, and correctionalism—the principles 
of “modern” penology (the subject of Discipline and Punish) and social 
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democracy.98 More contemporary spectacles of police in riot gear seek-
ing to defeat political demonstrators exercising their right of assembly on 
behalf of a critique of the present expresses the weakening of the institu-
tionalization of the norms of human dignity and equality within police 
departments. It expresses angry resistance to how the people’s critique of 
present circumstances is the force of progress that deepens the actualiza-
tion of those norms today and with an orientation to futurity. This spec-
tacle of abusive policing may indicate an inability of the state to produce 
legitimacy for its policies resulting from a political embrace of neoliber-
alism. Without state concern for democratic legitimacy, this spectacle 
also manifests the collapse of faith in democratic progress immanent to 
neoliberalism.
When cities host mega-events, patterns of police violence against non-
violent demonstrators are repeated. We can diagnose how this repetition 
fails to incite collective outrage that could lead to reform. Let’s return to 
Martin Luther King, Jr.’s points three and four above. In the third point, 
King finds that Americans of conscience will see that police violence 
violates democratic norms and that they will demand policies to redress 
this gap between norms and police practices. In the fourth point, poli-
cymakers will feel the force of the norm, feel the force of public pressure 
to redress the conditions that contradict the norm, and feel compelled 
to sustain the norm by correcting the police practices that deviate from 
the norm. Conditions three and four, I suggest, are lacking today with 
the evisceration of disciplinary power institutionalizing Enlightenment 
and social democratic norms. With the communicative equivalence of all 
opinion, and reflexivity regarding the multiplicity of communicative pos-
sibility, the normative gaze of the generalized other becomes weakened, 
as does modernity’s meta-narrative of progress towards justice, human 
dignity, and democracy. 
Under contemporary conditions where norms pertinent to human 
dignity or democracy no longer seem to function as efficiently as they 
once did, a video of police violence now simply adds one more frame to 
be communicated. It may even become communicable through some-
one’s mashup. Contributing to communicative multiplicity, police release 
their own videos of clashes between police and protesters.99 They even 
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release their own mashups of their videos, selectively editing them to 
communicate a more favorable brand.100 
The upshot of this communicative multiplicity along a common 
denominator of communicability is, on the one hand, to cultivate a 
“whatever” responsiveness to videos communicating police violence. 
In this regard, we can appreciate some of the amusing commentary that 
some contribute to such circulating imagery, like the response to the 
viral photo of Occupy Portland’s Liz Nichols being pepper sprayed by 
Portland police directly into her open mouth written by “sixfingered”: 
“I bet buffalo wings don’t even phase [sic] her now!” As subjects have 
become reflexive about mashups, however, it is unsurprising that one 
suspiciously wonders whether the photo itself may have been doctored 
(the homepage manager of The Oregonian posted a response from the 
photographer stating that the photo was uncropped, untoned, and cer-
tainly not photoshopped, so it appeared exactly as it had coming out of 
the camera).101 
On the other hand, without normative standards to judge the prolif-
erating communication of potentially mashed up photography, the guide 
becomes one’s affective attachments. To take this line of reasoning fur-
ther, the communication of a photo or video in which police violence 
against demonstrators appears may not inspire outrage. Some enjoy the 
expression of police violence against demonstrators. As “Godhelpus” 
writes in the comment thread to the photo of Nichols, “Welcome to 
the liberal oregonian who along with the freak mayor empoyered [sic] 
this disgusting movement and filth…. Excellent pitcher [sic] of this 
liberal nut getting pepper sprayed when her mouth is wide open … 
[sic] I support our police department over any of these freaks.”102 Or as 
“Don Collier” writes with regard to the viral video of NYPD Deputy 
Inspector Anthony Bologna pepper spraying women at OWS who were 
already penned within orange netting on a sidewalk and therefore pos-
ing no threat at all: “These are common criminals [he is referring to the 
women being pepper sprayed]…. Do I enjoy watching these people suf-
fer? I revel in it.” After others criticize him for his “sick” enjoyment of the 
video, he responds, “I love it. Few things make me happier than pepper 
spray and protesters.”103 Don Collier exemplifies post-disciplinary affec-
tive attachments as he enjoys watching Bologna take revenge on those 
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exercising the rights of democracy to protest neoliberalism’s expropria-
tion of the people.
“Forbalance” sums up the contemporary moment in the comment 
thread accompanying the photo of the police pepper spraying Nichols 
in her mouth. “One thing I do like about the photo,” this person writes, 
“is that it can be interpreted in so many different ways…. Some can look 
at it and imagine police brutality, others can see someone’s daughter 
who became an idiot.” A video communicating police violence becomes 
another moment in the communication of communicability, a moment 
of reflexivity regarding communicative multiplicity, or a moment of 
enjoyment to revisit one’s affective attachments. It no longer reveals a 
wrong or inspires collective outrage.104 
Under the neoliberal conditions of communication of communica-
bility, a video communicating the spectacle of police violence merely 
appears. In a niche or zone. Like the protests. Some may affectively enjoy 
the abuses protesters endure at the hands of police. Some might mash it 
up. Others might forward the link. Or they might not. Whatever.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have re-traced a familiar argument that disciplinary 
power has become weaker, and that control technologies functioning 
through communication systems are displacing patterns of order pre-
mised on disciplinary power. Under the conditions of communicative 
capitalism, the normative gaze of the generalized other no longer func-
tions with the force it once did. Control increasingly operates indepen-
dently of the habits or “soul” of the subject—it operates through digital 
codes communicating with other digital codes. Under contemporary 
conditions of communicative capitalism, an experience of infinite com-
municative possibilities and the communicative equivalence of all opin-
ion indicate the loss of modernity’s meta-narrative of gradual progress 
realizing norms of human dignity and democracy. 
Under these conditions, First Amendment jurisprudence has become 
reshaped in a neoliberal form that allows a demonstration to be zoned to 
a location far from (or invisible to) what one seeks to protest. The neolib-
eral First Amendment is satisfied so long as demonstrators can “express” 
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themselves, producing communicative multiplicity without contradic-
tion. Homologous to this, repeated acts of police using excessive violence 
against demonstrators in news reports or captured on YouTube videos 
do not compel normative outrage or changes in police practices the way 
they did in the 1960s. The communication of police violence does not 
produce a sense of contradiction, or inspire public denunciation. It adds 
one more icon to communicative potential. Entering the universe that 
communicates communicability, it shares the common denominator of 
communicability with a funny yell or a remix of a tortured scream. That 
is, it merely appears like … whatever.
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Chapter 2
The Turn to Punishment
Racism, Domination, and the Neoliberal Era
Noah De Lissovoy
In this essay I consider the meaning and logic of the turn to punishment 
within the context of neoliberalism, and the hardening that this turn 
marks in the cultures of the criminal justice system, education, and pub-
lic discourse. I begin by examining two lines of investigation that have 
been especially productive in their analysis of this conjuncture: The first 
approach understands the contemporary turn toward punishment in the 
context of the dynamics and imperatives of capital accumulation—and 
specifically in terms of a return in the present to a strategy of enclosure; 
the second understands the carceral turn in terms of the history of bio-
politics and its regimes for organizing the order and coherence of society. 
I argue that these approaches are useful but incomplete, both in objec-
tive and subjective terms. In the first place, they are false to the persistent 
excess of repression in the present, which is characterized in each case by 
a structure of doubled or repeated violation. In addition, they overlook 
the analytical importance of accounts elaborated from the standpoint 
of lived experiences of injury and punishment. A consideration of these 
inadequacies suggests that prevailing political-economic and biopolitical 
accounts should be enlarged to include a contemporary phenomenology 
of domination and its complex dialectics of subjection and resistance. 
Starting from insights afforded by the historical Black radical tradition, 
and in particular the work of W.E.B. Du Bois, I argue that in order to ade-
quately make sense of the turn to punishment, and neoliberalism more 
broadly, we need to foreground the fact and logic of racism. In the first 
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instance, the legacy of racism can be understood as the secret determi-
nant of the carceral turn in neoliberal culture. Secondly, the process of 
active violation that the history of racism expresses, as well as the eman-
cipatory agency that persistently opposes it, point to key moments of a 
broader dialectics of domination. I argue that on the basis of this investi-
gation we can then recontextualize neoliberalism itself as a specific con-
juncture within this broader history and logic of domination, while at the 
same understanding more fully the carceral turn that ubiquitously char-
acterizes it.
Political Economy, Biopolitics, and the Punishing State
Discussions of the culture of neoliberalism have focused on two central 
processes or manifestations. The first of these is the experience of the 
overall process of privatization that characterizes the neoliberal moment. 
Neoliberalism aggressively privatizes public and collective spaces, rela-
tionships, and institutions. At the macro level, this means a terrific col-
onization of the world and lifeworld by capital, and the conversion of 
almost all moments of social life into moments of surplus extraction. 
Public discourse is increasingly yoked to the ideologeme of the free mar-
ket, which serves as the cover for underlying processes of class war from 
the top, financialization, and deregulation.1 At the micro level, as cultural 
theorists have shown, these basic structural shifts set in motion a frag-
mentation of social life and a reterritorialization of collective dilemmas 
and contradictions onto the impossible terrain of the individual and his 
or her “choices.”2 In this way, consumerism is not merely substituted for 
richer modes of social identity and relationship, but is even offered as 
the solution to existential problems. Likewise, genuine political delib-
eration is made obsolete, as the very space of citizenship fragments into 
the private spaces of online identities and networks, homeowners asso-
ciations, media preferences, and the like, leaving those who are excluded 
from the privileges of the market and its associations to the wilderness 
of the decaying and vestigial public and its neglected streets, schools, 
and communities. This process is essentially a recasting of social iden-
tity and experience in terms of the metastasizing logics of reification and 
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accumulation. In this domain we recognize ourselves only in the flat-
tened avatars we navigate through terrains of competition, consumption, 
and spectacle.
The second central expression of neoliberal culture that has been 
focused on by critics is the tendency toward authoritarianism, hyperdisci-
plinarity, and punishment in the state and civil society. Within this logic, 
networks of solidarity and obligations to the vulnerable are replaced by 
a culture of blame, externalization, and denial—as those who are unable 
or unwilling to market themselves or to be marketed, or who are selected 
as the target for the collective fears and dissatisfactions that accompany 
the atomization of public life, are subject to intimidation, violence, and 
incarceration. This process is the obverse of the businessification and 
privatization of society mentioned above—marking its dead zones and 
limits as well as the exclusions by which the successful neoliberal identity 
recognizes itself. The punishing state has been noted particularly in terms 
of the growth of the prison-industrial complex, the targeting of people 
of color by the criminal justice system, attacks on immigrants, and the 
demonization of youth.3 It is also represented globally in an empire of 
surveillance and discipline organized around the permanent assault on 
so-called “rogue” states and societies.4 It is familiar in the educational 
sphere in the form of heightened surveillance and security in schools, 
draconian disciplinary procedures, aggressive accountability systems 
which stigmatize and push out “low performing” students, and a general 
culture of accusation against students and teachers. 
It is the meaning and logic of this turn to punishment—this second 
essential tendency within the culture of neoliberalism—that I examine 
here. There have been two main lines of investigation that have been 
most productive in analyzing this tendency. Each of these is powerful 
and useful, and each has important drawbacks that we need to consider 
if we are to more fully understand and more effectively respond to the 
current moment. The first approach understands the turn toward pun-
ishment primarily in terms of the dynamics and imperatives of capital 
accumulation—that is, in terms of the social upheavals brought on by the 
recomposition of class struggle and political economy that neoliberalism 
represents. The second approach understands the carceral turn in society 
in terms of a reordering of the modes and intelligibility of power itself, 
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specifically in terms of the history of biopolitics and its regimes for orga-
nizing the order and coherence of society.
The first approach just mentioned understands the authoritarian tex-
ture of neoliberal society as essentially the effect of a more fundamental 
process of enclosure that characterizes the economic logic of the current 
moment. Grounded in Marx’s5 own analysis of the original appropria-
tions of communal space and resources that created the fund of wealth 
that allowed for the development of capitalism, this perspective recog-
nizes, in Harvey’s6 terms, a contemporary process of “accumulation by 
dispossession” which motivates a whole set of disciplinary interventions 
against poor and working people globally. Both the violent founding of 
capitalism as well as contemporary forms of plunder are explained as 
processes that underlie and make possible the normative order of capi-
tal—in both cases resources are appropriated essentially by force, and 
outside of the process of exchange, as a platform and entry point for the 
market proper and for familiar processes of capital reproduction. Within 
this overall process, the strong arm of the state does the disciplinary work 
that capital requires. As Marx describes, there are two key moments of 
this violence. The first is that which accompanies the original disposses-
sion of the population: the driving of people from the commons that has 
traditionally been theirs. The second moment of violence is the bending 
of bodies and wills to the new regime of accumulation—and the use of 
the state to police the political boundaries of this system.
In the case of education, the hardening of systems of assessment and 
discipline, and their obsessive indictment of the poor performance of 
students, teachers, and parents crucially accompanies an aggressive push 
for the privatization of the public school system. As capital moves to col-
onize a social sphere from which it has largely been excluded, it works at 
the same time (through state education policy) to disparage the moral 
and political claims of public school constituents on the spaces of schools 
and on the very meaning of education.7 This is a contemporary instance 
of the first moment of violence associated with the process of “accumula-
tion of dispossession” described above, in which traditional rights to the 
commons are outraged in the process of enclosure. The growth of the 
prison-industrial complex might then represent the second moment of 
assault, as those who have been made redundant (through the rationing 
76 Noah De Lissovoy
of educational credentials, downsizing, and attacks on social services) are 
pronounced guilty of the crime of their own dislocation and submitted 
to the discipline of the system of “corrections.”8 Capital by this means 
attempts both to destroy the possibility of resistance and, as it happens, 
to colonize and profit from another social domain traditionally con-
trolled by the state (the prison system).
An alternative to this political-economic analysis of the turn to pun-
ishment in neoliberalism, and the second influential approach to this 
problem, is focused less on the process of accumulation and more on 
the form and sense of power itself. Specifically, this second approach 
understands the turn toward state violence, hypercontrol, surveillance, 
and detention in terms of biopolitics and its form of rationality. Starting 
from Foucault’s9 insight into the centrality of the management of organic 
life—bodies and populations of bodies—to modern politics, critics like 
Agamben10 have identified the proliferating points of political decision 
on what and who deserves to live, on what is healthy and what is not, as 
the essence both of official totalitarianism and of state terror generally—
as for instance in the long history in so-called “democratic” societies of 
experiments in detention and torture, precisely at the edge of the law. In 
this zone of indistinction between public health and eugenics, biopolitics 
appears as often as not in the form of thanatopolitics—a politics in which 
population management takes the form of pathologization, violence and 
murder. The punishing state associated with contemporary neoliberalism 
would then represent the latest and most perfect expression of the satu-
ration of society by biopower, since in the present this logic appears to 
be at once globally projected (in the far-flung gulag of the US empire) 
and at the same time miniaturized into the substance of everyday life (for 
example in the pervasive stigmatization and medicalization of deviant 
identities and experiences).
From this perspective, and in contrast to the economic approach, 
the contemporary culture of punishment is not immediately identified 
with the demands of capital. At the same time, however, it is important 
to remember that Foucault11 identified the birth of biopolitics with the 
moment in which the bourgeoisie transposed the social antagonisms that 
were previously thought to fracture society (into irreconcilable races or 
classes) onto the interior of a unified political space and project. Thus, 
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histories of conflict and the notion of war itself, which were variously 
evoked by the aristocracy, the monarchy, and the emerging bourgeoi-
sie to ground their own rights and virtues were reinvented in the mod-
ern period as a criterion of administration—a biopolitical management 
of apparently organic antagonisms rather than a principle of political 
cleavage or outright war. So to the extent that biopolitics is identified 
with the triumph of bourgeois society, it is linked in the same moment 
to capitalism, and this nexus points to the logic of efficiency that power 
now projects throughout society and the economy. Furthermore, the 
connection between biopower and capitalism has been explored by 
theorists who have argued that it is precisely capital’s full-fledged emer-
gence onto the terrain of the biopolitical that marks the contemporary 
moment. For Hardt and Negri,12 the very reproduction of life and society 
has now become privileged terrain for the appropriation of surplus value. 
Neoliberalism might then be said to mark this merging: When capital 
becomes biopower it is no longer simply a political-economic category, 
but rather a figure that unites the political, cultural, social, and economic 
within one domain of force (a domain that these authors call “empire”). 
The biopolitical analysis of the carceral turn in neoliberal culture 
illuminates the logic by which exercises in injury and violation are per-
sistently rationalized as humane, scientific, and efficient. Thus, between 
sessions of torture, the dietary preferences of “enemy combatants” in 
detention centers are apparently respected. In the US, private prisons 
are marketed to cities as crucial anchors of community and as means to 
livelihood for prospective employees. To take another example, racial 
profiling, within the logic of biopower, is represented as the activity of a 
fantastic intelligence, operating powerfully and beneficently behind the 
scenes to discover threats to public safety according to algorithms more 
sensitive—in a changed landscape—to the complex tensions between 
privacy and security than the old rationales. Understanding contempo-
rary cultures of punishment in terms of biopolitics allow us to recognize 
the impulses to population management, purification, and production 
that live, horrifically, within them.
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Gaps and Impasses: Excess, Experience, and Subjection
The approaches that I have described above to understanding the turn in 
the neoliberal moment toward a culture of punishment are important and 
useful. Nevertheless, I believe that they also suffer from some significant 
inadequacies. They are incomplete both in objective terms (i.e. in their 
account of the social logic governing the carceral turn) and in subjective 
terms (i.e. in their sense of the importance of experiences of injury and 
punishment). Furthermore, they do not account for the persistent excess 
and doubleness of domination. I believe that these inadequacies suggest 
the need for an analytic that is more than narrowly economic or politi-
cal in its approach to this question; or rather, that the political and eco-
nomic accounts we give should be enlarged to include a phenomenology 
of domination in contemporary context. As I describe below, this means 
in the first instance a confrontation with the fact and meaning of racism, 
and second, an extrapolation of the lessons learned from this investiga-
tion toward a broader theory of domination. The punishing state within 
neoliberalism can then be contextualized within this richer framework. 
To begin with, however, it is important to explain the shortcomings of 
the analyses I have described above.
In the first place, these accounts do not fully respond to the excess that 
characterizes the turn toward a security state and a culture of punishment. 
In this brave new world, the intensification of punishment means not just 
increased detention, but also the invention of new and exceptional cat-
egories of detainees (e.g. “enemy combatants”); not just the mainstream-
ing of torture, but also the production of a technical discourse which 
assaults the possibility of an ethical response (e.g. “enhanced interroga-
tion”); not just the increased surveillance of communities of color and 
their recruitment into the prison system, but also a brutal coarsening of 
the conditions of incarceration (e.g. “supermax” facilities, or trying youth 
offenders as adults). In education, not only are working class students 
consigned to underfunded and poorly resourced schools, but in addi-
tion, they are made responsible for the system’s own failures by means of 
the ideological apparatus of standardized assessment and accountability 
systems.13 In all of these cases, there is not merely a hardening of condi-
tions, but a double or repeated hardening, according to a logic in which 
the pathologization of vulnerable populations becomes the ground for 
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further assaults. In this regard, the cultural turn toward punishment in 
the current moment corresponds to the qualitative shift, in the economy, 
from vanilla capitalism to the neoliberal economy proper (we might call 
it “enhanced capitalism”)—an economic moment characterized not just 
by increased exploitation, but by outright abandonment; and not just by 
colonization of the public by the private, but by efforts to dismantle the 
public sphere altogether. 
This excess of assault does not easily cohere with the theories of 
accumulation and biopolitics described earlier. The first—political-
economic—approach to understanding this turn that I described above 
makes sense of it in instrumental terms as the essential tool for facilitat-
ing and consolidating dispossession. This view understands state vio-
lence and the culture that supports it as instruments for terrorizing peo-
ple into accepting the terms of capital and its encroachments.14 However, 
this account seems less than convincing in the ubiquitous cases in which 
the intensification of repression in fact increases resistance. Thus, with 
regard to what we might call the global culture of empire, detainee abuse, 
drone attacks, and targeted assassinations seem to be aimed as much at 
producing chaos and destabilization as they are at consolidating politi-
cal and economic interventions. Furthermore, the economic explana-
tion misses the structure of affective intensities and investments, or the 
organization of pleasures, that punishment mobilizes. The hardening 
in the criminal justice system, public discourse, and elsewhere exceeds 
itself as mere repression and invents unprecedented terrains, for the pow-
erful, for experimentation in injury. If there is a logic at work here, it is 
not only an instrumental one, but also a logic of domination proper; we 
might say that what these processes partly reveal is precisely a for-itself 
of domination.
From the perspective of the second—biopolitical—account of con-
temporary carceral culture that I described above, state violence in the 
modern period is described as an extrapolation of biopower, in which 
its extended dominion over life is proven in widening circles of murder, 
eventually directed almost against society as a whole in the cases of colo-
nialism and genocide.15 However, while they understand the operation 
of power and its contemporary assaults in more than instrumental terms, 
accounts starting from the notion of biopower also assimilate the effects 
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of power to a social rationality that is removed from the materiality and 
experience of violence. Racism, for instance, though it is an important 
category in these analyses, cannot be understood adequately without 
building from the experience of its assaults and from the vantage point of 
its targets. But Foucault16 aims to do away with the apparatus of oppres-
sors and targets—of power operating on or against persons (as opposed 
to constructing them). The genealogy that he traces contextualizes 
power’s innovations within the development of historical knowledge of 
war; biopower represents the application of the bourgeois reinvention of 
this problematic as one of public health, of internal war against society’s 
enemies. In the process, however, the lived experience of domination, 
its existential meaning and reality, are abstracted from—both histori-
cally and in the present neoliberal moment. Understood as a discursive 
management of differences, power’s concrete injuries to persons are de-
emphasized, or at least these do not constitute the vantage point from 
which to determine its essential meaning.
I believe that in order to understand power in the present, and its 
application in punishment and repression, we need to move toward a 
conceptualization of a logic of domination proper—beyond the theories 
of accumulation and biopower that I have described. First, the excess of 
punishment in the present makes it more than an instrument for guar-
anteeing the unobstructed accumulation and reproduction of capital. 
Second, in constructing a phenomenology of domination, the impor-
tance of starting analytically from the standpoint of those who have suf-
fered from its ravages means that power cannot be understood merely as 
a strategy at the level of knowledge, as a regime of truth for modernity. 
Power, as domination, sticks to subjects, enrolling them into a complex 
dialectics that we cannot understand without the notions of repression 
and oppression, of perpetrators and targets. We need to start from an 
analysis that takes this phenomenology of subjection and injury, and its 
structure of excess, fundamentally into account. In this way we can better 
understand the meaning of the contemporary punishing state and we can 
also begin to build a more general account of domination.
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The Logic of Racism and the Carceral Turn
The crucial starting point, I believe, for building an analysis that is sensi-
tive to the central aspects of domination I have mentioned, is a consider-
ation of racism. The history of racism shows clearly the surplus that char-
acterizes power as domination. The analytic tradition that starts from 
the experiences of those who have suffered from racism also reveals in 
this history the materialization of power in contests between subjects—
a concrete theater of subjugation—and in the same moment, the pos-
sibility of resistance and emancipation. Furthermore, I argue that the 
dynamics of racism illuminate the meaning of contemporary repression 
as a whole; this can allow us to understand what is perhaps unique in the 
current conjuncture and what is not, and to build outward toward a more 
general theory of domination and a more useful understanding of neolib-
eralism. Specifically, I argue that racism constitutes the secret ingredient 
in the carceral turn in neoliberal culture, accounting in the first instance 
for its structure of overdetermination; at the same time, neoliberalism 
represents the moment of a tendential generalization of this excessive-
ness across society, which points to a logic of domination proper at work 
in society that is distinct from (though linked to) the economic and bio-
political logics described above.
While the approaches I have discussed above do consider race and 
racism, their understanding of these phenomena is distorted by their 
focus on the imperatives and experiences of elites—on regimes of gov-
ernmentality and surplus extraction. By contrast, an approach to this 
problem that starts from the standpoint of the targets of racism can pro-
vide a richer picture of racism’s force and meaning—the range of its reg-
isters, and the form of its organization in concrete action.17 In the first 
instance, an attention to racism in the context of the neoliberal con-
juncture has two uses: 1) it exposes the contemporary punishing state 
as in fact essentially racist, and this racism as its secret determination; 
2) it points to a dialectics of violation that has been historically consis-
tent, and which can serve as a model for understanding the principle of 
excess within domination more generally. Anchoring this investigation 
in an antiracist standpoint, and in a perspective informed by the experi-
ence of racism’s ravages, means that the analysis of domination cannot be 
exhausted through reference to a governing rationality or regime of truth, 
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but rather should always be connected to and refer back to lived histories, 
and to the unreason that characterizes domination as existential fact. In 
this analytical effort, the historical Black radical tradition, and the work 
of W.E.B. Du Bois18 in particular, is an indispensable resource.
In the first place, I have described above how prevailing approaches 
to understanding the culture of punishment in the neoliberal moment 
fail to account for its essential excess. However, if we recognize that this 
punishing culture is fundamentally linked to a familiar logic in the his-
tory of the US—the logic of racism—then its excesses do not seem so 
novel. Angela Davis19 makes a compelling case that the preservation of 
the system of capital punishment and the growth of the prison-industrial 
complex represent a continuation in the present of the legacy of slavery 
and its exceptional juridical system. She argues not only that prisons 
function to preserve racism as system and structure, but also that they 
are the repository of the absolutely authoritarian form of juridical power 
inherited from slavery. Slaves had essentially no rights in the face of the 
law and its threats of violence; it is likewise toward the limit of this abso-
lute authority and violence that contemporary legal and carceral systems 
tend. In addition, while Black people and other people of color are dis-
proportionately the targets of the system’s excesses, nevertheless Whites 
also partly suffer from its fundamental exceptionality and irrationality. 
(The distinction between this analysis of exceptionality and the biopolit-
ical one should be clear: while racism for Agamben is a central expression 
of the zone of indistinction between fact and law at the heart of Western 
sovereignty and authoritarianism, for Davis racism is the crucial source of 
this authoritarianism.)
If we start from this insight, then the double hardening, described 
earlier, that characterizes the turn to punishment in the present might be 
understood as stemming directly from the intensification of repression 
already produced by racism. In other words, the rationale for an excep-
tional system of detention that suspends basic rights of due process (in 
the cases, for example, of both undocumented immigrants and terror-
ism suspects) is already given by racist law. That is, the system of assaults 
that was engineered in the context of the history of oppression of Black 
people and other people of color in this country is now being applied 
on new terrain.20 Another way to understand racism as determining the 
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contemporary carceralization of politics and culture is to recognize its 
persistent focus on people of color, even in the moment of globaliza-
tion—so that once again Brown folks, those perceived for instance to be 
Muslims or immigrants—are the targets around which the innovations 
of the legal system are organized, and whose persecution (in a racist cul-
ture) becomes the rationale for suspensions of democratic rights and 
processes. The doubleness of domination, from this perspective, is not 
exactly the effect of a new discipline required by a new regime of accu-
mulation, or the extension of the paradigm of the “camp” to society gen-
erally, as Agamben21 argues, but rather the familiar doubleness of racial 
domination and White supremacy, now writ large for the global era, and 
for its new terrains of racialization.
Secondly, analyzing the logic of excess expressed in the historical 
dynamics of racism can serve as an entry point to a general theory of 
domination as a distinct historical and social principle. Du Bois shows 
that racism has comprised not merely the limitation of opportunities, but 
in addition has always been an active assault.22 Thus, the guarantee and 
secret determination of the order of unequal rights represented by Jim 
Crow was the active terrorization of Black people by the Klan and by the 
state. Racism as a social logic has always been manifold, opportunistic, 
and enveloping—an attack and intimidation on all fronts, expressing a 
logic of terror rather than simply discrimination. In analyzing the coun-
ter-revolution of Whites in the South against Reconstruction, Du Bois 
describes a generalized assault that was simultaneously political, cultural, 
psychological, economic, physical, and juridical. Not only were Blacks 
denied the right to vote, they were also forced into a caste system that 
marked them as inferior in every interaction with Whites. And not only 
were they forced to identify psychologically and spiritually with this sys-
tem, but they also suffered physically from the sickness that this assault 
encouraged, and which economic exploitation and marginalization also 
produced. Racism, from this perspective, has always been a logic of vio-
lation in addition to a process of subordination23 —a bitter contest in 
which the oppressors have struggled not merely to prevail against the 
oppressed but even to break them, and to make them responsible for 
their own misery.
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The assault represented by racism has been active, unresting, and 
willful—not simply required of Whites but enjoyed by them, a system 
of injury that includes but also exceeds the effects of a political or eco-
nomic strategy. Even as systemic and structural, the logic of racist viola-
tion cannot be made sense of outside of the domain of the subject, and 
the subjective struggle for and against domination—and for the plea-
sures of domination. This means attending to the persistence of a sub-
jective dialectics in racism, which acts underneath as well as within the 
structural system of racism.24 For example, not only does the rage of the 
police against Black people shore up a structure of material privileges for 
Whites; conversely, a racist culture facilitates the subjective expression of 
and experimentation with cruelty against people of color by police and 
others. Racism is in this way at once motivated and desired. Contrary to 
the argument of Foucault,25 racism thus preserves a form of sovereignty 
associated with what he called a “subject-to-subject cycle” and which he 
describes as being rendered obsolete by modernity and its logics of disci-
plinarity and normalization. 
By the same token, this persistent dialectics points also to the integ-
rity of the subjugated, and to the possibility of emancipation. As Du 
Bois26 describes, in spite of the outrages visited upon them, Black people 
after the Civil War nevertheless survived and often thrived, persistently 
thwarting the demoralization and destruction prepared for them by 
the resurgent White South. And perhaps this human irreducibility, this 
refusal to submit, provokes after all the extremity of repression. Power 
in this way is doubly enraged—enraged at the audacity of the claims of 
those who have been constructed as inferior, and enraged again at their 
refusal to be broken. The agency and humanity of the oppressed, even 
within the depths of violence, inhabits immanently the logic of domi-
nation as its necessary obverse. The recognition of this agency, and the 
possibility of emancipation that it points to, is a crucial advantage of the 
existentially grounded work of Du Bois, and of the antiracist tradition 
generally, as against a biopolitical analysis for which the contradictions 
of sovereignty remain internal to power as a matrix of intelligibility. In the 
biopolitical framework, subjects dissolve into temporary effects, and in 
this way remain complicit and coincident with power, rather than being 
acted upon or against.
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Power, Domination, and the Neoliberal Era
From this perspective, the punishing state accompanying the neoliber-
alization of the economy is not a new formation. It is the familiar face 
of power as racism, which has long oppressed and repressed communi-
ties of color in the US. In its extrapolation to the complex landscape of 
globalization, it nevertheless builds on a constant repertoire of strategies 
and tactics for domination, tested over time on Black and Brown peo-
ple in the US. Indeed, the current cultural turn points to the urgency of 
attending to histories of race and racial domination in analyzing power. 
However, while the novelty of the neoliberal moment conceals a familiar 
history of racial oppression, what is peculiar to the current conjuncture is 
the extension of the logic of domination to new social domains. 
In education, for instance, the culture of blame has reached a fever 
pitch; the vituperation against teachers, schools, and communities now 
threatens to destroy the public system altogether. In this sphere, a stigma-
tization that had been reserved for students of color has been inflamed 
to the point that it touches on public schooling more generally, and, one 
is tempted to say, even on the prospect of education itself—to the extent 
that dominant reorganizations of teaching and curriculum aim to do 
away with the very possibility of real inquiry and learning. This is part of a 
larger pattern in neoliberalism noted by David Theo Goldberg,27 in which 
the government itself (as social service provider and agent of affirmative 
action) is read as Black, and becomes the target of racist resentment and 
suspicion. But one could also understand this process as a ramification 
of the repressive moment in racism toward a more general war against 
society. In this way, racism becomes the starting point for a generalized 
assault on public life. 
I would like to suggest that if analyzing contemporary politics and 
culture under neoliberalism in terms of regimes of accumulation and 
biopower is useful but still inadequate, as I have argued, then we need to 
begin to sketch the outlines of what I would call a regime of domination, 
identified most closely with the experience of racism, but perhaps not 
exhausted by it. Contemporary neoimperialism, authoritarian culture, 
and state violence all point to a generalization of this regime, in a way that 
crucially articulates the logic of capital to the histories and repertoires of 
racism. On the one hand, crises of accumulation and their aftershocks 
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have clearly precipitated a class offensive against working people (while 
also not seeming to fully account for the intensity of repression);on the 
other hand, a familiar racist culture reemerges in disguise in contempo-
rary forms of the repressive state apparatus (while also extending beyond 
its familiar forms to touch the organization of public life in a new way). In 
this context, the notion of domination, dusted off and recalibrated, might 
be a name for this point of intersection and combination.
Such a conceptualization would be motivated in part by a sensitiv-
ity to the crucial moment of unreason in contemporary politics and cul-
ture. As I have described, it is a stretch to calculate the current forms and 
intensity of repression as a simple effect of capital’s accumulative drive, 
or to understand them solely as an expression of contradictions within 
the realms of knowledge or discourse. At the same time, the very mate-
riality of domination, its embeddedness in the historical antagonisms 
of racism and exploitation, argues against any metaphysical notion of 
power. Domination is an entirely historical force and project the subject 
of which, however, we have not yet fully traced and recognized. This ten-
sion can be seen clearly in Du Bois’ Black Reconstruction in America,28 
which generally aims to narrate the history of racism as an expression of 
the dynamics of capitalist development, and yet which at its most vivid 
moments points beyond this analysis to a dominative force that makes 
racism, after all, irreducible to class struggle.29 On the other hand, as Du 
Bois consistently suggests, racism itself, looked at closely, points behind 
the superficial commonplaces of race to a different and more fundamen-
tal theater of power. 
Decolonial theorists have argued that Western culture, epistemology, 
and politics are shaped at the source by the impulse to conquest, and that 
a society not governed by the imperatives of war will have to start from a 
foundation that comes from outside the West and its traditions.30 While 
this perspective may too easily separate and reify the West and the rest, I 
believe that only a project that takes on these first principles of being and 
thinking will be able to expose the logic of domination that the neoliberal 
moment has so terribly multiplied. Focusing on the notion of domina-
tion may usefully challenge the narrow economic and political emphasis 
that the term “neoliberalism” itself tends to reinforce, and instead point 
to the complex interpenetration of these spheres with those of culture 
The Turn to Punishment 87
and spirit as well. After all, familiar critical analyses crucially point to a 
process of violation that nevertheless remains unexplicated in terms of 
its own particular structure. For example, the notion of “accumulation by 
dispossession”31 explains the appropriation of collectively held land and 
resources by capitalists, but does not convincingly start from the human 
suffering and response that accompanies this process, not as its mere 
effect but as part of its central meaning.
In state violence, and in the public cultures of racism and xenophobia 
that accompany it, the psychical and spiritual investment in domination 
not only supports elites but determines them as well—making of power 
a kind of total and enraged subject of the social. This logic of domination 
is always beyond itself as mere hegemony, essentially reckless with regard 
to its own self-preservation. In this way, the point of racial profiling or 
efforts to restrict the access of immigrants to public services is not only 
to protect the privileges of elites but also and equally to injure those who 
are vulnerable, those who are offered as targets for the drive and need 
for domination. The turn to punishment in the neoliberal conjuncture 
would then represent a moment of liberation for power as domination, 
an awakening to the possibilities of its rage. In neoliberalism, power and 
capital reach beyond mere subordination and exploitation, and grow into 
themselves as principles of violation. 
Proposing the notion of domination as a framework for understand-
ing neoliberal politics and culture may seem like a theoretical retreat, 
to the extent that it pries this moment loose from the frameworks that 
have most particularly addressed it. However, the contemporary analytic 
of domination that I have sketched here is not undefined. Rather, it is 
characterized by several key aspects that I have highlighted above: 1) it 
connects the economic and the political, and thus articulates an analysis 
of capital to an analysis of power, including biopower; 2) it reveals the 
simultaneity of the objective and subjective, pointing to the coincidence 
of structural and individual effects; 3) it exposes power as characterized 
by an essential surplus expressed in the doubleness of its operation and 
intensity; 4) it includes within its dialectic the fact of resistant agency, as 
the object of power’s rage and as the remainder it can never overwhelm; 
5) it points to the present unfolding of domination across the length of 
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the global, as it is given increasingly free reign within contemporary pro-
cesses of carceralization, privatization, and permanent war.
Political work has to begin from a witnessing of domination, in its 
fullness and complexity, rather than from easy explanations that seek to 
exorcise it. The impulse to act which founds political praxis comes after 
all from this attention rather from a final knowledge of reasons and deter-
minations. Frantz Fanon’s32 writing on colonial society and anticolonial 
resistance, for instance, takes the form of a complexification of analy-
sis that is also an interrogation of given critical accounts. His specific 
description of colonial racism is achieved by means of a critique of the 
failure of available critical knowledges (Marxism, psychoanalysis, and 
philosophy) to fully respond to its dynamics. What he leaves us with is 
a fuller description of power, and also an ethical demand that starts from 
and points to its ultimate unreason—an exposure of the murderousness 
of the exalted “humanism” of Europe, and an argument for a different and 
more authentic humanism. In the same way, as he challenges the erasure 
of the Black experience in dominant US historiography, Du Bois33 implic-
itly confronts the failure of Marxism to start from experiences of racism 
in conceptualizing the inner principle of historical oppression. I believe 
that to respond to these theoretical challenges is to foreground the prob-
lem and phenomenology of domination, as a problematic that links race 
to capital and points beyond both, a category that is at once material and 
existential.34 If this means taking a step back from the most fashionable 
approaches to power in contemporary theory, and a step towards the still 
incomplete (and still revolutionary) projects of the thinkers that I have 
just mentioned, so be it. 
These antiracist and anticolonial traditions offer an essential starting 
point for making sense of power in the present, and their analyses can 
be extended to respond to the particular moment of neoliberalism, and 
in particular to the turn to punishment in culture and politics that I have 
highlighted in this essay. The global reach of this trend, its colonization of 
almost all domains of social life, and the new forms of counter-subject it 
produces all have to be imaginatively reckoned with. Familiar democratic 
and critical rhetorics that emphasize engaged citizenship, voice, and ide-
ology critique are important, but they also need to be reconfigured to 
address a process of assault that is as much immanent and ontological as 
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it is “political” or “cultural” in the ways we are accustomed to. The global 
racism of neoliberalism, for instance, acts directly on beings and bod-
ies through forms of surveillance, interrogation and detention, as much 
as through the ideological work of constructing friends and enemies. 
Likewise, the subject of resistance has to be recognized as irreducibly 
present even in these occupied and injured beings and bodies as an onto-
logical fact and horizon, rather than only in the overtly political moments 
of organized protest.35 The biopolitical analysis of contemporary strug-
gles over “bare life” is an important starting point in this regard, but it has 
to be supplemented by a recognition of the agency that is always present 
and stirring within the pulsating targets of power. The biopolitical proj-
ect of reducing human being to mere existence ultimately fails in fact, as 
human beings persistently assert their presence and survival in the face of 
injury. In this context, a radically humanist commitment should take the 
form of an urgent responsiveness to the irreducible agency and emanci-
patory minimum that lives within and against power’s extended assaults.
Conclusion
For educators and cultural workers, these reflections suggest that it is 
important to help students and others to make connections between 
their own experiences and broader social processes without attempting 
to explain these experiences away, or to substitute official critical analy-
ses for vernacular understandings. In schools, it is important to analyti-
cally connect the turn toward punitive forms of so-called accountability, 
hyperdiscipline, and the blurring of the line between school administra-
tion and law enforcement to larger processes of carceralization in global 
society.36 However, the notion of domination that I have described 
here brings together a range of modalities of power, including exploita-
tion, normalization, marginalization, and violence; discovering the links 
between these processes and the broader logic they point to involves 
working organically from the standpoint of those affected. Thus, recent 
walkouts by high school students in the Southwest have creatively con-
nected protest against national anti-immigrant politics and the criminal-
ization of youth to struggles for critical and culturally relevant pedagogy. 
These protests have crucially called out the racism that operates at the 
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heart of mainstream educational policy while connecting it to issues of 
colonialism, demonization of youth, and economic oppression. This 
creative and synthetic impulse, which precisely uncovers the complex 
contours of domination in the neoliberal moment, challenges the nar-
rowness of prevailing analyses in education scholarship, which tend to 
understand inequities and oppression in terms of isolated principles of 
ideological hegemony or racialization.37 
In addition, critical pedagogy and critical theory generally should 
learn to recognize the irreducible agency that lives within individuals and 
communities, including students, even in the face of oppression.38 At the 
level of theory, this means resisting the tendency of both structuralism 
and poststructuralism to absorb subjects, as mere effects, into exhaustive 
accounts of society. At the level of praxis, this means a refusal of fatalism 
and cynicism, not out of mere progressive virtue, but rather because fatal-
ism and cynicism are false to the truth of the ubiquitous fact and potential 
of emancipation. Critical pedagogy and theory have often described this 
potential as initiated by the intervention of the teacher or leader39; it is 
important now to recalibrate our sense of the function of critical teaching 
to see that it interacts with subjects that are always active and in motion 
(however constrained by power at the same time), and always propos-
ing, incipiently, their own refusals of the logic of domination. Popular 
and digital youth cultures, for instance, should not be derided as signs of 
an escapist orientation, but rather recognized as experiments in organiz-
ing alternative social and political communities, as we have seen in dra-
matic fashion in the uprisings of the Arab Spring. In this context, critical 
pedagogy should be reimagined as more profoundly collaborative with 
students and young people, and their autonomous interventions, rather 
than as leading the charge of critique and praxis.
Neoliberalism names a doctrine and tendency within the capitalist 
economy as well as a broader social process. However, my analysis of the 
turn to punishment in culture and politics in the present moment shows 
the limits of identifying the set of narrowly economic imperatives associ-
ated with neoliberalism as the essence of the current conjuncture. Instead, 
analyzing the current hardening of conditions in the areas of criminal jus-
tice, education, and public life from an antiracist perspective sensitive to 
the continuity between these contemporary formations and historical 
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racisms exposes a larger and persistent problematic of domination as a 
more useful matrix for understanding power. From this perspective, the 
turn to punishment in the neoliberal moment, if we can understand the 
latter term now in a larger sense, does not so much name the invention of 
new repressions and assaults—which are generally familiar from the his-
tory of racial subjugation—as it does their amplification and extension. 
In fact, the contemporary carceralization of society and the proliferating 
violence of neoimperialism indicate the metastasis of this process, and 
point to the urgency of tracing the shape of domination as an overarching 
logic. This logic, however, can only be deciphered through a collective 
effort and from the complex standpoint of all those who suffer from it. 
When this collective emancipatory project asserts itself, calling the bluff 
of domination and its claims to exhaust the truth and potentialities of 
social life, then a different space begins tentatively to appear—a whole, 
healing, and democratic space for which we do not yet even know the 
proper name.
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Chapter 3
Neoliberalism, Environmentality, 
and the Specter of Sajinda Khan
Robert P. Marzec
Two influential books were published in 1962: Rachel Carson’s Silent 
Spring and Milton Friedman’s Capitalism and Freedom. Friedman’s poli-
cies of an unregulated market economy, economic individual rights, 
and a limited government have become the defining structure of plan-
etary development for the course of the last thirty years. From the 
Reagan-Thatcher, then Clinton and Blair eras in the US and the UK; to 
the Hawke-Keating governments in Australia; to the Pinochet dictator-
ship in Chile; to Yeltsin in Russia; to Xiaoping in China, to Chrétien and 
others in Canada; and to nations in Europe, Africa, Latin America and 
elsewhere, neoliberalism is now the decisive planetary organizational 
force. The negative effects of the so-called Chicago School have been 
well documented.1 Constituted as an exceptionalist, end-of-history para-
digm, its radical rejection of critical alternatives ushered in what Žižek 
has aptly termed the “post-political” era.2 On the other end of the spec-
trum, Rachel Carson’s text ushered in a new critical awareness of eco-
logical concern. The publication of her indictment of pesticides had a 
galvanizing effect, helping to generate an environmental movement that 
has expanded from the focus on chemicals toxins to various disciplinary 
efforts in the academy, and the increasingly comprehensive field of “eco-
criticism” in my own field of literary studies. For the past five decades, 
these two areas of human production and concern have developed in a 
relatively autonomous fashion, although many environmentalists have 
been making the connection between capitalist economic policies and 
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the destruction of specific environments. During this time, capitalism 
proceeded apace without any serious consideration for ecological con-
cerns; conservatives, moderates, and libertarians tended to eschew, if not 
condemn outright, leftist and liberal pleas for a more sustainable lifestyle 
(barring the kind of lip-service found in green-friendly corporate adver-
tising campaigns and institutionalized forms of environmentalism such 
as recycling and shop-for-a-better world entrepreneurship). This ostrich-
like relationship on the part of neoliberals to the clear scientific evidence 
of global warming has begun to radically change in recent years—signal-
ing, against its own structural desire, the logical self-destructive end of its 
essential character, and perhaps the first glimpse of the coming of the end 
of a monocratic economic paradigm. 
That change can be defined as a new awareness of ecological necessity 
or eco-empiricism, one that has begun to draw attention away from eco-
nomic production and development towards matters of national security. 
This eco-empiricism, as we shall see, is not the form of empiricism typi-
cally deployed to mount a convincing argument. As I will develop in this 
essay, it should more properly be understood as a new type of reproduc-
tive machine, one energized by state, military, and scientific authorities 
buttressing their activities on the futural event of environmental catastro-
phe. I define this machine’s consumption of environmental catastrophe, 
specifically the event of climate change now under way, through the use 
of two critical theoretical terms: “environmentality” and “the Accidental” 
(which I will define in detail below). Environmentality, in turn, is the 
force now confronting the neoliberal State, and it is beginning to trans-
form this reigning state formation into a new, more complex political 
apparatus: a formation I will call the Accidental State.
The stakes of unsustainable practices have changed since the pub-
lication of both Carson’s and Friedman’s works. The event of planetary 
climate change has globalized regional ecological concerns. Capitalism 
began, as I have argued elsewhere, in conjunction with an essential 
transformation in the human-ecological nexus. From its beginnings, 
it defined itself in opposition to Feudalism—specifically in terms of a 
“freeing” of the individual from the drudgery of the land (serfdom). The 
structure of this freedom was made possible through the national, then 
global, expansion of the enclosure movement, which turned a communal 
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and a sustainable (subsistence) relationship to the environment into an 
entrepreneurial enterprise by privatizing land. Once ecosystems were 
privatized, nature became a source or “energy,” on object needing to be 
“improved” and thus challenged to produce a “high yield,” to use the old 
discourse of enclosure terminology). From its beginnings, Capitalism 
has depended for its existence and development on the establishment of 
an injurious relationship to nature. As individual entrepreneurship and 
national aspirations become more competitive, the relationship to nature 
becomes increasingly abusive. Planetary climate change is the logical self-
destructive conclusion of this economic form of anthropocentric devel-
opment, revealing what capitalism looks like on the brink.
In 1988, the United Nations organizations of the World Meteorological 
Association and the United National Environment Program created 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)—a body of 
thousands of scientists voluntarily working to address the risk of plan-
etary climate change in order to provide information for policymakers. 
In 2007, the United Nations (IPCC) released its fourth in a series of 
climate change reports. Entitled Climate Change 2007 and known offi-
cially as “The Fourth Assessment Report,” the document is the product 
of 500 authors and the scrutiny of 2000 expert reviewers, representing 
over 50 nations and over a dozen international organizations. It confirms 
that global warming is “unequivocal,” and that it is the result primarily 
of human activities, with the greatest output of greenhouse gases occur-
ring between 1970 and 2004 (a 70 percent increase since pre-industrial 
times).3 The report was produced, in part, to give concrete authoritative 
advice to the international body established to address global warm-
ing—the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. 
(The Framework Convention is the same body that produced the “Kyoto 
Protocol” in 1997.) Many of its projections are grim: by 2020 some 75 
to 250 million people in Africa will be “be exposed to increased water 
stress”; in some African countries agricultural yields maybe be reduced 
by 50 percent; “water security” will intensify in southern and eastern 
Australia and New Zealand and water resources will decrease in sec-
tions of Africa, Asia, Europe, and elsewhere; agricultural yields in Latin 
American will be compromised; by mid century the eastern Amazonia 
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forest will become a savanna; and there will be a significant loss of biodi-
versity in key geographical regions (such as the Great Barrier Reef). 
One would think that such a report would have a profound effect 
on the ruling administration of social matters, not to mention public 
consciousness (and here I speak mostly of the economic policies of the 
neoliberal North and West). Even so, the majority of governing political 
structures and social discourses continue to thwart real efforts to legislate 
new environmentally-friendly policies—in part a symptom of the end-of-
history, post-political age. The rhetoric of the report itself makes this clear. 
Despite the fact that the report describes itself as a “remarkable achieve-
ment,” the product of “enthusiastic” and “dedicated” scientists devoted to 
providing scientific information to policy makers, it is also consciously 
framed by a series of enunciations emphasizing its apolitical nature—
statements designed to alleviate any anxiety that the conclusions drawn 
and the suggestions made for policy makers might be contaminated by 
any particular political agenda. Moreover, the IPCC describes itself on its 
home page as an organization that produces information that is “policy-
relevant” yet also “policy-neutral” and therefore “never policy-prescrip-
tive.”4 The standard scientific approach to such statements is to read them 
as non-political, in the sense of non-partisan—they are the result of the 
objective, and clearly important fact-oriented work of the scientist. The 
self-evident nature of the report means that it does not succumb to the 
limitations of any particular ideological vision of human ordering; it tran-
scends all ideological agendas. The IPCC speaks to nations across the 
planet about the environmental crisis, now clearly visible as a worldwide 
phenomenon. It urges governments to work together. Academic theori-
zations of the political teach us to critique this apolitical emphasis. Such 
disclaimers, for instance, can be seen as reflecting a metaphysical neutral-
ity that is ultimately too transcendental to speak to any particular nation, 
and any particular ecological problem (for instance, the problem of shore 
erosion in small islands in the Pacific and the problem of changing pat-
terns in rainfall in North America cannot be handled in the same man-
ner). Moreover, suggesting that “facts” have little to do with the business 
of prescribing changes to policy opens the door to the kind of hollow 
agreements such as the Kyoto Accord (which enabled wealthy nations in 
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the north to continue their production of green-house gases unabated by 
“selling” their carbon credits to poor nations in the global south). 
Such a pat reading, however, misses something crucial about the two-
fold ideological character of our contemporary global occasion—an eco-
nomic system that has brought the planet to the brink of an ecological 
shift—that generates a gap between knowledge and desire. The report 
should more precisely be read as symptomatic of a larger structural prob-
lem, namely the inability to touch on the political (as an authentic act that 
breaks through the limitations of an established mode of existence). The 
report wishes to be political (like an ineffective desire running idle), yet 
somehow is caught within a neoliberal logical economy that assumes it 
should not be political (the essence of the Friedman school of knowledge 
production). To use the early postmodern terminology of Baudrillard, 
the report ends up being another example of the meaningless simulacra 
of “civilized debate” about climate change that ultimately produces no 
real threat to the status quo, despite its clear description of the urgency 
of our ecological occasion. In other words, this “knowing” by the IPCC 
that the report should not be political, buttressed by the unexamined 
coupling of the empirical/fact-oriented sciences to the apolitical, is a sign 
of a particular ontological and epistemological enclosure that governs 
social reality today. This is not a criticism of the IPCC; it is symptomatic 
description of the modern era’s fear of the political.
In the modern era, however, one nation-state body can perhaps be 
openly politically engaged without having to deal with the stigma of 
being condemned as political. During George W. Bush’s second term 
in office (a time when the White House openly denied global climate 
change) the Pentagon began to openly show a concern for the planet’s 
environment.5 In 2004, the Pentagon urged the White House to begin to 
seriously consider the effects of climate change. After the publication of 
the “Fourth Assessment Report” the Pentagon began to use the report as 
the basis for a necessary transformation of our political reality. In March 
2007, the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College (SSI) 
held a conference on the topic “The National Security Implications of 
Global Climate Change,” and produced a “Colloquium Brief ” that argued 
the need for a “coordinated strategic communication plan” to inform and 
explicitly direct “public awareness.” In 2008, the SSI published an edited 
Neoliberalism, Environmentality, and the Specter of Sajinda Khan 101
volume of over four hundred pages entitled “Global Climate Change: 
National Security Implications.”6 In July of 2007, the Center for Naval 
Analysis (CNA)—the Navy and the Marine Corp’s federally funded 
research center—released its first major publication directly focused on 
the environment: “National Security and the Threat of Climate Change.” 
The publication not only establishes the environment as a threat to global 
security, but links climate change directly to terrorism—on the basis that 
increased stress on resources will increase conflict. On July 27, 2008, the 
Center for a New American Security (CNAS) brought together 45 sci-
entists, military strategists, policy experts, and business executives from 
Asia, South Asia, Europe, and North America to engage in a new type of 
military exercise: the Climate Change War Game. The exercise was sup-
ported by an extensive governmental, military, scientific, and business 
community, including the Brookings Institution, the Center for American 
Progress, the Center for Naval Analysis, the Heinrich Böll Foundation, 
McKinsey Global Institute, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, The Pew 
Center on Global Climate Change, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, the 
Sustainability Institute, and Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution.7 
Though it was not stated directly in the post-game analysis report, the 
goal of the game clearly was to convince the Department of Defense to 
take a new course of military action based upon the findings of the IPCC. 
Such activity is becoming generalized. The highest authorities in the 
military and the Department of Defense have ramped up their military 
investment in climate change, producing, since 2007, a flurry of reports 
designed to convince state authorities and global economic organiza-
tions that they need to take the troubled ecological status of the earth 
seriously.8 Moreover, the military has begun to work openly with envi-
ronmental scientists to address the issue of climate change. In 2012, 
the National Council for Science and the Environment (NCSE, the key 
political science organization recognized by state and military authori-
ties) held its 12th annual National Conference on Science, Policy and 
the Environment. The theme was “Environment and Security,” and, in 
addition to leading members of the scientific community, the confer-
ence highlighted presentations by Sherri Goodman (Executive Director 
of the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) Military Advisory Board), 
Vice Admiral Lee Gunn (President of the CNA’s Institute for Public 
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Research), Rear Admiral David Titley (director of the Navy’s Task 
Force on Climate Change), Major General Muniruzzaman (President 
of Bangladesh’s Institute of Peace and Security Studies), Marcia McNutt 
(Director of the US Geological Survey), Nancy Sutley (Chair of the 
White House Council on Environmental Quality), Rear Admiral Neil 
Morisetti (Commander UK Maritime Force and the UK government’s 
Climate and Energy Security Envoy), and a host of others. In addition, 
key economic players such as the IMF and the World Bank now openly 
expressed their concern for climate change. In 2008, president of the 
World Bank Robert Zoellick stated that the world is one harvest away 
from a global catastrophe.
Nonetheless, this neomilitary activity has yet to crack through the 
simulacra of climate change “doubt” that currently engulfs the public 
arena and forestalls any real political change. Here it is important to rec-
ognize the isomorphic power of this arena, generated by its post-political 
essence: namely, the ability to entertain differential sources of information 
and points of view while still maintaining the status quo. Here, the argu-
ment that would presumably change the coordinates of existence (what 
would amount to a real political act, according to Jacques Rancière) is 
effectively reduced to a particular agenda recognized immediately as “spe-
cialist” and therefore untrustworthy and requiring critical suspicion of a 
kind that can only come from an unbiased, apolitical mind. The IPCC, 
for instance, must confront the extreme pressures put on its findings over 
the course of the last fifteen years by conservative politicians, fossil-fuel 
dependent corporations, and think tanks supported by oil companies 
such as the George C. Marshall Institute (whose scientists directly deny 
any scientific evidence of human-caused warming). To recall a few of the 
instances, in 1995 the Institute reported in the Wall Street Journal that a 
key scientist working for the IPCC deliberately cleansed uncertainties 
from his findings to make global warming appear more indisputable. The 
accusation was proven to be false, but the impression that the IPCC could 
not be trusted remained, which only further solidified the hegemony of 
the fiction that global warming may be a hoax.9 Less conservative media 
outlets such as CNN and MSNBC indirectly add fire to this fiction in 
and through their tendency to report on the IPCC almost only when a 
“controversy” arises: e.g., the “Climategate” scandal of 2009, when over 
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a thousand emails from the IPCC’s affiliate the Climate Research Unit 
of East Anglia University were illegally obtained by anti-climate change 
advocates. The statements made by researchers in the emails were taken 
out of context and used to “prove” that IPCC scientists were falsifying 
information to support their claims.10 Again, the IPCC was vindicated 
in these same media outlets, but the mistrust for its scientists was only 
magnified. This discursive play of controversy was enhanced by views 
from alternative, leftist media sources—with the same result. Each new 
vindication of the IPCC only generates more “smoking guns,” more sus-
picion, and consequently more “dialogue” that further obscures any and 
all ability to make distinctions. The introduction of empirical evidence 
into this dialogic play, therefore, is absolutely innocuous. At best, such an 
approach can only support the ineffectual need to achieve an agreeable 
“consensus,” in which all points of view are given equal merit, ensuring 
that the overarching needs of the very market forces that threaten envi-
ronments continue unchecked. 
Thus the most resistant and clear-headed empiricist representation—
even when generated by a vast apparatus of experts—actively participates 
in the pacifying field of representation that maintains the framework 
of existing political practices. More to the point, this interminably pro-
tracted diversification of “opinions” should be thought properly against 
the horizon of capitalist neoliberal globality that creates its conditions 
of possibility. Despite the fact that each representation is weighted with 
significance, in the multi-viewpoint economy of neoliberal democracy, 
in which each representation is “given its share,” rationality and empiri-
cism can only ensure that this agitation is maintained. The continual 
production of agitation becomes an end in itself, transforming even the 
emancipatory agency that presumably comes from criticism and skepti-
cism into the essential subsidizing force of existing relations. Hence, a 
narrative that would directly break through this protraction—such as 
the empirical Real of global warming that cannot be fully admitted in a 
profit-oriented structural economy—is entirely deprived of any perfor-
mative force. Empiricism is crippled by its own indisputable ontic evi-
dence, which is a key reason why this approach does not even come close 
to uncovering the ontological ground that constitutes the preset stage of 
this theatricalized debate. 
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It should be noted that this post-Cold War militarization of ecology 
links security to environmental matters at the global level, directly in and 
through the foregrounding of insecurity (planetary climate change, for 
instance, is frequently described as the successor to the insecurities of 
post-9/11 terrorism). The regulatory mechanisms of this militarized envi-
ronmentalism operate according to the deployment of global environ-
mental catastrophe: rising sea levels that will effect all national borders; 
the increasing stress put on border control by the movement of millions 
of “climate change refugees”; shifting weather patterns that will lead to 
drought and subsequent water and food insecurity; etc. The staged activ-
ity of this insecurity has begun to overshadow the many local/regional 
ecological concerns that, for years, defined the environmental movement 
and its struggles. Consequently, the new “environmentalism” beginning 
to define the political field of the early twenty-first century (once that 
field is politicized again), is a militarized environmentalism, one that 
overlooks the complexities of local concerns, not to mention the philo-
sophical work of generating new conceptual human-nature relations. 
A more critical strategy might begin to shed light on the planet’s 
various actors occluded by this globality and its illuminated terrain. For 
instance, very little media attention was given to a different form of envi-
ronmental activism that uncannily paralleled the two decade-long opera-
tions of the IPCC. For instance, very little media attention was given 
to a different form of environmental activism that uncannily paralleled 
the two decade-long operations of the IPCC. It was uncanny because 
it directly conflicted with the precise manner in which the concerns of 
the IPCC became actualized as policy and substantially recast within the 
neoliberal paradigm (the Kyoto accord and carbon trading are the prime 
examples). The primary intermediary of this activism was a woman by 
the name of Sajida Khan, a South African Indian Muslim and political 
activist who spent the majority of her life in a struggle for a livable and 
ecologically-sound habitation. Khan fought first against the racial injus-
tices of apartheid, then against the post-apartheid ecological climate poli-
cies of the Kyoto accord that paradoxically ensured that a toxic landfill 
would continue to fully function literally across the street from her house 
in Durban, South Africa. Known as the Bisasar Road landfill, it is South 
Africa’s largest formal garbage dump, which was created by apartheid 
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bureaucrats in 1980 on the site of what was formerly a nature reserve 
in a mixed-race neighborhood. The Bisasar Road site is one of the most 
active landfills. It substantially exceeds the limits of waste emissions con-
sidered to be hazardous: “hydrogen chloride by 50%, cadmium by 200%, 
and lead by more than 1000%.”11 Sewage slug is dumped at the site on a 
daily level—a direct violation of South Africa’s water law, which requires 
that sewage be transported and disposed of so as not to cause a hazard.12 
The decomposition of the landfill’s waste produces heavy concentrations 
of methane, benzene, toluene, trichloroethylene, and formaldehyde. 
Each of these poses both short-term and long-term problems. Benzene, 
for instance, causes dizziness, tremors, confusion, unconsciousness, and 
death if experienced in a high enough dose. Long-term exposure to high 
levels of benzene in the air, according to the Department of Health and 
Human Services, can cause leukemia. Women in particular who live near 
landfills have a four-fold increased susceptibility to cancer (Khan herself 
died of cancer in 2007).13 A survey found that seven out of ten house-
holds in the area reported cases of tumors. The government promised to 
close the dump in 1987, but it continues to function to this day.
In 2002, a team from the World Bank met with Durban officials and, 
under the official carbon-trading credits system of the Kyoto accord, 
convinced local officials to keep the landfill open an additional 7 to 20 
years. Carbon trading is one of the “realistic solutions” to climate change 
generated by global capitalism (the idea was written into the accord by 
the United States, before it backed out from signing the agreement). It 
essentially turns ecological protection into eco-prostitution. The carbon-
trading credits systems functions as follows: The Kyoto accord requires 
that nations across the planet reduce a certain percentage of their car-
bon output. It recognizes at the same time that developing countries 
do not necessarily have the wealth and infrastructural means to trans-
form their environmental practices to meet these reductions. Thus the 
burden of ecological change is supposedly put on the wealthy nation 
(which typically produces more CO2s/greenhouse gases). However, if 
a wealthy nation does not want to meet this requirement it can buy “car-
bon credit” from a less wealthy nation by helping that nation reduce its 
greenhouse gas production. This has all the appearance of colonization 
turned on its head, with a colonial authority deploying “green” standards 
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of existence it refuses to meet at home on its peripheral colonies. This is 
why the Bisasar Road landfill is so “productive” to keep open. The toxins 
the landfill produces are a “clean development mechanism”: the methane 
it radiates can be reclaimed so as to produce electricity, which is a more 
“environmentally sound” method than, say, coal (which produces green-
house gases). For this reason, nations in the north financially support the 
Bisasar methane-to-electricity project because of its reduction of green-
house emissions. In this way a northern nation can continue its high level 
of greenhouse gas production at home, and still meet the required per-
centage of reduction set by the Kyoto accord by buying carbon “credit” 
from abroad.
Sajita Khan’s struggle for a livable inhabitancy is symptomatic of a fun-
damental limitation that rules in today’s world of geopolitics—a frame-
work that I define according to an organizational machine that I refer to 
as “environmentality.” “Environmentality,” like Foucault’s governmen-
tality, refers to the structural administration of environmental matters 
by state organizations, the neomilitary machine, and corporate-global 
actors. The term is designed to show the indissoluble relation to the 
increasing control of public life by military modes of thought and struc-
tures of existence. Environmentality thus names the generation of sci-
entific and state environmental authorities within militarized paradigm, 
in turn buttressed by the machine of neoliberal economic globalization. 
The complex and unpredictable flow of multinational and transnational 
corporate and speculative capital thus works in tandem, not against, this 
ecological war machine. The two are interrelated, and can be defined in 
part as the return of a certain coloniality that controls the flow of energy 
resources, creating monumental inequalities between the nations of the 
North and the West over the South and near East, and unforeseen finan-
cial and ecological impoverishments in all countries. 
In this framework, both universalizing forces of apolitical disinter-
est and particular forces of brutal, local essentialism work in tandem 
and define the terrain of human possibility. This terrain is divided geo-
graphically. Universalizing forces predominate in the north and west—
areas presumed to exist in the advanced state of the “end of history,” 
where wars and essentialist political struggles have supposedly disap-
peared. In these regions, human subjectivity is not constituted in terms 
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of ecological habitations but along the complex and paradoxical lines of 
a sovereignty that controls and encloses but also transcends all habita-
tions. This sovereign subjectivity is fluid and mobile, and not tied to any 
particular identity (racial, ethnic, etc.). In this sense it is “developed” and 
“exceptionalist.” It is the offspring of the imperial subject, yet unlike the 
essentialist identity of its near ancestor, its adaptable identity is “specu-
lative” (in a primarily economic sense). Hence, it is also subject to the 
uncertainties of a global geopolitical economy. In opposition stands the 
subject of developing countries. This form of subjectivity is identified (by 
the exceptionalist subject) in terms of its passionate and essentialist con-
nection to a particular habitation or ecosystem. This subjectivity remains 
mired in the colonial and postcolonial history and political struggle that 
marks underdeveloped regions (ethnic identities associated with spe-
cific geographical regions; indigenous populations underrepresented by 
the States that surround them; racial identities associated with particu-
lar neighborhoods). The neighborhood of Bisasar, for instance, has its 
origins in the racist and military practices of Apartheid—in an imperial, 
essentialist conception of the land based on the discourse of blood-and-
soil politics that marks so much of twentieth-century world affairs. The 
tendency of planetary organizations to supersede the needs of local dif-
ferences, coupled with the instability generated by the speculative logic 
of late capital only supports the increase of these essentialist claims: the 
blood-and-soil position thus arises directly in relation to the fluidity of 
exceptionalist, apolitical forces. They are two sides of the same coin.
The complexities of these forces need to be taken into account when 
analyzing the various and growing struggles for inhabitancy in our cur-
rent historical occasion, such as Khan’s. For starters, we should be careful 
not to condemn the impact of the Kyoto accord on the Bisasar landfill as a 
sign of government hypocrisy (the typical libertarian stance). Instead, we 
need to diagnose it as symptom of the founding foreclosure that defines 
today’s new radical neoliberalism—a neoliberalism defined less by eco-
nomic necessity than by the empirical necessity of national security (in 
the ecological forms of “energy security,” “food security,” and “water secu-
rity”). This foreclosure is difficult to uncover, for it is mystified in the way 
we (mis)perceive reality in terms of the tension outlined above: between 
“global” administrative orders (that present themselves as disinterested 
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and non-partisan) and the “local” desires of particular communities and 
individuals (who are seen as fully enmeshed in their special concerns and 
interests, and therefore less able to intervene “objectively” in matters of 
policy). The carbon-trading system is an attempt to keep the struggle for 
environmental change literally off the ground, by overlooking the antag-
onistic “essence” of this “ground” in principle. Being “off the ground” is 
constituted as liberatory (postmodern and post-political). It is made pos-
sible by the idea of being “on the ground,” which is deployed as a dis-
ease of the historically arrested. It is one of the key ways that an erasure 
of an alternative to either the essentialist or the speculative conception 
of geography is inscribed into the very system of globality in which the 
Kyoto agreement participates. It is also the same globality to which many 
environmentalists unwittingly subscribe. 
In addition, underdeveloped national administrations more often 
than not fully support their transnational counterparts in maintaining 
this global framework. South Africa’s Department of Environmental 
Affairs and Tourism’s climate change “response strategy” states that “clean 
development mechanisms” (such as the Bisasar landfill) present “a range 
of commercial opportunities” and an “important source of foreign direct 
investment.”14 What this unabashed neoliberal calculus of human lives 
reveals—in its direct, even ruthless disrespect for the “other”—is a wan-
ing of postmodern political correctness in favor of a neoimperial struc-
ture of marginalization that feels no need to give the slightest lip service 
to the struggles of disenfranchised peoples. My key claim here is that this 
neoimperial structure functions by mobilizing a fear and orchestrating a 
patent dismissal of any and all attempts to conceptualize and actualize a 
philosophy of inhabitancy—that is, a realization of the human (and the 
nonhuman) from the standpoint of a fundamental right to a habitation. 
Instead, human subjects are either formed as deputies and attendants in 
relation to what might be called “above-surface” structures—corporate 
transnational agencies, global governance bodies, international judicial 
systems—or they are fashioned as dispensable, nonessential remainders 
stripped of all rights and liberties, capable of being displaced whenever 
the fluctuations of market forces or the new policies of an administrative 
order deem it necessary. 
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These complex forces manifest themselves in terms of a general-
ized war against land that involves the coconstitutions of 1) a no-man’s 
land and landless peoples, 2) a new understanding of geography based 
on a militarized “omni-surveillance,” and 3) new conception of nature. 
The last of these involved the reconceptualization of nature in terms of 
“energy,” which in the 21st century is grounded in the military problem-
atic as “energy security.” “Energy security,” which was always operative in 
a mode that is more properly defined as colonial during the 17th to the 
20th centuries, is now in the process of reaching its logical conclusion, in 
the sense of its uttermost fulfillment on a global scale. The military eco-
logical maneuvers listed above reflect this reconstellation of nature within 
the discourse of energy security. Another sign is the recent concern for 
environmental causes on the part of neoconservatives in the US—orga-
nizations such as the Green Patriots and the Set America Free Coalition 
that wish to reterritorialize entire ecosystems in terms of their potential 
as non-petroleum sources of energy. Robert Zubrin’s 2007 book Energy 
Victory: Winning the War on Terror by Breaking Free of Oil—in which he 
makes the case for essentially the total enclosure of practically all third-
world agricultural communities in order for the first world to make the 
transition to alcohol-based fuels—is exemplary in this aspect. Zubrin’s 
argument is based on the fact that the crop base for producing methanol 
includes “all plants, without exception”: “Not only the edible and ined-
ible parts of commercial crops, but weeds, wild jungle underbush, trees, 
grasses, fallen leaves and branches, water lilies, swamp and river plants, 
seaweed, and algae, can all be used to produce methanol…. By switch-
ing to alcohol we could quadruple our purchases of third world agricul-
tural goods…. A huge engine for world development would thus be cre-
ated.”15 Thus the various critical signifiers that disclose the truth of the 
many threats to the planet’s ecosystem are being overwritten and erased 
by the single conservative allotrope “US Energy Security.” Here, the land 
and its inhabitants—the human and the non-human—come to presence 
in the neoliberal paradigm as a military problem. Reorganized in this new 
stratocracy, environmental activism is thus co-opted and managed in an 
environmentality that reigns over human and nonhuman existence, with 
little concern for the specifics of ecological habitations and their nonhu-
man and human inhabitants.
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This, finally, leads me to central organizational mechanism that enable 
the threefold combination of neoliberalism, the military machine, and 
the environment—a mechanism I would like to identify with the criti-
cal conceptual name of “the Accidental.” The Accidental is a term that 
combines Kant’s concept of the transcendental and Paul Virilio’s “acci-
dental thesis.” In his work on ecology, Virilio has identified a much longer 
historical relation between the military and ecological concerns. Part of 
the military’s approach to ecological concerns relates to late modernity’s 
mandate to expose and fully explain the totality of existence: 
[I]n a world which is now foreclosed, where all is explained, 
the accident is what remains unexpected, truly surprising, 
the unknown quantity in a totally discovered planetary habi-
tat, a habitat over-exposed to everyone’s gaze, from which 
the “exotic” has suddenly disappeared in favour of [the] 
“endotic.”16 
Virilio’s thesis is that this drive to “overexpose” for purposes of total con-
trol, technological manipulation, and economic development (typified 
by the high-yield demand of economic liberalization and the subsequent 
military need to secure these developed environments) creates a world 
of increasingly dangerous and globally-consequential accidents: from 
flight disasters to Chernobyl to the unexpected outcomes of the genetic 
manipulation of crops. Virilio’s name for this is “the accident thesis.”17 It 
characterizes how increased pressure to overcome obstacles to the pro-
duction of high-yields through technological manipulation creates an 
increased potential for accidents to occur. In a “totally discovered and 
overexposed habitat”—an asphyxiating version of “the end of history”—
the potential for transcendence disappears and is replaced by the differ-
ent form of a “breakage of/from the system”: the accident. Developing 
this idea, I argue that transcendence from the disciplinary confines of 
context becomes increasingly impossible; it is replaced by acid-ence—
forms of momentary breakdown that only occur within and because of the 
system, not breakdowns that radically open a free space for the potential 
to restructure the system. It is in and through the Accidental that envi-
ronments are militarized.
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To give an example of full global enclosure and exposure, and the 
erasure of any potential to transcend context: the colonization of the 
environment for military purposes reaches its full development in the 
20th century, even before the environment became an issue in public 
consciousness with the publication of Carson’s Silent Spring. It was dur-
ing the post WWII Cold War nuclear experiments by the US military 
industrial complex that ecology became a field of study in the university 
system. The Atomic Energy Commission created the field of “radiation 
ecology,” which began with the study of effects of militarized radioac-
tivity on the environment around the Pacific island of Bikini Atoll. As 
Elizabeth DeLoughrey so powerfully documents, the establishment of 
this field began with the hundreds of nuclear tests conducted in what 
was known as the “Pacific Proving Grounds.” To name two: the H-Bomb 
Mike was dropped in 1952 and blew the island of Eugelab out of exis-
tence. According to DeLoughrey, at 10 megatons (700 times the explo-
sive force of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima), Mike’s radioactive fallout 
was measured in rain over Japan, in India, and in the US and Europe. Two 
years later, the next bomb dropped increased this yield to 15 megatons. 
A scientist working for the AEC declared in 1954 that after just two years 
of testing, that all humans on the planet now had “hot” strontium in 
their bones and teeth and “hot” iodine in their thyroid glands: “Nobody 
believed you could contaminate the world from one spot. It was like 
Columbus when no one believed the world was round.” In 1958, the US, 
UK, and USSR exploded nearly 100 nuclear weapons, leading to record 
levels of strontium-90 in American soil, wheat, and milk. Total control 
through targeting leads to the accident of total exposure and the impos-
sibility for any human to transcend this contamination. 
In this erasure of the transcendental in favor of the accidental, our 
access to ecology changes fundamentally. Instead of “ecology” or “envi-
ronmentalism” we now have environmentality. In addition to the defi-
nition I’ve given this term above, we can now see that this discourse of 
environmentality combines 1) neoconservative efforts to pass legislation 
for the control of third world agricultural communities in key geographi-
cal regions across the planet; 2) the changing status of neoliberalism and 
its “concern” for the environment; and 3) the shift on the part of the State 
and its corporate supporters from a focus on the constitution of human 
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subjects in terms of biopower to a focus on the environment as an eco-
power that ultimately trumps human subjectivity (for instance, the atten-
tion paid by military and state actors to the coming catastrophe of climate 
change manifests itself most strongly in terms of the climate change refu-
gee category—of the near-future migration of millions of people across 
the planet currently living in coastal regions and on island nations that 
will eventually disappear by 2050). The diversity operative in traditional 
liberalization is now giving way to a form of diversity evacuated of any 
political agency and cultural content (it does not matter which culture 
appears as the next accident—all cultures are equal and equally reduced 
as accidents, and are only accepted as such). 
Manipulation can thus be addressed more critically (i.e. outside dom-
inant theories of sovereignty) in terms of the lines being drawn between 
corporate/State flows of power and ecosystemic developments—namely 
the corporate, judicial, and legislative alliances being formed around 
the struggle for diminishing resources, and the impending shift to non-
petroleum sources for global mass transportation and global mass con-
sumption. Though the State is part of this shift, it and the cultural socius 
lag behind the direct activity of what should be understood properly as 
the developing Accidental State—a structure composed of environmental 
organizations, State and corporate officials, security institutes, centers for 
foreign and domestic policy, private companies, and the military. 
We can extend Virilio’s work here by first drawing a firm connection 
between the accident, the environment, and what I have referred to else-
where as the war on inhabitancy. The event of the Love Canal disaster in 
the US, which galvanized a specific environmental awareness and move-
ment, is one example of an “accident” that irreparably damaged an envi-
ronment and its inhabitants. But the accident is more firmly connected, 
even embedded now, in the planet’s ecosystems in the late enclosing age 
of postmodernity, as we can see in the overproduction and subsequent 
destruction of ecosystems for today’s high yield-oriented profit system. 
The capitalist technological manipulation of land that defined the Green 
Revolution in the Punjab is symptomatic of an “overexposing” of land 
that leads to the “accident” of excess salinity and waterlogging. This in 
turn leads to the “accident” of mass hunger and a global decrease in calorie 
intake. The push to monocrop by transnational corporations turns food 
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into a commodity for sale on the international market. Monocropping 
eliminates the chances of a community to fall back on locally produced 
food and forces the community to pay for food produced elsewhere. 
When an “accidental” dip occurs in the market, agricultural workers’ pay 
drops and communities already underpaid find themselves in the posi-
tion of having no money to buy food. The struggle to survive produces 
the “threat” of encroachment by these communities in forests and priva-
tized farmland. This in turn requires the transformation of nature into 
“threatened” nature, which in term produces legislation that represents 
nature as a being in need of “environmental protection.” In the ontology 
of the accidental humans are constituted in terms of their ability, and con-
sent, to “protect” the environment (in other words, securing the highest 
yield of energy). For bad subjects and the poorest of humans, especially 
those working in the worst possible conditions in agricultural communi-
ties in the third world, the shadow humans that make the north and the 
west possible, they are increasingly seen as a threat to the environment, 
and to this new environmentality.18 
The massacre of Marichjhãpi in the Sundarbans of India is another 
example. In the aftermath of Partition, low-caste and impoverished refu-
gees from the war, Dalites, moving from East Pakistan into India, were 
taken to locations outside of West Bengal. The refugees resettled in 
what were called Permanent Liability Camps that were surrounded by 
barbed wire and guarded. With the encouragement of the CPI(M) party 
(before it came to power in 1978), the refugees organized an escape 
and made their way toward the east in the hope of settling in the area of 
the Sundarbans. In a place where there had been no inhabitants before 
there were now thousands, almost overnight. Once the Leftist govern-
ment came to power, however, they began to recast the refugees’ plight 
by transforming them from a people struggling to find a habitation into 
a “threat” to the Sundarban environment, which subsequently led to 
their forced eviction and massacre. This transformation was in part the 
responsibility of the party itself, which originally spoke on behalf of the 
refugees, but ultimately used them for gaining a broader support base. 
In the wake of these events the human and the nonhuman were posed 
as mutually-exclusive problems to a state caught within the accidental 
problematic, and when one problem entered the domain of the other the 
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“solution” could only be a destructive one: the “accident” of encroach-
ment and subsequent violent “accident” of forced eviction and massacre. 
These and similar events—environmental disaster and human excess—
are now coproduced by the State within the ontology of the accidental. 
The result is that threatened environments unavoidably contribute to the 
endotic logic of closing humans off from their ability to inhabit the land. 
This increase in the number of accidents (catastrophes) defines 
human culture and its environment at the level of its being in our current 
historical occasion and plays a role in the way our minds constitute Third 
World environments as objects of investigation and use. The foreclosure 
of encounters with anti-systemic phenomena brought about by the occa-
sion of “overexposure” (the total enclosure of the heterogeneous being of 
nature as monocrop-commodity; the submerging of geographical differ-
ences and distances under the signifier “space” so as to transform it into 
an obstacle for technology to overcome in favor of “speed” and “imme-
diacy”) repositions the appearance of the unexpected from the exterior 
to the interior. Hence the unexpected begins to appear as an internalized 
accident. It is paradoxically surprising but also expected. The foreclosed 
system of the Accidental puts people on the alert for accidents, generat-
ing a state of hyperactive awareness. The accident thus offers no transcen-
dence from the system, and on this basis can be named the accidental. 
The accidental names a world in which events—the struggles of constitu-
ents and their environments that emerge in the media—can only appear 
in the form of accidents. It evacuates the political sphere of both national 
sovereignty and citizen sovereignty. 
Thus a peculiar ontological understanding of the world rules relations 
between humanity and the environment today—made manifest by this 
glut of symbolic investiture in popularized eco-political polemics. This 
ontology makes the possibility of inhabitancy on our planet—for both 
humans and non-humans—increasingly untenable. The Accidental is 
thus the name for a specific status of humans and the environment.19 It 
is the nature of the Accidental, to co-opt both the life struggles of poor 
communities and threatened habitats. It is highly mobile and freefloat-
ing, shifting incessantly in its chase for the next accident. It incites a cer-
tain form of heterogeneity, and in this sense is decentered and postmod-
ern. It parallels the logic of the contemporary occasion of neoliberalism, 
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variously called “post-Fordism,” “late capitalism,” “flexible accumulation,” 
“bare life,” “empire” after colonial imperialism, etc. As such it cannot be 
located within any classical notion of national sovereignty, though the 
nation is still retained as a part of the functioning of the accidental. But 
the accidental evacuates the political sphere of both national sovereignty 
and citizen sovereignty. A certain form of political conservatism still 
operates within this liberal structure, but this mainly functions in order 
to manipulate public opinion by directing it toward the next impending 
accident: it is a form of terrorism directed at all. What we are thus seeing 
is the coming of the end of neoliberalism as we know it. Friedman’s ideal 
form of human (non)political existence is being replaced by environmen-
tality—a new form of human ontological existence that foregrounds the 
environment not as space for the development of new, non-anthropocen-
tric relations and modes of production, but as a threatening space, as the 
space of catastrophic insecurity. In turn, this ontology is being adminis-
tered through its co-constituent structure—the Accidental State—which 
has begun to replace former nation-state structures and transform the 
developmental economy of the neoliberal state.
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Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Core 
Writing Team, R.K. Pachauri, and A. Reisinger, eds.], (Geneva, Switzerland). 
In 2010, the IPCC came under fire when conservative organizations stole 
emails from one of its key research centers, the Climate Research Unit of 
the University of East Anglia. Statements within the emails were taken 
out of context by conservative organizations and misread to dispute the 
authenticity of the report. Only one particular statement made in the Fourth 
Assessment Report has been found to be questionable, that the Himalayan 
ice cap will melt by 2035. The IPCC has publicly admitted the questionability 
of this finding. Despite this, the report has failed to produce any agreement 
on the part of organizations to broke a global deal on climate change. See 
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Chapter 4
Rhetorical Assemblages
Scales of Neoliberal Ideology
Jennifer Wingard
This spring in Texas, Rep. Debbie Riddle proposed House Bill 2012, 
which sought to fine or imprison1 employers who “intentionally, know-
ingly, or recklessly hire” undocumented immigrants. It was not these stip-
ulations that caught media attention, however. It was the exemption Rep. 
Riddle wrote into the Bill, which stated that employers hiring undocu-
mented workers were in violation of state law “unless they were hiring a 
maid, a lawn care worker, or another houseworker.”2 Many supporters of 
the bill said the exemption was necessary, especially in Texas, because as 
Democratic Rep. Aaron Pena told CNN:3 “‘With things as they are today, 
her bill will see a large segment of the Texas population in prison’ if it 
passes without the exception.”4 And others saw the exemption as a neces-
sary intervention where the continued hiring of undocumented domes-
tic workers helps sustain the Texas economy. 
No matter how the bill was reported or discussed, one thing became 
glaringly apparent: In Texas there are two kinds of labor and two kinds of 
employers—public and private. And the private employers and employ-
ees (regardless of their immigration status) should not be held to the 
same rules as those considered public work sites (e.g. construction sites, 
corporate workplaces, any workplace that is not a home).5 The differen-
tiation between sites of labor tells a narrative about Texas’ commitment 
to private interest in lieu of state-wide mandates, practices, or laws. The 
private citizen and his/her home are central to both the ideologies and 
economic policies that structure Texas life. And it is because of these 
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policies that Texas becomes an excellent site to discuss how aspects of 
privatization—a feature central to the economic and political practices 
of neoliberalism—begin to tell stories about who we “other” and who we 
exempt in order to define ourselves as discreet communities—Texans, 
Americans, Homeowners.
It is this need to define ourselves against “others”—Immigrants, 
Corporate Employers—that allows for neoliberalism to create a culture 
in which there is the image of a coherent, imagined community, at the 
same time as the political power and economy of that state is becoming 
more and more diffuse due to open trade agreements, offshoring of labor 
and goods, and global monetary exchange. In the example above, immi-
grants are both defined as outside the nation, but inside the Texas econ-
omy. Thus, they become both outsiders and insiders in a sense, but they 
function rhetorically to allow Texas citizens to define themselves as both 
distinctly American—those who want to protect their economy and bor-
ders from immigrant labor and bodies—but also distinctly Texan—those 
who see their private homes as different and above all separate from pub-
lic and public economy. Therefore, the rhetoric of House Bill 2012 makes 
particularly visible the complexities and conjunctures of neoliberal cul-
ture and economics. The bill is not merely a site where immigrants are 
“others” in order for nations to deny their economically porous borders. 
Instead, immigrants are those “Other-others”6 but they are also “others” 
who to protect the private economies and comfort of white citizens must 
be accepted, protected, and brought into the state’s borders in order to 
reify the cultural and economic status quo. 
In Strange Encounters, Sara Ahmed talks about the role of the “other” 
and the “other-other” as two sides of neoliberal nation building in west-
ern countries. She talks of how others are the people who those in the 
nation can “save” or show “benevolence” to by allowing them into the 
economy and culture of the nation, thus allowing the nation to become 
multi-cultural. The “other-other” (on the other hand) is the one who can-
not be interpellated into culture. It must be expelled, sent away, deported 
in order for the nation to define and imagine itself, its borders, and its 
citizenry. According to Ahmed, both “others” and “other-others” are cen-
tral to determining a national identity—much like an imagined commu-
nity7 once was—in the wake of neoliberal shifts in economic policy and 
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political exchange. Now, instead of relying solely on common assump-
tions of economic frameworks, politically inscribed borders or identi-
ties, other bodies—both foreign and domestic—work as key means to 
define nationhood.
I agree with Ahmed in so much as I see the construction of the “other” 
and/or the “other-other” working across multiple scales. It is not just 
a national phenomenon, but it is a neoliberal cultural one wherein the 
“other” and/or the “other-other” can be employed at multiple scales—
the individual (it’s about my maid, my gardener, and my nanny), the 
local, the national, the international, in order to create a sense of com-
munity. But in addition to the mere construction of community, other-
ing also allows for something more insidious. It allows for a masking of 
the economic and ideological practices which drive neoliberalism at all 
scales. By creating a range of others as the catalyst for our identity, the 
material conditions that produce and influence daily lives are occluded. 
Instead, the focus is placed on the narrative of those others, what they 
have done, what they may do, and not on the reality of state power and 
the economic choices that influence us all.
This paper will attempt to disrupt the “othering” of neoliberal rhetoric 
by looking at two sites in which it was employed—Houston, TX post-
hurricane Ike and a US national anti-immigration campaign 2004. Both 
of these sites employ “others” and/or “other-others” to define a commu-
nity during a time of perceived jeopardy. And both of these sites of other-
ing occlude the material conditions of neoliberal culture, which I argue, 
produce said jeopardy. By assembling these narratives in such a way, I am 
striving to create a counter narrative wherein the other can be seen not 
as a tool of neoliberal culture, but rather a symptom from which we can 
begin to analyze its material conditions and rhetorical deployments.
No Zoning?!: How Hurricane Ik﻿e (De)Mystified De-Regulation
12 September 2008 Hurricane Ike blew through Houston, TX and the 
outlying areas. There was not quite as much rainfall as predicted because 
the hurricane lost momentum upon hitting land and ended up a high cat-
egory two in ferocity, instead of the predicted category four that had been 
circling the gulf. However, even at a high category two, Ike managed to 
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down trees, rip through roofs, flood neighborhoods, and leave the entire 
Houston metropolitan area literally powerless.
And it is the reality of and discussions surrounding the month long 
power-outage that I now want to focus on. And in order to do so, there 
are a few facts about civic life in Houston that must be made clear. The 
first is that the city of Houston like the rest of the state of Texas has a 
strong pro-business governmental orientation. From the lack of city wide 
zoning (meaning that property can be developed for business or resi-
dential anywhere in the city—we won’t get into deed restrictions at this 
point in order to keep this discussion moving) to the lack of personal, 
business, and state income tax, Houston is invested in business and pri-
vate property rather than social services or municipal investment. 
Seeing that as the political context of Houston and Texas at large, 
it is not surprising that Houston was an exemplar of Texas’ Energy 
Deregulation which had begun statewide in 2002. And even though there 
were some critiques of the rising costs of power associated with the priva-
tization of power services, especially in Houston,8 during the spring and 
summer of 2008 the citizens of Houston were in the process of choosing 
their power delivery companies which were, of course, separate from the 
power grid company. By the time Ike hit in early September, Houstonians 
had made their choices and had signed up with particular power com-
panies that they thought would bring the best price—and none of these 
companies were directly connected to Center Point energy, the company 
who delivered the power to the delivery companies, who then delivered 
them to the homes of the millions of residents in Houston. 
This move is not rare, and it is merely an example of neoliberal eco-
nomics wherein prices, ethics, and customer service are guaranteed 
through competition. Two of the main beliefs in the neoliberal economic 
model are: the market will regulate itself and competition will insure fair if 
not low pricing. Sounds good, yes? Well, in the case of post Ike Houston, 
the good quickly became the ugly when it took over one month to restore 
power to the whole of the city. During which time, there was seemingly 
no rhyme or reason as to who got power restored when. No, Houston 
was no repeat of Katrina in that the wealthy neighborhoods were just 
as likely to be without power for the duration as those neighborhoods 
known as the “poor” or lower class ones. The ethnic demographics of the 
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neighborhoods had little to do with it. Instead, most citizens of Houston 
saw the power-out as an inconvenience, but one that was fair9 —just 
like the market.
The local news coverage of the outage, however, did not focus on 
the parallels between market logic and the city’s loss of power. Instead, 
the power problems were discussed, charted, and reported to be due to 
the unique nature of Houston’s topography and the lack of knowledge 
and/or ability to understand and overcome the very Houston-ness of 
Houston. For example, a story that circulated between all three of the 
local news stations followed out-of-state electrical service workers who 
had been called in to help restore power to Houston. The reporter would 
follow them down manholes into sewer like walk ways, up electrical poles 
as they opened breaker boxes, and around fallen trees as they attempted 
to clear pathways for trucks and other service vehicles. The conversa-
tions between the workers and the news reporters always produced the 
same three memes: 1) Houston’s heat is like nothing they had ever expe-
rienced; 2) Houston is full of large bugs which fly at you while you are 
working; and 3) Houston does not have a clear map of its grid, like other 
cities, so it is difficult to systematically restore power. Each of these narra-
tives provided a chuckle to the news anchors, and allowed for some levity 
about how non-Houstonians just don’t get Houston. 
One could argue that these faux-human interest stories served as a 
way for uncomfortable and frustrated Houstonians to begin to bond 
over the trials and tribulations of their collective fate. I, however, see 
this rhetoric as a function of the neoliberal economics (and the dereg-
ulation) responsible for the lengthy return of Houston’s power. The 
use of out-of-state workers as the main conduits of information on the 
progress of the restoration allows for those gems above to serve as the 
reasons why power hasn’t been returned in a more timely fashion. It is 
not that the system is flawed, although you could argue that the lack of 
a map of the grid of Houston does nod to that conclusion. But rather it 
is the fact that there are “others” who cannot handle what Houston has 
to offer (the heat, bugs, quirky electrical grid). The use of the “other”10 
is a trend in both media and legislation to shift focus from the failures 
of power, and place the failures of a system on a group of people who do 
not belong. I have argued in other work that nationally you see this in 
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anti-immigration and anti-LGBT discourses,11 but I also argue that here, 
in a much more benign way, you can see it focused on those workers who 
came from Montana, Arizona, and California to help restore power here 
in Houston. They just could not do it fast enough because they aren’t part 
of this unique community.
Jasbir Puar argues that rhetoric is not only used to produce intensi-
ties or feelings, but it is used interchangeably to create an assemblage of 
“othering” that requires totalizing governmental and occasionally coer-
cive means of protection. She draws upon post 9/11 rhetorics of terror 
demonstrate how “other-others” are mobilized by amalgamating features 
and histories together so as to create “assembled” threats. Puar defines 
“the assemblage”:
As a series of dispersed but mutually implicated networks, 
draw together enunciation and dissolution, causality and 
effect. As opposed to an intersectional model of identity, 
which presumes components—race, class, gender, sexuality, 
nation, age, religion—are separable analytics and can thus be 
disassembled, an assemblage is more attuned to interwoven 
forces that merge and dissipate time, space, and body against 
linearity, coherency, and permanency.12 
Again, in this rhetorical construction history and identity are both 
palimpsestic13 and scrambled, which leads to a critique of the ways in 
which language represents figures and bodies as discrete and individual. 
The assemblage works to produce contradictory identities and affective 
figures that are both mobilized in the name of governmental threat and 
protection. 
According to Manuel DeLanda,14 the theory of assemblage joins 
together the discursive, material, and organic through interactions and 
reconceptualizations of how we understand our most basic biological 
and social interactions. We assemble meaning by placing words, phrases, 
and sentences together (or in my case scenes from the city of Houston) 
to create meaning, we must also attend to how these words, phrases, and 
sentences are territorialized and coded or decoded, or as Rebecca Dingo 
would say networked,15 throughout their exchange. And each exchange 
can be scaled from the minute (discursive assemblages at the sentence 
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level, or organic at the atomic level) to the global (assemblages of territo-
rial nation states or biological viruses that grow and adapt other organ-
isms and cells in their wake).
Even within this scene, the assemblage appears in multiple scales—
as a rhetorical structure—the development of an “outside worker”; as a 
spatial organization schema—the focus on “no zoning” and the subse-
quent seeming lack of city planning; and the economic “free-market”—
the commitment and implementation of deregulation. The scaling from 
rhetorical construction, to city planning, to economic policy represents 
how flexible the assemblage is within rhetorical and critical theory. And 
they reveal that the assemblage is both discursive and material, as well.
No Zoning and deregulation are both easily translated into Deluezian 
assemblage theory because after all, per Deleuze, assemblages are just 
wholes characterized by relations of exteriority. And when a city is dereg-
ulated or marked by unrestrained growth, the only way to find mean-
ing is by how the external buildings relate to one another once they are 
put in place. You cannot look to city plans, corporate schemes, and/
or national ideology. Instead, you are forced to assemble some kind of 
reading of Houston from the exteriority—how the buildings, the power 
grid, the people fit together, move around one another. In other words, 
Houston is a prime city to be read through assemblage theory. Rhetorical 
Assemblage, however, can be a little more complicated. Therefore, I will 
give a grounded example of how the figure of the “outsider” of the “other” 
has been assembled in neoliberal economic and political contexts as a 
way to define who “belongs” within a particular community, and who 
must be excluded.
Rhetorical Assemblage, Danger of Othering
In her 2007 book The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism, 
Naomi Klein puts forward a productive framework for understanding the 
collusion between political and economic systems in neoliberal globaliza-
tion. She discusses how a more appropriate name for what is often called 
neoconservative or neoliberal economics—practices that “erase the 
boundaries between Big Government and Big Business”—is “corporat-
ist.”16 Klein seeks to present to the US public the fallacy that democracy 
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and the free-market are one and the same. Klein claims that the key char-
acteristic of the shift to free-market, laissez-faire (what I am calling neo-
liberal, even though Klein would argue that this is not a sufficient defini-
tion)17 corporatist economics is that of shock. She cites the theories of 
Milton Friedman and the students of the Economics department of the 
University of Chicago as central to this strategy, and she documents how 
Friedman’s belief in “freedom through capitalism” was embraced across 
the globe from Pinochet’s Chile to Thatcher’s Britain and Reagan’s US 
According to Klein, Freidman’s claim is that if nations took advantage 
of the state of shock surrounding disasters and catastrophic events, they 
would more readily pass through legislation to end the Keynesian welfare 
state once and for all. 
Klein’s articulation of the consequences of shock is not only descrip-
tive of the economic and political exigency of shock. Instead, she also 
claims that one of the most important characteristics of shock is the way 
in which it makes people feel. And it is from that space of feeling that peo-
ple are persuaded to action. It is not merely rational or persuasive rhetoric 
that prompts change or apathy in the body politic, but rather it is through 
a rhetorically and materially produced state of feeling—fear, confusion, 
anger, disassociation—that the body politic is prompted to seek solace in 
the government’s rhetoric and policies.18 
Brian Massumi’s description of fear reads strikingly similarly to Klein’s 
reading of Friedman.19 Instead of focusing on figures and the rhetori-
cal production of shock, he looks at the production of “threats” to show 
how fear becomes removed from its initial event referent, combined 
with other memories of fear, and then reassembled to new events with 
an increased magnitude of fear that is not directly proportional or even 
applicable to the event at hand.20 The reactions and associations created 
because of this imperceptible joining of discrete events of fear are central 
to the development and deployment of the rhetoric of neoliberalism. It 
is the deployment of threat to incite fear that Massumi sees as a critical 
feature in the rhetoric of neoliberal geopolitics. And because threats are 
often multifarious, insidious, and non-containable, they become even 
more threatening when they are amalgamations of combined (if not dis-
associated) referents. 
128 Jennifer Wingard
Here is an example of the coupling of threats: On December 8, 2006 
the Los Angeles, California chapter of Solidarity.org, a pro-immigrant 
rights group, received a hateful voice mail message. It was from a woman 
who was later discovered to be from the Arizona chapter of the anti-
immigrant group gainusa.org. The woman who identified herself in addi-
tional emails to the group as “Laura,” attempted to challenge the rhetoric 
of the immigrant rights movement by reiterating that those who enter the 
US without appropriate papers are in fact “illegal aliens” and not immi-
grants of any kind. She states:
You are not immigrants. You are illegal aliens. That is the cor-
rect immigration term for sneaks, cheats, and liars. People 
who sneak into our country; spit on our laws; steal our peo-
ples’ identification. That’s what you are. You are criminals. 
Immigrants apply to come to this country. Then they comply 
with all kinds of requirements like background checks and 
health checks. And then they get on line and they wait like 
human beings. Not like crud cheats and liars like illegal aliens. 
[pause] You will be deported. Stop manipulating our words. 
Stop trying to manipulate our people. If we go to your coun-
try you know that that is a felony. In Mexico it’s a felony. And 
in most other countries it’s a felony. Stop trying to take advan-
tage of our laws. Murderers are human beings also, but they’re 
still murderers. Rapists and thieves are still are [sic] human 
beings, but they are still rapists and thieves. And you people 
are illegal aliens [hang up].21 
There are several things going on in “Laura’s” statement. First of all, Laura 
recognizes the rhetorical moves of the immigrant rights movement to use 
the term “undocumented immigrants” instead of “illegal aliens.” This is 
an important move in the rhetorical construction of who is crossing the 
border and how we can begin to think of them. By using the term undoc-
umented instead of illegal and immigrant instead of alien, the immigrant 
rights movement is attempting to shift the immigration debate from one 
centered on felonious actions (illegal) by unidentifiable people (aliens) 
to one of the bureaucratic status (undocumented) of a definable group 
of people (immigrants). But for “Laura,” that rhetorical move is one of 
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manipulation and lies. What is evident from Laura’s comment and its 
intended audience is that the immigration debate is one where language 
and word choice are critical components for both sides of the debate.
But “Laura’s” comment also reveals some key assumptions about who 
immigrates into our country and what they are really doing here. First of 
all, according to “Laura” these people are “sneaks, cheats, and liars” who 
“sneak into our country; spit on our laws; and steal our peoples’ identi-
fication.” And much like “murderers, rapists, and thieves” “illegal aliens” 
may be human beings, but ultimately they are defined as “illegal aliens.” 
By including multiple types of criminals together—thieves, murder-
ers, sexual predators, and illegal immigrants—who do not really have 
anything to do with one another, Laura is creating an “assemblage of 
threat”—whose characteristics are then attached to “illegal aliens.” Her 
move to compile different criminal identities, and then associate those 
characteristics with one particular type of criminal is a move, which I will 
discuss at length later in this chapter, toward assemblage—wherein the 
characteristics of figures are removed from the original identities asso-
ciated with the figures and combined to create an all pervasive or uber-
threatening criminal.
Laura’s message demonstrates, however crudely, the ways in which 
assemblage operates by creating associations of threats through mere 
mention, no matter how faulty the connection between these identities. 
Part of the work of the assemblage is to demonstrate how the threat in 
question, in this case the “illegal alien” is not only dangerous because of 
its own associations, but instead, it is far more dangerous because of its 
association with other more violent criminals. Therefore, an assemblage 
is a means with which to heighten the affective intensity surrounding the 
discussions of threat, and Laura’s statement works to do just that. Laura 
is showing the severity of the threat posed to the US by undocumented 
immigrants. This echoes her earlier sentiments that “illegal aliens” are 
“sneaks, cheats, and liars”—all characteristics of successful thievery—
and that there are documented cases of the severity of their crime—iden-
tity theft of presumably law abiding citizens. 
Laura’s accusation of thievery, however, is not centered on the notion 
that “illegal aliens” actually steal anything, although there is an implicit 
connection to the idea that not “getting on line” is in some way a stealing 
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of privilege that is not theirs to take. Instead, their crime is based solely 
on their immigration status. Laura invokes Mexico’s immigration law to 
support her claim, and discusses how even though HR 4437 may not 
have passed, “illegal aliens” are felons, and they (the undocumented 
immigrants) should know this because their presumed home country has 
the same law. The connection Laura makes to Mexican immigration pol-
icy functions to not only show how the US is a more benevolent country 
than Mexico—presumably because even though immigrants are indeed 
felons according to Mexican law—but to also show that those entering 
this country should not expect special treatment because they would not 
extend the same in their own country. 
Additionally, this move to link immigrants to Mexico reveals an 
assumption that “illegal aliens” come from Mexico. Laura’s statement 
does not only criminalize “illegal aliens” but links them directly with 
a specific national population. This move racializes the immigration 
debate, and even though “Laura” never specifically calls “illegal immi-
grants” Mexicans, her nod to Mexican immigration law prefaced by 
“if we go to your country” (emphasis mine) makes a clear case that for 
“Laura” the “illegal immigrant” problem in this country is coming from 
a specific place (Mexico) and can be attributed to a specific population 
(Mexicans). For “Laura” not only are undocumented immigrants felons, 
but they are Mexican, as well. And even when the rhetoric does not spe-
cifically link the two, much like “Laura’s” rhetoric it creates associations 
through contiguity—naming legal immigrants in the same paragraph 
as particular countries, naming illegal immigrants criminals by printing 
information about thieves and rapists in the same paragraph. 
Both media and governmental rhetorical outlets have made immi-
grant bodies into “other-others” that serve as cautionary tales of what to 
avoid, who to fear, and who is outside the norm of citizenship. Having 
been made into “other-others, immigrants are evacuated of any human 
characteristics and turned into things from which citizens need protec-
tion. Laura’s rhetoric also demonstrates these “other-others” are assem-
bled—drawing on the traces of previous historical usages. Furthermore, 
with the eroding of government infrastructures of the Post-Fordist 
neoliberal world and the development of uber-security forces such 
as the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency (ICE), these 
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“other-others” are place together under the same umbrella of surveil-
lance. This material connection allows for an assembling of threats within 
the cultural imaginary which in turn allows for what I have coined “rhe-
torical assemblage,” wherein the threatening characteristics of one group 
become applied to another through proximity, not through causality, 
analogy, or logic. 
It is the both/and nature of the assemblage that makes it so danger-
ous. It draws on seemingly commonplace historical associations (i.e. 
Mexican immigrant), and then brings several of those together to create 
new associations that are not created through metaphor or analogy, but 
rather are created through contiguity. It is through the rhetorical means 
of placing brands next to one another in a chapter or a sentence without 
creating direct analogy or presenting the connections in any clear way 
that defines the assemblage in our “neoliberal kairotic moment.”22 
Within this moment, clearly identifiable threats are no longer the 
norm. Instead, the rhetoric surrounding protection and threat works 
to create an ever present, unidentifiable, yet strangely familiar, series of 
threats. And the discussion of these threats uses affective intensity and 
identification to help citizens recognize just how much they need pro-
tection. The shift toward assemblage—creating multivalanced threat 
through contiguity, much like Laura, creates a different type of political 
rhetoric—what I am calling the rhetoric of terror. These threats create 
new circumstances for law enforcement which impacts citizens and non-
citizens alike. 
Houston, TX: An Exemplar Neoliberal City
The establishment of the “other” can be seen functioning in the media 
around issues of national crisis: presidential elections, economic down-
turns, and in the case of Houston (although there was coverage of the 
devastation in Galveston, TX)—a “powerless” city. The stakes of a power 
out versus an economic collapse are obviously less, and therefore, the 
story did not carry. However, the presence of “others” still served a dis-
tinct purpose for the Houston area. In fact, there was little national cover-
age of post-Ike Houston largely because the Monday after the storm, Wall 
Street collapsed sending the entire country into an economic tailspin. 
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Therefore, there was no need to follow a regional story about a city that 
appeared to be purely victimized by the weather, even if the local press 
saw it otherwise.
Even though the discussions of out-of-state workers do not carry the 
potential stereotypes and material harm we find in the othering of LGBT 
and immigrant bodies, I see this discussion of other-ness as indicative or 
symptomatic of neoliberal discourse. The naming of outsiders as a cause 
for the delay in power restoration to Houston masks several very real rea-
sons that caused the power to remain out in many parts of Houston for 
over one month. The first is the presence of deregulation in Houston. The 
power companies who delivered electricity to residences and business 
were only responsible for the delivery of that power—not the infrastruc-
ture that supplied the power. In other words, due to deregulation and the 
separation of power companies into multiple private entities, power in 
Houston comes into a home or office via one company, but is supplied to 
that company’s wires which start close to said building by Center Point 
energy. Now Center Point does not deliver power, but it does manage the 
infrastructure that supplies power from the plants into the city, suburbs, 
and even unincorporated areas of Houston. So, if your home is without 
power, it could be the delivery service (which could be one of 20 plus 
companies) or it could be Center Point that is to blame. However, you 
will not know who to contact because your neighbor may have power, 
but that has to do with their personal choices of their power delivery 
and/or what portion of Center Point’s grid they are on. And yes, the grid 
is a mess largely because of the lack of zoning laws in Houston along with 
its unrestrained growth. The power infrastructure is a huge maze and no 
single company holds the map. 
Let me break for a moment here to state clearly that Houston lost 
power because of hurricane Ike, but it remained without power for over 
one month because of deregulation and its commitment to neoliberal 
economics. And the power out was seemingly ruled by nothing more 
than the market—not some ideological, racist, or classist beliefs about 
whose power should be restored first. Now, by no means is that entirely 
true. Houston is an incredibly segregated city, but it is all done through 
defacto-segregation (schools are almost exclusively African-American, 
or Caucasian, or South East Asian not because they are segregated, but 
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because Houston does not want to pay for bussing, and therefore, accord-
ing to the Houston Independent School District—schools districting is 
done through economics not census)23. However, many believe that this 
adherence to economics in all of its decisions is a way for Houston to 
remain racially neutral in its politics. Even liberals to whom I presented 
my reading of the post-Ike power-out always felt a little proud when 
confronted with the fact that post-Ike was not post-Katrina because the 
issues in Houston did not only effect lower class African American neigh-
borhoods, but they effected everyone in Houston—equally or seemingly 
rationally. 
In The Feeling of Kinship: Queer Liberalism and the Racialization of 
Intimacy, David Eng discusses the logic of colorblindness. He states that:
[A] politics of colorblindness willfully refuses to acknowl-
edge the increasing socio-economic disparities that mark our 
society, while also refusing to see these disparities as anything 
other than the just distribution of inequality to those who are 
unwilling to participate in the so called level playing field of 
the neoliberal market.24 
If we follow this logic through, those in Houston who live in “depressed 
socio-economic” areas are not participating fully in the neoliberal eco-
nomic system of the city. It is choice, laziness, or individual circum-
stance that prevents them from reaching a better economic station. In 
other words, for Eng, colorblindness is another version of the myth of 
meritocracy—the belief that anyone can work hard enough and have the 
same opportunities as anyone else. And if someone is disadvantaged it is 
because of their own faults or missed attempts at improvement.
These beliefs support and mobilize the rhetoric of equality, and that 
rhetoric continues to allow us to construct “others” who are excep-
tions—people who may need a little help to become citizens, gain better 
economic footing, but ultimately will face a “choice.” The either become 
a part of the neoliberal economic system of the city, or “other-others” 
those who will never participate fully in the neoliberal economy, and thus 
must be expelled from the state. “Othering” and equality work in tandem 
to produce a rhetoric that masks the material effects of any given choice 
or crisis, so much so, that said effects appear to be equal across the board. 
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Now, I am not arguing that Houston is the only place where this can 
happen. Jenny Edbauer in her work on rhetorical ecologies shows how 
the local rhetoric in Austin—a much smaller and more liberal Texas 
town—circulates by “moving across the same social field and within 
shared structures of feeling.”25 Edbauer draws on Raymond Williams’ 
notion of “structures of feeling,”26 a term Williams defines as “difficult” 
but “concerned with meanings and values as they are actively lived and 
felt, and the relations between these and formal or systemic beliefs are in 
practice variable (including historically variable), over a range from for-
mal assent with private dissent to the more nuanced interaction between 
selected and interpreted beliefs and acted and justified experiences. An 
alternative definition would be structures of experience.”27 
The presence of the “other” and “other-other,” as well as the invoca-
tion of equality, work to create a public experience all the while main-
taining the private nature of experience. This seemingly contradictory 
move to make experience both public and private mirrors even the most 
basic spatial conditions of neoliberalism—the mall, the freeway, and the 
promenade are all public private spaces. The rhetorical moves within 
Williams’ structures of feeling are quite in line with the economic and 
political beliefs of neoliberalism. Therefore, neoliberalism can name any-
thing as a value or meaning, “freedom” or “equality” for example, as long 
as it fits with current beliefs. So the “others” who helped to restore power 
were not “bad” because they didn’t know Houston. Instead, their lack of 
knowledge became a way for Houstonians to share a momentary feeling 
of pride in their uniqueness—which by extension makes the month long 
power-outage part of our uniqueness, as well. After all, it was the most 
equanimous hurricane and post-power-outage the world had seen.
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1. The penalties proposed are up to a $10,000 fine and/or 2 years in state prison.
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com (1 March 2011). http://articles.cnn.com/2011-03-01/politics/texas.
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4. The appearance of the terms “exemption” and “exception” are both notable. 
Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Palo Alto, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 1998) and Jasbir Puar and Amit Rai, “Monster, 
Terrorist, Fag: The War on Terrorism and the Production of Docile Patriots,” 
Social Text 72, 20.3 (Fall 2002): 117-148, both discuss current forms of state 
sovereignty based in the development of exceptions—who is recognized as 
a citizen, who must be expelled or imprisoned. Within this short news story, 
it appears the Representatives within the state of Texas see threats to the 
economy and citizenry of Texas defined by exception, as well.
5. This division of labor is also quite gendered. It is defining the reproductive 
labor of the home which has been scripted and defined as “feminine labor” 
(Maria Mies, Patriarchy and Accumulation on a World Scale [New York: Zed, 
1986]) as outside the dominant public economy of the state. Although there is 
a recognition that the monetary exchange provided to this labor is within the 
realm of the state economy, the bodies that perform the labor, the domestic 
workers, are not seen coded as threat, like their productive economy counter 
parts—factory and/or corporate workers.
6. Sara Ahmed, Strange Encounters: Embodied Others in Post-Coloniality (New 
York: Routledge, 2000), defines other-others as those who cannot be 
interpellated into society, therefore, they must be expelled.
7. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflection on the Origin and 
Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983), wrote that citizens imagined 
commonalities of nations through symbolism, hegemony, and constructed 
memories. In other words, the culture of nations are not inherently stable or 
produced through shared experience. 
8. Tom Fowler and Janet Elliott, “Many call energy deregulation in Texas 
a failure,” Houston Chronicle (6 October 2007). http://www.chron.
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com/business/article/Many-call-energy-deregulation-in-Texas-a-
failure-1824046.php 
9. Or perhaps even “cruel but fair.”
10. Ahmed’s intelligible foreign body—and these out-of-state workers certainly 
fit that definition. They are different enough to help a community define itself, 
but not so different as to need to be expelled.
11. Jennifer Wingard, Branding Bodies: Rhetorically Assembling the Nation State 
(Boston: Lexington Press, forthcoming).
12. Jasbir K. Puar, “Queer Times, Queer Assemblages,” Social Text 23.3-4, 84-85 
(November 2005): 121-139, p. 127-128. Jasbir K. Puar, “Terrorist Assemblages: 
Homonationalism in Queer Times (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007).
13. A palimpsestic reading, according to M. Jacqui Alexander (Pedagogies of 
Crossing: Meditation of Feminisms, Sexual Politics, Memory, and The Sacred 
[Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005]), who works to define ideology 
as inflected and mobile in her book Pedagogies of Crossing, allows scholars to 
begin to view ideological practice as unbounded by history and nation. It 
is a shift necessary for understanding ideology as transnational in its very 
conception. Alexander defines the transnational not only spatially but also 
temporally. She asserts that our current state ideologies are not developments 
from historical moments, but rather they are carried throughout time 
shifting and mutating (but not becoming wholly different) in particular 
circumstances. She uses the term “ideological traffic“ to reveal the ways in 
which the same ideologies can be seen functioning in historical spaces, as well 
as current ones.
14. Manuel DeLanda, New Philosophy of Society: Assemblage Theory and Social 
Complexity (New York: Continuum, 2006).
15. Rebecca Dingo, Networking Arguments: Rhetoric, Transnational Feminism, 
and Public Policy Writing (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 
forthcoming). In her forthcoming book, Dingo discusses how rhetoric is 
formed through neoliberal linkages that cross both global and economic 
borders. She examines policy and NGO public exchanges to demonstrate how 
neoliberal culture has created conditions for changes in rhetorical practice. 
16. Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism (New York: 
Picador, 2008), p. 15.
17. Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine. Klein argues that the term neoliberal 
economics is too vague and does not specify who benefits from and whose 
interests are served by our current governmental economic protocols. She 
believes that corporatist economics is more descriptive of the true nature of 
the economic system in place today. I, however, decline to take on Klein’s 
terminology because I feel that corporatist economics only grants definition 
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to the power base that benefits from the economic system and can easily 
occlude those who are positioned to serve as material labor for the corporate 
system. What becomes interesting is the ways in which contiguous reasoning, 
which I am examining as particular to the assemblage in this chapter, 
function not only in association with identities and individual threat. Think 
of the Bush administration’s reasoning for invading Iraq. It was not based in 
logic or the demonstration of fact, but rather it was the repetition of the meme 
that Saddam Huessin was involved with Al-Qaeda. And even now when this 
has been proven inaccurate, there are some who still hold on to this tenuous 
connection to justify our presence in Iraq.
18. The greatest irony here is that during times of “shock” the public returns to 
the social contract in the hopes that their civil liberties will be protected and 
honored by their government. Yet it is that very moment that the government 
is using the public’s desire for protection to erode those civil liberties and the 
social contract upon which they have come to rely. A strong example of this 
exchange is post-9/11 America and the development of the Patriot Act. The 
legislation was “sold” to the American public as necessary to protect them. 
All the while it stripped them of many basic civil liberties in the name of 
that protection.
19. Brian Massumi, “Fear (The Spectrum Said),” Positions 13.1 (2005): 31-48.
20. This is how the justification for the invasion of Iraq 2003 was created.
21. Lee Siu Hin, “12/8: Very Serious Hate-E-Mail/Call/Threat Against 
Immigrant Solidarity Network,” Immigrant Solidarity Group, 
immigrantsolidarity.org, December 8 2006. http://www.immigrantsolidarity.
org/Campaigns/Minutemen2006.htm 
22. J. Blake Scott, “Kairos as Indeterminate Risk Management: The 
Pharmaceutical Industry’s Response to Bioterrorism,” Quarterly Journal of 
Speech 92 (2006): 115-143. Scott’s notion of “neoliberal kairotic exigency” 
is one of movement, circulation, and affect in which a rhetor (or rhetorical 
scholar for that matter) cannot classify and/or know all the conditions of 
rhetorical practice, and therefore, cannot fully control the rhetoric. 
23. Defacto and dejure segregation are, however, forms of racial segregation—
they merely rely on economics or political districting as the structuring 
force instead of ideology. What they do not allow for (or admit to) is that 
most economically disadvantaged neighborhoods have deep ties to racially 
structured political pasts, such as segregation and immigration statutes. 
Therefore, even the most seemingly “fair” economic plan contains remnants 
of racial ideology.
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Chapter 5
Neoliberalism, Autoimmunity and Democracy
Derrida and the Neoliberal Ethos
Zahi Zalloua
In the American neoliberal imaginary, democracy and the free market are 
symbiotically interwoven; the latter could not exist without the full pres-
ence of the former in the realm of public discourse. In addition to guar-
anteeing a way of life at home, neoliberalism serves in this imaginary as 
a global antidote to the most corrupt and tyrannical governments in the 
world. Winning the “hearts and minds” of would-be terrorists goes hand 
and hand with the promotion of neoliberal ideals. In 2003, for example, 
Paul Bremer, then head of the Iraqi Coalition Provisional Authority, 
observed that “rebuilding the Iraqi economy based on free market prin-
ciples is central to our efforts.”1 The neoliberal ethos, however, does not 
merely dominate the public or political sphere; it also structures our very 
mode of being.2 Two decades ago, Fredric Jameson alerted us to the dan-
gerous and alarming ways neoliberal rhetoric infiltrates not only how we 
conceptualize the economic field but also how we understand our place 
within that field: “‘The market is in human nature’ is the proposition 
that cannot be allowed to stand unchallenged; in my opinion, it is the 
most crucial terrain of ideological struggle in our time.”3 Neoliberal ide-
ology has thoroughly naturalized itself—appearing to its defenders and 
dissenters alike as the only game in town. As the argument goes, global 
capitalism may not be perfect—but what else is really out there as an 
alternative? 
More recently, Slavoj Žižek reiterated Jameson’s sense of urgency 
mixed with utter dismay at the cognitive state of the public at large, 
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noting how “it seems easier to imagine the ‘end of the world’ than a far 
more modest change in the mode of production.”4 For Žižek, one symp-
tom of capitalism’s triumphant reign is the alleged “return to ethics” that 
made its way into Western universities, particularly in the humanities. 
On Žižek’s account, with the return to ethics, the Left’s project of radical 
democracy has fallen victim to a pervasive type of intellectual blackmail:
[T]he moment one shows a minimal sign of engaging in 
political projects that aim to seriously challenge the existing 
order, the answer is immediately: “Benevolent as it is, this 
will necessarily end in a new Gulag!” The ‘return to ethics’ in 
today’s political philosophy shamefully exploits the horrors of 
the Gulag or Holocaust as the ultimate bogey for blackmailing 
us into renouncing all serious radical engagement.5 
For the humanist liberal, revolt, not revolution, is the reasonable and 
moral way of proceeding, a position to which Žižek is entirely opposed. 
It is not a secret that Žižek blames postmodernism—Derrida is a 
favorite target—for fostering an intellectual climate wholly compatible 
with neoliberalism. Derridean skepticism hardly suffices to dismantle 
capitalism’s “general matrix,” its ideological system of thought produc-
tion and regulation. Yet what most offends Žižek is not Derrida’s philoso-
phy as such, but its academic reputation as subversive. In this essay, I want 
to challenge Žižek’s reading of Derrida, and to show how Derrida offers 
a powerful critique of the neoliberal ethos, in particular in his reflections 
on the autoimmunity of democracy. 
Derrida first evoked the biomedical term of autoimmunity in his 1996 
article “Faith and Knowledge.”6 This essay focused, in part, on religion’s 
paradoxical relation to technology: how religion—in its desire to remain 
pure, sacred—defines itself in opposition to technology while, also, 
needing technology to survive and spread in a global world. But it was 
in the aftermath of 9/11 that autoimmunity gained far more prominence 
in Derrida’s conceptual analysis. Derrida’s reflections on autoimmunity 
open up a space for rethinking democracy and sovereignty in ways that 
challenge the cultural work of neoliberalism, seen most visibly in its inter-
pellation7 of a given individual as a private, competitive, self-interested, 
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calculating, de-politicized—or post-ideological—economic subject, that 
is, homo economicus.8 
Derrida’s critique of neoliberalism is both ethical and political in 
nature; yet, there is in Derrida a tension, a friction between these two 
incommensurable registers. He retains at some level Levinas’ view of 
ethics as involving a dyadic relation while politics involves the Third, 
the other’s others, so to speak. Yet Derrida never seeks to affirm ethics 
as first philosophy; rather, ethics and politics constantly supplement one 
another, contaminating one another. In speaking of the ethics of autoim-
munity, we must also speak of the autoimmunity of ethics, in an effort to 
account for this slippage of the ethical when talking about democracy as 
a political category.
To begin, what is autoimmunity and how does it affect the individual 
body as well as the political body? In biomedicine autoimmunity signi-
fies a disorder, a living organism’s failure to recognize that it is attacking a 
very part of itself—and not just any part, but the immune system, the sys-
tem that protects the living being from foreign, harmful elements. In the 
process of autoimmunization, Derrida writes, “a living being, in a quasi-
suicidal fashion, ‘itself ’ works to destroy its own protection, to immunise 
itself against its ‘own’ immunity.”9 
Moving from the individual body to the political body, Derrida 
examines “this strange illogical logic” of autoimmunity, as he calls it, in 
America’s response to the traumatic events of 9/11. In its desire to pro-
tect itself, to immunize itself against the spreading disease of terrorism, 
America illustrated all-too-well the potential “pervertibility of democ-
racy,”10 “los[ing] itself by itself,”11 turning against itself, against its own 
self-protection, against, that is, its immune system: laws aimed at safe-
guarding the legal rights of its subjects, especially during states of emer-
gency. In its fight against the virus of terrorism, American democracy, 
under the willful watch of “homeland security,” thus suppresses its own 
traditional mechanisms of auto-protection—and arguably compromises 
its own integrity, its moral core, its ethical ideals—in favor of an alterna-
tive, hyper-vigilant mode of self-protection that must posit America in a 
state of perpetual war. Former Deputy Assistant Attorney General John 
Yoo made explicit, in Machiavellian fashion, this ideological shift in what 
constitutes military normalcy after 9/11: “The world after September 11, 
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2001 … is very different from the world of 1993. It is no longer clear that 
the United States must seek to reduce the amount of warfare, and it cer-
tainly is no longer clear that the constitutional system ought to be fixed 
so as to make it difficult to use force. It is no longer clear that the default 
state for American national security is peace.”12 
In the same spirit, we could say that it is also no longer clear that the 
default state for the legal American system is due process. To be sure, the 
US Constitution makes provision for suspension of the Writ of Habeas 
Corpus, but this option is reserved for truly exceptional situations: only 
in cases of rebellion or invasion can the Writ of Habeas Corpus actu-
ally be suspended.13 The putative necessity of an open-ended “war on 
terror” supersedes this fundamental legal protection, transforming an 
exceptional and temporary action into a far more normal and permanent 
condition. The “Patriot Act,” more generally, emblematizes this curtailing 
of individual civil liberties in the name of a greater/est good: American 
sovereignty. 
But how does American sovereignty—its power to decide the state 
of exception, to determine to whom the law applies and to whom it does 
not—fit within the economic space of the neoliberal global order? Quite 
smoothly! As Wendy Brown observes, though “neoliberal rationality” did 
not cause current American practices, it “has facilitated the dismantling 
of democracy during the current national security crisis. Democratic val-
ues and institutions are trumped by a cost-benefit and efficiency rationale 
for practices ranging from government secrecy, even government lying, 
to the curtailment of civil liberties.”14 Neoliberal rationality thus, at the 
very least, contributes to America’s ethical disorder, to America’s autoim-
mune disorder, by making its democratic institutions all the weaker, all 
the more vulnerable to political and legal abuse. 
In her chapter “Sovereign Hesitations,” which appears in the 2009 
edited volume Derrida and the Time of the Political, alongside an essay 
by Jacques Rancière to which I will turn shortly, Brown pursues a more 
direct engagement with Derrida on these matters. To be sure, ever since 
his 1993 Specters of Marx,15 Derrida has increasingly caught the interest of 
critics from the Left. Like many, Derrida sought to disrupt the particular 
conservative intellectual climate under which neoliberalism flourished in 
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an almost uncontested way, soundly rejecting such claims as Fukuyama’s 
pronouncement that the “end of history” had arrived: 
For it must be cried out, at a time when some have the audac-
ity to neo-evangelize in the name of the ideal of liberal democ-
racy that has finally realized itself as the ideal of human his-
tory: never have violence, inequality, exclusion, famine, and 
thus economic oppression affected as many human beings in 
the history of the earth and of humanity.16 
Derrida’s intervention attempts to elicit skepticism, doubt about this 
neoliberal grand narrative. Despite (or because of) his explicit encounter 
with Marx and Marxism, the Left (I use the word to refer to a wide range 
of progressive thinkers who may not necessarily agree with one another) 
has continued to keep its distance, scrutinizing what Derrida may offer in 
terms of an effective critique of neoliberal hegemony. 
Brown is a case in point. In “Sovereign Hesitations,” she explores the 
vexed relation between sovereignty and democracy in Derrida’s 2003 
work Rogues (Voyous). Whereas Brown emphatically argues for a “par-
ticipation in power that is greater than oneself,”17 Derrida, she finds, 
presents a mostly negative and excessively skeptical attitude toward the 
demos. For instance, in Rogues, Derrida writes:
[Sovereignty is] the concentration, into a single point of 
indivisible singularity (God, the monarch, the people, the 
state or the nation-state), of absolute force and the absolute 
exception.18 
Derrida’s conflation of democracy with force (kratos) excludes what 
Brown considers essential for political critique and a critique of the polit-
ical, namely a commitment to “shared power,” to the ideal of “governance 
in common.”19 For Brown, Derrida reverts back to a rather traditional 
model of the liberal individual—the subject who is defined by his or her 
freedom—identifying democracy with “individual liberty.”20 Indeed, it 
would not be an overstatement to say that Derrida is allergic to the idea 
of the common, to the idea of belonging to some phantasmatic “we”:
“I am not one of the family” means do not consider me “one of 
you”, “don’t count me in”, I want to keep my freedom, always: 
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this, for me, is the condition not only for being singular and 
other, but also for entering into relation with the singularity 
and alterity of others.21 
Yet, the picture might be more complicated than it first appears: what 
Derrida is objecting to here is not a sense or even the possibility of a col-
lectivity but its affirmation as a point of departure. Why? Behind such an 
affirmation often lies a logic of exclusion (of fraternity, of the family, of 
the Nation-state, etc.), a logic so ingrained in thought that an ethical rela-
tion to the other worthy of its name would be all but ruled out. 
I would like to follow Brown and see Derrida as hesitating here, but 
hesitating in a way that exceeds its rather limiting meaning in Brown’s 
suggestive title “Sovereign Hesitations.” In fact, hesitation as such drops 
out of the essay completely. It is only intended to convey Derrida’s ambiv-
alence about his deconstruction of sovereignty; Derrida truly wants to 
overcome its dubious metaphysics but he ultimately views the individual 
as a baby that he hesitates to throw out with the bathwater, the ontotheo-
logical legacy of sovereignty. But isn’t there an alternative reading of hesi-
tation, one that is more “faithful” to Derrida’s own use of the term? 
Readers of Derrida will recognize that in his work, hesitation does not 
at all represent a failure of action; rather, it is a kind of failure that short-
circuits the very logic of success. Hesitation is a hermeneutic principle 
that Derrida adopts earlier in his writings. In his 1967 essay “Violence 
and Metaphysics,” for example, Derrida foregrounds hesitation in his 
critical reading of Levinas’ ethics of difference, disputing Levinas’ 
“dream of a purely heterological thought.”22 Yet Derrida does not dis-
miss Levinas’ radical project. Quite the contrary: while carefully expos-
ing Levinas’ dependence on a philosophical discourse that he claims to 
have left behind, Derrida nevertheless argues that the question is not 
one of choosing between infinity and sameness, between “the opening 
and the totality”23: “Without reflecting here upon the philosophy of this 
hesitation, let us note between parentheses that by simply articulating it 
we have already come close to Levinas’ own problematic.”24 Refusing an 
either/or logic, Derrida opts to hesitate between infinity and sameness. 
Though there is always something surprising about the other, something 
“wholly other,” a pure or unmediated encounter with the other remains 
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something of a phantasm. And to be sure, we find Derrida, at times, all-
too-enthralled by this phantasm of a “pure ethics”:
Pure ethics, if there is any, begins with the respectable dignity 
of the other as absolute unlike, recognized as nonrecognizable, 
indeed as unrecognizable, beyond all knowledge, all cogni-
tion and all recognition: far from being the beginning of pure 
ethics, the neighbor as like or as resembling, as looking like, 
spells the end or the ruin of such an ethics, if there is any.25 
In his article “Ethics and Politics in Derrida,” Jacques Rancière likewise 
laments Derrida’s proximity to Levinas:
That affirmation of a radical heteronomy is what some of our 
contemporaries make the touchstone of ethics: ethics would 
properly mean the law of the heteron, a heteron that was con-
structed at the crossroads of the Levinasian Other and the 
Lacanian Thing. That conception of ethics substitutes the 
unconditional law of heteronomy for the Kantian uncondi-
tional law of self-determination of the subject.26 
Derrida’s turn to Levinas is read here as an ideological return to ethics, a 
reframing of “political matters in ethical terms.”27 For Rancière this trans-
figuration of political concerns into ethical ones is not simply conceptual 
cosmetics. Simply stated, Derrida errs in privileging ethics (irreducibil-
ity and dissymmetry) over politics (equality and symmetry). Derrida’s 
democracy is “a democracy without demos,”28 which is, for Rancière, 
utterly detrimental to the task of politics.
Yet Rancière does not pay sufficient attention to Derrida’s self-
puncturing moments of doubt, to moments such as the one above, 
where Derrida entertains thoughts of a pure ethics while qualifying 
such remarks with the repetition of the words, “if there is any,” drawing 
attention, as it were, to the phantasmatic character of a “pure ethics.”29 
Moreover, Rancière draws too static of an opposition between ethics and 
politics, locating “justice” in the sphere of the calculable, in the realm of 
politics. And though he quotes Derrida as saying that “incalculable jus-
tice urges us to calculate” before paraphrasing Derrida’s view of politics 
as “an unrelenting negotiation between calculation and the incalculable, 
the possible and the impossible, autonomy and heteronomy,”30 Rancière 
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believes that the theoretical damage has been done: the political has been 
irredeemably severed from the ethical.
Like Brown, Rancière is unwilling to entertain a politics, a notion 
of justice that is not firmly grounded in the equality of the demos. As 
Rancière repeatedly insists, “the equivalence of the same and the other”31 
is a precondition for emancipatory politics. The Derridean aporetic—
and the type of hesitation that it solicits—is simply foreign to politics. 
From the perspectives of Brown and Rancière, Derrida ought, then, to 
be treated with some suspicion on the grounds that he remains too ideo-
logically invested in the subject (at the expense of the collective) and for 
endorsing what amounts to a de-politicized philosophy of the other. I 
would like next to question both of these objections, and suggest how an 
aporetic or autoimmune understanding of democracy might provide the 
Left with a different conceptual model with which to contest neoliberal-
ism’s cultural work. 
Here Žižek’s notion of the parallax view might help us add a fresh per-
spective on Derrida’s notion of “democracy to come” and his logic of auto-
immunity. Žižek himself makes a similar gesture of rapprochement in his 
2006 book The Parallax View; he limits it, however, to the early Derrida’s 
use of différance—to Derrida’s later notions, like “democracy to come,” 
he remains quite hostile.32 If the OED defines parallax as the “difference 
or change in the apparent position or direction of an object as seen from 
two different points,” for Žižek, the parallax signifies far more. Žižek har-
nesses its conceptual potential, using it to reconceptualize the interpre-
tive scene itself. As Žižek puts it, “The philosophical twist to be added 
[to the standard definition of parallax] … is that the observed difference 
is not simply ‘subjective,’ due to the fact that the same object which exists 
‘out there’ is seen from two different stances, or points of view. It is rather 
that … subject and object are inherently ‘mediated,’ so that an epistemo-
logical’ shift in the subject’s point of view always reflects an ‘ontological’ 
shift in the object itself.”33 Reading Lacan with Hegel, and Hegel with 
Lacan, Žižek conceives of the dialectic as an on-going process involving 
a constant shift in perspective between two points “between which no 
synthesis or mediation is possible”34: indeed, the parallax gap reveals that 
“there is no common language, no shared ground”35 on or through which 
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such a synthesis or mediation could take place. With this in mind, isn’t 
Derrida adopting a kind of parallax view in the following passage?
[T]here is the impossible, whose promise democracy 
inscribes—a promise that risks and must always risk being 
perverted into a threat. There is the impossible, and the 
impossible remains impossible because of the aporia of the 
demos: The demos is at once the incalculable singularity 
of anyone, before any “subject” … beyond all citizenship, 
beyond every “state,” indeed every “people,” indeed even 
beyond the current state of the definition of a living being as 
living “human” being, and the universality of rational calcula-
tion, of the equality of citizens before the law, the social bond 
of being together, with or without contract, and so on.36 
Derrida offers what can be described as a parallactic approach to the 
demos; the aporia of the demos (“the enigma or the autoimmune double 
bind of the democratic” [2005, 38]) that “democracy to come” articulates 
and sustains can only be grasped parallactically. The moment of apo-
ria results from democracy’s incommensurable injunctions: to respect 
the absolute singularity of each being and to value each of its members 
equally: to be “indifferent to difference,” as Rancière would put it. The 
movement between these two injunctions (both not to compromise and 
to compromise on the alterity of the other) is shot through with hesi-
tation. The double bind of the demos (to uphold the phantasm of the 
pure other and to remove all distinctions among its citizens) can thus be 
reread dialectically in terms of the parallax view37: these two perspectives 
on the demos share no common language. The “Real” of the demos, so to 
speak, resides in this parallax gap. And like Žižek, Derrida seeks to con-
ceive of this gap in its temporality or “becoming.”38 
For Derrida, “democracy to come” indeed entails a permanent con-
dition of (self)critique; he reinterprets the eighteenth-century notion 
of democracy’s perfectibility as a call for “interminable analysis.”39 
“Democracy to come” is thus clearly not governed by a “regulative 
idea”; it is, as Derrida says, “foreign to the order of my possibilities.”40 He 
goes on to add: 
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When there is a determinable rule, I know what must be done, 
and as soon as such knowledge dictates the law, action follows 
knowledge as a calculable consequence: one knows what path 
to take, one no longer hesitates, the decision then no longer 
decides anything but simply gets deployed with the automa-
tism attributed to machines.41 
How to interpret the other in a non-mechanical manner—in stark oppo-
sition to the fantasy of the neoliberal calculating machine—preoccupied 
Derrida throughout his career. Derrida illustrates and enacts this mode 
of hesitation through his formulation of the rapport sans rapport (“rela-
tion without relation”). This paradoxical relation entails both a relation 
and a non-relation to the other; it joins and disjoins. This relationless 
relation sustains “a non-appropriative relation to the other”42; it answers 
the aporetic demands made upon me by the other: to be understood 
without being reduced to an object of comprehension, to never dissolve 
the “without” of the “relation without relation” that interrupts any tra-
ditional, static subject-object relation and respects the alterity of the 
other. The rapport sans rapport necessitates, in this respect, a parallactic 
mode of thought.
In many ways the illogic logic of autoimmunity translates Derrida’s 
earlier notion of a rapport sans rapport. As with any translation, however, 
the “original” always undergoes a transformation of some kind. While 
the notion of the rapport sans rapport focuses on the other’s irreducibil-
ity to me, and, though, in principle, the same could be said of my own 
irreducibility to the other’s interpretive gaze, simply pointing out that 
the relationship is reversible, and thus making to some extent an abstrac-
tion of the existing relation, always runs the risk of harmonizing the two 
temporalities, of reintroducing a compromising symmetry at the heart of 
the ethical relation. Autoimmunity reorients the ethical inquiry back to 
the self without, at the same, reducing the other to the economy of the 
same. Both Brown and Rancière fail precisely to acknowledge this stra-
tegic function of the return to the individual—neither of them, in fact, 
discusses the notion of autoimmunity in their critical reading of Derrida. 
Autoimmunity not only reveals the dangers of a political body’s inabil-
ity after 9/11 to discern its own cells (or citizens) from pathogens (or 
terrorists), but unravels what he dubs the “phantasmatico-theological”43 
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character of sovereignty: “it is not some particular thing that is affected in 
autoimmunity but the self, the ipse, the autos that finds itself infected.”44 
Autoimmunity produces hybrid sovereigns, or what he calls “sovereign[s] 
without sovereignty.”45 Making an analogy with a body’s need for 
immuno-depressants (functioning as a necessary “supplement” to the 
immune system) to counter its natural antibodies and render possible 
“the tolerance of certain organ transplants,”46 Derrida stresses the self ’s 
finitude and lack of self-sufficiency.47 But what follows from this heteron-
omous condition is neither despair nor nostalgia but an awareness of the 
relational quality of the self, an ethical awareness of the self ’s exposure to 
otherness: “[A]utoimmunity is not an absolute ill or evil. It enables an 
exposure to the other, to what and to who comes—which means that it 
must remain incalculable. Without autoimmunity, with absolute immu-
nity, nothing would ever happen or arrive; we would no longer wait, 
await, or expect, no longer expect one another, or expect any event.”48 
Elizabeth Rottenberg aptly describes autoimmunity as an “enigmatic 
force … that is at work wherever the future (of life in general, of the living 
being, of democracy, of reason itself) is at stake.”49 Here we may finally 
speak of an ethics of autoimmunity (as opposed to an autoimmunity of 
ethics—as in America’s state of ethical disorder after 9/11); autoimmu-
nity, in this context, would entail a radical or unconditional hospitality 
to the neighbor as radical other (the uncanny neighbor of Judaism, “the 
neighbor as the bearer of a monstrous Otherness”50), whose effects on 
the self cannot be determined fully in advance.
Derrida opposes his rhetoric of hospitality to that favored by France’s 
right-wing politician Jean-Marie Le Pen: “Le Pen’s organicist axiom … 
only lets in what is homogeneous or homogenizable, what is assimila-
ble or at the very most what is heterogeneous but presumed ‘favorable’: 
the appropriable immigrant, the proper immigrant.”51 In stark contrast, 
Derrida embraces an infectious understanding of difference, an impure 
difference irrevocably at odds with the ideological function of “France” as 
a Master-Signifier, capable of changing France’s ontological being by con-
taminating its mystified organic whole. While Le Pen’s nationalist-pro-
tectionist ethos, nostalgically holding on to the “symbolic paternal func-
tion”52 (the authority of the big Other), may seem diametrically opposed 
to the deterritorialized logic of late capitalism and global neoliberal ethos, 
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Le Pen and advocates of neoliberalism do share one fundamental phan-
tasm: the immigrant other must be predictable, foreseeable; only under 
such hermeneutical conditions would this other be most manageable and 
amenable to assimilation and capitalist exploitation (that is, translatable 
into human capital). 
To conclude, Derrida’s “democracy to come” should not be inter-
preted as a simple return to ethics if by ethics one means to follow Levinas 
too closely in reducing it to a dyadic relation divorced from the economic 
and political field of power. Unlike many of his counterparts on the Left, 
Derrida continues to uphold the virtues of difference; governed by the 
illogic logic of autoimmunity, difference serves as an ethico-political 
alternative to the politics of subtraction (captured in the slogan of “indif-
ference to difference”). This alternative, though, ought not to function as 
a mere substitute for the Left but as an ethical supplement to the politi-
cal Left in its struggle to disrupt the hegemony of neoliberal rationality. 
Derrida implicitly invites the Left to resist the all-too-common urge to 
view ethics as mere ideology, as a retreat from the political proper, and to 
reconsider the relation between ethics and politics in terms of a double 
bind, to conceive of ethics and politics through the parallax view—that 
is, as at once irreducible to one another yet also fundamentally insepara-
ble, tensely linked in a “relation without relation” that binds as it divides. 
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II
Literature, Culture, and the Self
Chapter 6
Complexity as Capture
Neoliberalism and the Loop of Drive
Jodi Dean
Real existing neoliberalism reconfigures elements of multiple discourses. 
By neoliberalism, I mean not simply the ideological program of the 
Chicago school and its adherents in government and business but rather 
the broader cloud of distributed suppositions and practices through and 
within which capitalist reality takes its particular neoliberal format. Some 
of the elements from differing discourses that neoliberalism configures 
include frontier myths of heroic individuals, new media celebrations of 
fast and fluid networks, fantasies of free markets, misplaced critiques of 
collective ownership and government regulation, as well as confusions 
between the economic concept of competition and competition under-
stood as a rivalry or contest. There are others.1 In this essay, I highlight 
two additional components of the neoliberal atmosphere—reflexivity 
and complexity. 
Reflexivity and complexity show up as assumptions regarding neo-
liberalism’s basic setting. Insofar as these assumptions traverse politics, 
economics, science, philosophy, and media theory and insofar as their 
academic and popular applications crisscross, reflexivity and complexity 
seem to point to fundamental truths about thinking and being. They seem 
so obvious and uncontestable that only an idiot would question them. 
Since at least Descartes (though some might say Socrates), reflexivity has 
been a primary feature of reason (not to mention a necessarily constitu-
tive element of critiques of reason).2 Most critical academics as well as 
most economists and financial analysts link reason to self-consciousness 
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and give this link a moral valuation. Most critical academics as well as 
most economists and financial analysts likewise embrace a general 
notion of complexity (if not all the specifics of complexity theory). Even 
as they may differ on the relative power of models and abstractions (and 
hence of the explanatory value of cellular automata and similar computer 
experiments), these academic and financial types share a weak ontology 
of interconnectivity, mutual causality, contingency, and singularity (the 
unique qualities of individuals, persons as well as non-persons). Everyone 
knows that there are always exceptions, different experiences, improb-
able results. The world exceeds our attempts to explain it. It’s complex.3 
To consider the ways assumptions of reflexivity and complexity con-
tribute to the configuration of neoliberalism, I use the psychoanalytic 
category of “drive.” In so doing, I employ and extend some ideas from 
Slavoj Žižek, specifically, his upgrade of ideology critique via the later 
seminars of Jacques Lacan. As is well known, Louis Althusser taught that 
the category of the subject is constitutive of ideology. But what kind of 
subject or the subject in what sense is constitutive? Perhaps the most 
widely accepted answer to this question emphasizes the subject of desire, 
particularly as theorized by Lacan. The subject emerging through ideo-
logical interpellation is said to be a desiring subject, its desire a product 
of the intervention of the law that prevents it from getting what it wants, 
thereby insuring the openness of desire. Žižek’s version of ideology cri-
tique reaches beyond the subject of desire to consider the subject of 
drive. Here the subject is understood as a remnant or effect of the failure 
of ideological interpretation, the ineliminable gap exceeding ideology’s 
efforts to determine its subjects.4 
One way to get at the difference between the subject of desire and 
the subject of drive is to highlight each’s relation to the object. As Žižek 
explains, desire is for a lost object. In contrast, in drive loss itself is an 
object.5 Drive, then, is the force of loss. For example, capitalism expresses 
this force of loss as an absence of completion or limits. Capital is only 
capital through the loss of a capacity to be at rest (money under a mat-
tress, money that can’t be invested or put to work, isn’t capital). Absent 
an end or a limit, capitalism pushes on, in a relentless, nonsensical circuit. 
The theoretical benefit of the move from the concept of desire to the con-
cept of drive is that critique can explore not just what we want but can 
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never attain (the economy or logic of desire), but what we cannot avoid, 
no matter how hard we try (the economy or logic of drive). 
Desire alone can’t account for the persistence of capitalism. 
Capitalism cannot be reduced to our desire for it. Rather, capitalism per-
sists as a system of practices in which we are caught. Žižek writes, “Drive 
inheres to capitalism at a … systemic level: drive is that which propels the 
whole capitalist machinery, it is the impersonal compulsion to engage in 
the endless circular movement of expanded self-reproduction.”6 Capital 
strives to accumulate, to reproduce itself. It circulates, ceasing to be capi-
tal if this circulation stops. I use drive to analyze the extreme capitalism of 
neoliberalism, a specific historical formation in which the limits to capi-
talism brought about through a century of working class struggle have 
been undone in the course of political victories by capitalists acting as a 
class. By exploring reflexivity and complexity in terms of drive, I hope to 
illuminate some of the specific ways neoliberalism captures its subjects 
and thus formats the terrain of contemporary class struggle.
Drive
I begin with a brief sketch of drive. In his classic work on drive, Sigmund 
Freud attributes four vicissitudes to the drives (unfortunately translated 
as “instincts”): reversal into its opposite, turning round upon the sub-
ject’s own self, repression, and sublimation.7 Freud’s uses scopophilia, 
voyeurism, as an illustration. More than just a desire to look, scopo-
philia is accompanied by a drive to be seen. Looking or seeing reverses 
into exhibitionism. The voyeur doesn’t get off just by seeing. The voyeur 
wants to be seen seeing. This reversal into “being seen” converges with the 
second vicissitude: it is a “turning round upon the subject’s own self.” 
The self becomes the object (what is seen). As it does so, its activity is 
transformed into passivity. The object to be seen is replaced by the sub-
ject who is seen (and who is now the object being seen). Holding onto a 
conception of the object qua object thus misses the point. What matters 
is the reversal, the reflexive turning round back onto the subject. 
Freud’s third and fourth vicissitudes likewise converge. The third, 
repression, is a kind of dam. Dammed up water can overflow into a 
network of tributaries, breaking out in multiple directions. Like water 
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creating new channels, the drives, Freud explains, are “extraordinarily 
plastic.” “They may appear in each others’ places. One of them may accu-
mulate the intensity of the other.”8 Sublimation, the fourth vicissitude, 
is this finding of new outlets, new paths of expression, for the repressed 
desire. Indeed, drive is only expressed as sublimated, as an effect of repres-
sion. And while this effect takes the form of a circuit (turning round upon 
the subject’s own self), the circuit isn’t closed; it’s open, plastic, capable 
of moving among and attaching to different objects as so many outlets 
or opportunities for enjoyment (sublimation). Drive is a circuit that in 
the course of its movement outwards and back can alter, shift, disperse 
and branch. 
The reflexive movement drive designates is a loop, a loop that is less 
a circle or oval than a messy spiral or fractal. Similarly, the loop of drive 
isn’t fixed or balanced; it’s an uneven repetition and return that misses 
and errs. As Lacan explains, drive is “beyond the instinct to return to a 
state of equilibrium.”9 In other words, drive isn’t a force through which 
the subject achieves some kind of steady state. Stuck in the loop of drive, 
the subject tries to get the same result by doing the same thing over and 
over, but fails. Still, the subject gets something, a little bit of enjoyment 
(jouissance), in the repeated effort of trying. This little bit of enjoyment 
is enough of a payoff for the subject to keep on keeping on, although 
each moment is a little different. Why is each movement a little different? 
Because it comes next; it adds itself and thereby changes the setting of 
the next circuit. So in addition to reversal and dispersion, the movement 
of drive involves accumulation, amplification, and intensification. 
Consider slot machines. People ostensibly play the slots because they 
desire to hit the jackpot. This desire alone, however, can’t account for 
the appeal of slot machines, as if slot machines were vehicles for players’ 
rational calculations of expected financial return given a specific expen-
diture of capital. Instead, slot machines are assemblages for and of the 
drive. They rely on little pleasures of anticipation, seeing pictures disap-
pear and appear, experiencing the little rush of noise and lights, being 
seen by others as one who might be the big winner. Each pull of the 
handle occurs at a different moment, so no pull is exactly the same. Our 
anticipation with the fourth pull may be invested with more excitement 
and delight than we have at the ninth one, when we might be anxious, 
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worried about how much we’ve put in the machine. By the fortieth pull, 
our attachment to the machine, our capture in the circuit of drive, has 
disruptive effects of its own, making us late for dinner or unable to pay 
our phone bill. What we started for pleasure, perhaps as a way to escape 
from the constraints of pragmatic day-to-day responsibilities, reverses 
into something from which we want to escape but can’t (which is why, 
incidentally, Lacan rejects Freud’s distinction between eros and thanatos; 
drive is a loop rather than something than can be bifurcated into a posi-
tive and negative force). 
Because drive designates a turning back upon one’s self, it provides 
a concept for theorizing reflexivity at the level of the subject. A keep-
ing on beyond pleasure, beyond use, beyond desire, drive makes reflex-
ivity appear as a circuit or loop in which the subject is caught, thereby 
disrupting the assumed coincidence of reflexivity and reason. Mark C. 
Taylor’s definition of reflexivity is helpful here: “Reflexivity is a nonlinear 
relation in which cause and effect are interdependent: the thoughts and 
actions of agents influence the operation of the system, which, in turn, 
influences the thoughts and actions of agents.”10 Just as the way scopo-
philia becomes exhibitionism and the subject becomes the object, so 
does reflexivity involve a loop or turn. This looping or turning marks an 
unpluggable, unavoidable gap, a kind of “halting problem” as an irreduc-
ible feature of a consciousness conscious of and anxious before its con-
stitutive limit (in computer programming, a halting problem arises when 
a program gets to a point where its only options are stopping arbitrarily 
or running infinitely; children play with this problem when they invoke 
reflexive loops like “I know that you know that I know that you that I 
know…). Conceiving the reflexive turn via the loop of drive draws our 
attention to our capture in the picture we ourselves draw, the loop we 
ourselves designate. Rather than an operation that can come to an end 
or answer, reflexivity oscillates between an eliminable choice between 
the arbitrary and the infinite. Drive marks our enjoyment of this oscil-
lation (and, conversely, oscillation here points to the fact of enjoyment). 
It indexes not only the inclusion of the observer in the system but the 
entrapment of the observer as a somatic and mental entity that enjoys. 
We constitute the circuits, processes, tactics, operations, and systems that 
constitute us even as this constitution is less a matter of choice than a 
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matter of dynamic fixation. We are features of self-constituting systems. 
The emphasis on drive is thus a way to retain knowledge, knowing, and 
enjoyment as effective components of material networks. 
Reflexivity
Although analysts of the recent expansion and collapse in the finance sec-
tor rarely use Lacanian psychoanalysis to explain why it happened, they 
frequently invoke bubbles, feeding frenzies, and feedback loops. They 
appeal, in other words, to the extremes and ruptures brought about by 
reflexivity in complex networks. Financier George Soros is most explicit 
on this point, theorizing reflexivity as the two-way connection between 
participants’ views and their situation and analyzing the crisis in terms of 
this two-way connection.11 As he makes clear, reflexivity contributed to 
the recent financial crisis in multiple, reinforcing ways. I emphasize three: 
risk management, derivatives, and poverty.
1) Risk management. In the nineties, financial firms began to assess 
the amount of capital that they needed to have on hand to back up their 
investments in terms of “value at risk” (VAR). VAR is a single number 
that lets a bank determine how far its portfolio can drop in a single day.12 
VAR is calculated in terms of asset volatility—how much an asset’s price 
jumps around in a given time period. The assumption is that price move-
ments vibrate within a standard deviation; their distribution takes the 
form of a bell curve. Armed with their VAR, banks can calculate how 
much capital they want to carry in light of their overall risk exposure. 
Seeking to escape from government determined standards of acceptable 
risk, financial firms in the nineties argued that their investment strategies 
were better pegged to the market.13 Rather than sitting dormant as an 
unnecessary back-up or safety measure, their capital could be leveraged 
to create more opportunities for the generation of wealth. VAR would let 
them know what they could reasonably risk. 
One problem with this approach to risk arises from its adoption by 
numerous parties.14 Presuming that they and their trading partners have 
taken appropriate measures to insure against risks, firms and money man-
agers are likely to think they are more secure than they actually are (and, 
indeed, some blamed portfolio insurance for Black Monday, the 508 
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point drop in the Dow on October 19, 1987).15 For example, they may 
assume that diversifying their holdings provides sufficient protection 
against declines in a particular asset class since prices of different assets 
tend to move in opposing directions (they are negatively correlated). In 
extreme circumstances, however, everything might start to drop. Why? 
Because a firm trying to protect itself from losses in one area starts selling 
assets in a second area in order to maintain its VAR. This selling pushes 
down the price of this second area, which begins or can begin a further 
downward cascade, particularly insofar as other firms see prices falling 
in this new area and don’t want to get slammed there as well as in the 
first area. The dynamic is reflexive in that relies on the fact that observers 
of the system are agents in the system. So it’s not only a matter of what 
a given firm is doing. It is also a matter of the firm’s (always partial and 
distorted) knowledge of what it is doing, its knowledge that others have 
knowledge or expectations of what it is doing, and its entrapment in the 
loop of this knowledge of knowing.
2) Derivatives. Closely linked to risk management are derivatives, the 
class of custom-made financial tools such as commodity futures, stock 
options, currency swaps, credit default swaps, and collateralized debt 
obligations that let traders insure or bet against movements in other 
financial instruments.16 As a class, derivatives have three key attributes: 
they are limited term contracts to exchange capital in an agreed upon 
description of the future on the basis of the price of the underlying asset 
at that time (“limited term” here means that the contract has an expira-
tion date.)17 Most derivatives trade privately in the unregulated over-the-
counter or OTC market. The face value of derivates rose from 866 billion 
dollars to 454 trillion dollars between 1987 and 2007.18 
Derivatives exemplify reflexivity in a number of ways. First, the deriv-
ative instrument itself is reflexive: it steps back from an asset’s relation to 
its setting to bet on how investors will assess that relation in the future. 
It’s not just a bet; it’s a bet on how others will bet. 
Second, this reflexivized bet itself contributes to producing the future 
on which it is betting. Derivatives enable enormous leveraging. Small out-
lays of capital can have huge pay-offs or pay-outs in the future. Because 
the immediate cost of risk is comparatively small, firms can undertake 
more investments than they would with regular stocks and bonds.19 
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Derivatives also contribute to the future on which they are betting inso-
far as they require counterparties. Someone has to be on the other, los-
ing, side of the deal. Complex derivatives combine, slice up, recombine, 
and sell bundles of assets ( J. P. Morgan designed synthetic CDOs; there 
were also CDOs of CDOs and CDOs of CDOs of CDOs).20 From one 
perspective, these recombinant financial instruments distribute risk so 
broadly that no one firm suffers too badly when an investment sours. 
From another perspective, the multiplication of counterparties exposes 
more firms to investments gone wild. Because derivatives “tighten inter-
market connectivities,” turbulence more easily flows from one mar-
ket into another, making it “increasingly difficult to inoculate a market 
against potential damage.”21 
A third way that derivatives exemplify reflexivity is in their relation 
to their setting in the circulatory regime of global capital. Derivatives 
emerge out of the perceived need to protect against the risks involved in 
complex speculative financial transactions even as they make these trans-
actions possible and thereby produce, retroactively, their own conditions 
of emergence. In the words of LiPuma and Lee, “once the speculative cap-
ital devoted to financial derivatives becomes self-reflexive and begins to 
feed on itself, it develops a directional dynamic toward and autonomous 
and self-expanding form.”22 The circulation of money detaches itself from 
production; money is purely self-mediating. Since abstract financial rela-
tions are themselves treated as underlying assets, money markets can 
expand seemingly without limit—that is, as long as everyone involved 
believes that they will, as long as the circuit keeps on going on and no one 
tries to cash in or call. 
Consider the synthetic collateralized debt obligation. This is a CDO 
comprised of credit-default swaps, insurance on tranches of bonds that 
pays when the bonds’ prices decline. As Michael Lewis explains, “The 
market for ‘synthetics’ removed any constraint on the size of risk associ-
ated with subprime mortgage lending. To make a billion-dollar bet, you 
no longer needed to accumulate a billion dollars worth of actual mort-
gage loans. All you had to do was find someone else in the market will-
ing to take the other side of the bet.”23 For derivatives such as synthetic 
CDOs, risk is not primarily a side effect of complex, interlinked market 
166 Jodi Dean
transactions. Rather, risk is deliberately and intentionally configured into 
a securitizable object. 
When a market is made for a specific designer instrument, like a CDO 
or a credit default swap, the surplus risk shifts from being a byproduct 
to being the product; it occupies the place previously held by the asset. 
Thomas Adams and Yves Smith bring the point home as they trace the 
incentive to make bad loans that drove the massive expansion of the 
CDO market. The riskiest tranches of a CDO are the ones with the high-
est potential reward. Investors, particularly hedge funds and others look-
ing for something to short, wanted them, so banks looked for more bad 
loads to buy, which stimulated more brokers to issue more mortgages to 
anyone who would take them. In the words of Adams and Smith: 
Dozens of warning signs, at every step of the process, should 
have created negative feedback. Instead, the financial incen-
tives for bad lending and bad securitizing were so great that 
they overwhelmed normal caution. Lenders were being paid 
more for bad loans than good, securitizers were paid to gener-
ate deals as fast as possible even though normal controls were 
breaking down, CDO managers were paid huge fees despite 
have little skill or expertise, rating agencies were paid mul-
tiples of their normal MBS fees to create CDOs, and bond 
insurers were paid large amounts of money to insure deals that 
“had no risk” and virtually no capital requirements. All of this 
was created by ridiculously small investments by hedge funds 
shorting MBS mezzanine bonds through CDO structures.24 
The financial crisis that started in the housing market and spread through-
out the finance sector and into the broader economy was an effect of 
reflexivity—reflexivized risk.
3) Poverty. My third example of the role of reflexivity in the recent 
crises in the finance markets concerns poverty, inequality, and debt.25 
Although per capita GDP in the US nearly doubled between 1976 and 
2005, about half the gains went to the top one percent of the population.26 
Real median wage remained stagnant. Any small increase to the middle 
class households during the “lost decade” was the result of more hours 
worked, whether as an effect of the increase in dual income households 
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or of declines in vacation time. Debt addressed the decline in purchasing 
power experienced by the majority of people. 
As I’ve mentioned, debt also had the benefit of being securitizable and 
thus available as an investment vehicle for the excess of capital at the top. 
In Michael Lewis’ words, “Complicated financial stuff was being dreamed 
up for the sole purpose of lending money to people who could never 
repay it.”27 The expansion in the number of subprime mortgages, their 
bundling into bonds, the bonds’ dividing into tranches, the tranches’ 
repackaging into CMOs (collateralized mortgage obligations) and 
CDOs (which included debts besides mortgages such as student loans 
and credit card debts) resulted from demand for these massive finan-
cial instruments. Working people’s desire to purchase homes they could 
not afford did not create CDOs (as media accounts blaming mortgage 
defaults on low income people sometimes make it sound). Investment 
banks did. Scott Patterson puts it bluntly, “without the demand from the 
investment banks, the bad loans would never have been made.”28 Michael 
Lewis agrees: the mortgage holders “existed only so that their fate might 
be gambled upon.”29 
Investment banks used CDOs to remove debt from their balance 
sheets. They sold this debt to investors in the form of tranches of the 
CDOs. Most investors thought they were buying measurable risk. Those 
who purchased tranches with AAA ratings from Moody’s or Standard 
& Poor’s thought they were investing in something pretty secure with a 
very, very low likelihood of failure, primarily because the likelihood of 
default on a large number of mortgages was very, very low. AAA tranches 
were particularly attractive for pension funds and university endowments 
required to keep their risk exposure low. 
The problem was that the models used to figure out the correlations 
between the tranches not only assumed predictable, bell-curve like pat-
terns in the data, but also ignored the fact that the price information fed 
into the models was coming from a bubble in the housing market. The 
housing bubble was inflated by historically low interest rates after 9/11, 
the rush of investors wounded in the burst of the dotcom bubble into 
ostensibly secure real estate, banks’ enthusiasm for mortgages and other 
loans that generated lots of fees, and the rise of derivatives themselves.30 
Scott Patterson explains that the result was “a vicious feedback loop—an 
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echo chamber, one might say, in which enthusiastic investors snapped up 
tranches of CDOs, creating demand for more CDOs—and that created a 
demand for more mortgage loans.”31 
Demand for CDOs corresponded to the rise in inequality. Prior to the 
subprime mortgage boom, subprime mortgage lending was a fairly sleazy 
business, selling off its loans with little to no regard for whether they 
could be repaid, charging lots of fees to its high-risk customers, relying on 
teaser rates that would balloon up after a couple of years. Most of these 
early lenders went bankrupt in the mid-nineties. Less than a decade later, 
the subprime market was larger than before, offering even lower quality 
mortgages to people who, facing a decade of stagnant wages and maxed 
out credit cards jumped at the chance of no money down, interest only 
mortgages.32 The debts of poor and working people were useful, fodder 
for the Wall Street finance machine. So even though adjustable-rate mort-
gages were defaulting at epic rates in 2005, the price of houses contin-
ued to rise, the subprime mortgage market continued to expand, and the 
price of credit default swaps fell. The massive financial boom required, 
was made possible by, the debts of the people seemingly furthest from 
Wall Street, those considered the least credit-worthy. At this interface of 
the extremes of profit and loss, poverty (like risk) isn’t an unavoidable 
byproduct of financial, speculative capitalism but its condition and con-
tent. In the circuit of amplified inequality, the increase in the number of 
poor people isn’t a social problem, it’s an investment opportunity. The 
system turns in on itself and feeds on its own excesses. 
Even in the last months of the bubble in subprime mortgage bonds 
(between February and June of 2007), the market in CDOs continued to 
generate billions. In the words of one analyst (and short-seller): “it was 
like watching an unthinking machine that could not stop itself.”33 To be 
sure, there was ever-increasing turbulence as banks tried to get rid of bad 
investments before they collapsed. But insofar as buyers kept purchas-
ing them (and firms like Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers continue 
to emphasize the soundness of the bonds), the market remained afloat. 
Michael Lewis’ description suggests the trap of drive: “it was as if an 
entire financial market had tried to change its mind—and then realized 
that it could not afford to change its mind.”34 The interconnected banks 
were caught in a circuit beyond their control. If there were no buyers for 
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the CDOs, and the mortgages deep in their bowels were defaulted upon 
as house prices continued to drop, the CDOs would be worth nothing. 
The credit-default swaps were ostensibly a kind of insurance, a way to 
hedge against massive losses, but that hedging depended on the seller’s 
ability to pay. If the seller couldn’t pay, then the insurance wasn’t worth 
anything either. In effect, the over-leveraged derivatives market, a sub-
stantial component of Wall Street’s exorbitant profits and bonuses, led 
the financial system to deceive itself. 
The effect of the assemblage of incentives, rewards, penalties, egos, 
debts, mortgages, models, computers, hormones, and wagers was a finan-
cial crisis of epic proportions. The global financial meltdown and result-
ing recession, unemployment, and indebtedness, particularly of govern-
ments subsequently pressured to eliminate social services, expose the 
specificity of neoliberal capitalism as a circuit in which reflexivity is a 
mechanism of capture rather than reason, where the loop of drive ampli-
fies the worse tendencies rather than employs feedback as a mechanism 
of self-correction. Neoliberalism is thus neither a formation well-defined 
in terms of free, unregulated markets nor one well-understood in terms of 
competition as a moderating force. 
As Michel Foucault explains already in his lectures on the birth of 
biopolitics, neoliberalism is a governmentality that intervenes in mar-
kets, that creates them, that governs in their behalf.35 Its conceit is not 
liberalism’s laissez faire approach to markets but instead an ensemble of 
policies and interventions resulting from the subjection of the state of 
the market.36 Foucault is less accurate when he describes these inter-
ventions as attempts to induce and protect competition (neglecting 
capitalism’s already well-documented tendency toward monopoly). 
Contemporary financial markets might be cut-throat, blood-thirsty, but 
they aren’t competitive, not if by competitive we imagine some kind of 
open contest with clear, fair rules. I should add here the mistake with 
another assumption regarding neoliberalism, namely, that it is linked to 
consumerism. The emphasis on consumption might have highlighted a 
feature of Fordism, particularly insofar as Fordist economic strategies 
depended on keeping wages high enough for consumers to purchase the 
goods they produced. In contrast, neoliberalism relies on the inequal-
ity of rich and poor—a point explicitly acknowledged in the notorious 
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Citigroup report, “Revisiting Plutonomy: The Rich Getting Richer.”37 A 
set of recommendations for investors to buy stock in luxury goods, pri-
vate banks, and financial services (a group of stocks the authors refer to 
as the “plutonomy basket”), the report points out the insignificance of 
poor and middle class consumers. The only consumers who matter are 
rich ones, the ones who have been benefiting and can be expected to 
continue to benefit from neoliberal globalization. The rich drive demand 
(not the mass of middle and working class consumers). The rich have an 
increasingly larger share of income and wealth and thus greater proclivity 
to spend. In the words of the report, “Asset booms, a rising profit share 
and favorable treatment by market-friendly governments have allowed 
the rich to prosper and become a greater share of the economy in the plu-
tonomy countries.” The super-rich purchase luxury items and investment 
vehicles. The poor rely on cheap, low quality goods and massive amounts 
of corn, that is, the sub-standard food of corporate agriculture. For every-
thing else, there is debt, the debt the finance sector needs to function.
Complexity
We are regularly told that financial instruments like collateralized debt 
obligations and credit default swaps are beyond our comprehension. 
Not only are they too hard for average citizens to understand, but Alan 
Greenspan couldn’t even understand them. In fact, as hundreds of lob-
byists for the finance sector have ceaselessly worked to teach US mem-
bers of Congress, derivatives can’t be regulated, precisely because no one 
understands them. Beyond comprehension, they are beyond control. 
Complexity disposes of politics because nothing can be done.
Initially, finance porn (I have in mind here mainstream media treat-
ment of the finance sector as well as the multiple books on the subprime 
mortgage crisis) lauded “quants” as the ones who actually knew what was 
going on. These nearly magical geeks, siphoned off from academe, used 
their advanced mathematics and high powered computers to identify sta-
tistical anomalies and price differentials and quickly capitalize them. The 
economic theory at the basis of their calculations, the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis, cast these profiteering moves as necessary and ethical: 
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buying up underpriced assets helped move their prices to their proper 
place, back to equilibrium. 
Other wizards then came up with alchemical strategies for manag-
ing risk, strategies that involved lots of borrowing (leverage) and shifting 
(structural investment vehicles). Many CDOs were new combinations 
of slices of other CDOs that a bank had created but had been unable to 
sell. CDOs’ interrelation was circular; they contained each other yet were 
somehow able to transform this mutual containing into gold (with regard 
to the CDOs built out of subprime mortgage bonds, the supposition was 
that real estate would nearly always rise in value, that any declines in the 
housing market would be local rather than national, and that mortgage 
backed securities distributed risk so broadly as to dissipate it almost 
completely; each one of these assumptions ended up being wrong). The 
CDOs’ opaque, exotic names, names that refuse any concrete relation 
with their contents—Abacus, Carina, Gemstone—heighten the sense 
that one is approaching the inner sanctum of finance’s arcane myster-
ies.38 At the heart of finance are impossible objects that create money. 
A Goldman Sachs trader described them in an email to his lover as “a 
product of pure intellectual masturbation, the type of thing which you 
invent telling yourself: ‘Well, what if we created a ‘thing,’ which has no 
purpose, which is absolutely conceptual and highly theoretical and which 
nobody knows how to price?’”39 A financial product that exceeds the 
market, a product beyond valuation, the synthetic CDO is a real abstrac-
tion (particularly when one keeps in mind that investors’ demand for 
CDOs created banks’ demand for mortgages to back them which led to 
the issuing of ever more sleazy and predatory loans to vulnerable and low 
income people).
The powers-that-be allegedly at the helms of the big investment 
firms—Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Citigroup, 
Goldman Sachs—have claimed that they both knew and didn’t know 
what was going on as the financial markets heated up and burned out. On 
the one hand, their risk management strategies necessarily involved all 
sorts of bets and plans on what could happen. Their justification for the 
creation of credit default swaps (CDSs) was protection, security, preven-
tion of the worst. On the other hand, the bankers and regulators have all 
claimed that the crisis was the once-in-a-century event that no one could 
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have predicted. Under questioning at the Congressional hearings on the 
financial crisis, legendary investor Warren Buffett (chief shareholder in 
Moody’s ratings agency) said that he didn’t know what Moody’s was 
doing. He didn’t know that the agency was making massive mistakes in 
rating mortgages and bonds before the crisis. Neither he nor anyone else 
could be expected to know. His own business is too complex for him to 
understand.40 Overrun by mutually influencing dynamics, expectations, 
unintended consequences, and unknown unknowns, contemporary 
finance is a domain so complex that no one should even be expected to 
be able to understand it. The hand of the market isn’t simply invisible. It 
cannot be known or understood by mere mortals (although sometimes 
those with the right stuff, Tom Wolfe’s masters of the universe, might be 
able to ride it successfully for a while).
The appeal to complexity displaces accountability. The big banks 
are not accountable because there were all sorts of things they couldn’t 
account for. To be sure, they can enjoy complexity, getting off on the 
obscure objects they create, abstracting themselves from the debts out 
of which the objects are made, from the risks that are taken with pen-
sion funds and municipal bonds, reveling in a sense that their power puts 
them above it all. This is the sense, incidentally, at the heart of the cul-
ture of extreme bonuses, the only sense such excess makes. Outlandish 
bonuses inscribe the surplus inequality before which politicians and 
press bow down. Merely grossly unequal salaries would still inscribe the 
bankers in the same world as the politicians, an economic world based in 
labor, production, and commodities rather than a financial world based 
in fantasies, bets, risks, and will. 
The appeal to complexity is a site of convergence between despotic 
financialism and critical theory (I’m using the term broadly here to 
encompass contemporary continental and post-Marxist developments 
in philosophy and political theory). Some critical theorists associate 
responsibility with sovereign subjectivity and moralizing impulses to 
punish. The mistake both they and the bankers make is assuming that 
responsibility implies total knowledge, total control, or total determina-
tion of outcomes. Both argue that since the world is more complicated 
than this, since our networked interactions implicate us in relations and 
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outcomes beyond our knowledge and determination, accountability can-
not rightly be localized. 
Jane Bennett is attuned to the complexity of assemblages consti-
tuted out of human and non-human actants, assemblages like those mix-
ing “coal, sweat, electromagnetic fields, computer programs, electron 
streams, profit motives, heat, lifestyles, water, economic theory, wire, and 
wood” into an electrical grid.41 Given this complexity, she finds the invo-
cation of agency and strong responsibility to be “tinged with injustice.” 
“In a world of distributed agency,” Bennett argues, “a hesitant attitude 
toward assigning singular blame becomes a presumptive virtue.”42 As I 
see it, this hesitation corresponds with attitudes dominant in the neolib-
eral cloud. For examples, we might add to the abundant and proliferating 
crises in the finance sector the strings of failure dispersed in the wake of 
Hurricane Katrina, connected with the ill-conceived and aggressive war 
in Iraq, and gushing from British Petroleum’s deep water oil rig in the 
Gulf of Mexico. Even as each instance resists confinement into a singu-
lar moment or single individual decision, decisions of boards, regulators, 
investors, voters, politicians, consultants, and officials are made, nonethe-
less. The oil rig didn’t emerge spontaneously out of the ocean. The city 
of New Orleans didn’t somehow lose organizational capacities previously 
put to use in Super Bowl football games and Mardi Gras celebrations.43 
Some decisions are rightly described as bets or gambles, wagers for one 
future rather than another. Winners commend themselves for their pre-
science, presenting their good fortune as grounds for promotion, re-elec-
tion, praise, a generous bonus. This commendation seems almost appro-
priate because of the risk of error—they could have been wrong. Blame, 
condemnation, and punishment are likewise appropriate for those on the 
losing side of the bet. They had to make a judgment under conditions 
that were fluid, changing, interconnected, and uncertain—the condi-
tions of any human judgment. 
Bennett is right to emphasize the dispersion and distribution of 
agency: decisions are intermeshed, mashed-up so as to resist confine-
ment into specific, separable choices. Agency is an effect of a larger set 
of relations. It often feels as if decisions have always been already made, 
as if we have no real choice, as if the current or process or circuit is in 
motion and there’s nothing we can do to stop it. But we are nonetheless 
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accountable for this sense. It’s part of the setting of our choices. We are 
accountable because we can be wrong, because we lack knowledge, con-
trol, and the capacity fully to determine outcomes. Responsibility arises 
because one has to choose not only when one does not know but when 
one cannot know. 
Franco “Bifo” Berardi takes a view of complexity in line with Bennett’s: 
“the complexity of the global economy is far beyond any knowledge and 
possible governance.” Accordingly, he argues that “the political and eco-
nomic knowledge we have inherited from modern rationalist philosophy 
is now useless, because the current collapse is the effect of the infinite 
complexity of immaterial production…”44 I disagree. To say that the 
global economy is beyond knowledge and governance cedes in advance 
a terrain of struggle, a terrain that banks and corporations find important 
enough to spend millions upon millions to defend. Regulating deriva-
tives isn’t impossible—make them illegal. Treating food as a commodity 
to be speculated upon isn’t necessary and unavoidable—forbid it. Banks 
can be nationalized and required to back permitted investment with ade-
quate capital reserves. Whose purpose does it serve to pretend that this 
can’t be done? Bankers benefit from our thinking that there are opera-
tions and processes that compel our obedience, like so much absolutist 
mystical arcana. They also benefit when we slip into thinking primarily in 
terms of immaterial production, a kind of derivative thinking that fanta-
sizes value in the absolutely conceptual and without price, in the enjoy-
ment that accrues through adding, repeating, and circulating. 
Given the convergence between finance and critical theory around the 
notion of complexity, it’s not surprising to find an overlap with Friedrich 
Hayek. The rejection of accountability, of politics, repeats his argument 
against economic planning: we cannot know. For Hayek the problem 
of the economy is a problem of knowledge. As he points out, economic 
knowledge is widely distributed; much of it is local, a matter of the avail-
ability of materials and workers and infrastructure. Economic knowledge 
is also subject to constant change. Infinite particulars of time and place, 
chance and circumstance, call for constant modulation. “It would seem to 
follow,” Hayek concludes, “that the ultimate decisions must be left to the 
people who are familiar with these circumstances, who know directly of 
the relevant changes and of the resources immediately available to meet 
Complexity as Capture 175
them.”45 His argument against central economic planning, then, is that it 
is impossible because knowledge cannot be totalized. Total knowledge, 
complete knowledge, is unobtainable. 
Foucault specifies the idea that limits on knowledge are limits on gov-
ernment as the economic rationality of liberalism. Liberalism extends the 
problem of economic knowledge into a more fundamental incompat-
ibility between “the non-totalizable multiplicity of economic subjects of 
interest and the totalizing unity of the juridical sovereign.”46 Insisting that 
the totality of economic processes cannot be known, liberal economics 
renders a sovereign view of the economy impossible. In other words, for 
the liberal, the limit of sovereign knowledge is a limit on sovereign power. 
As Foucault puts it, homo economicus tells the sovereign, “You must not 
because you cannot. And you cannot in the sense that ‘you are powerless.’ 
And why are you powerless, why can’t you? You cannot because you do 
not know, and you do not know because you cannot know.”47 Just as the 
impossibility of complete knowledge served as a wedge against sovereign 
power, so does the inability to know emerge as an attempt to block or 
suppress politics, to displace matters of will and action onto questions 
of knowledge. 
Foucault’s historical account of the links between the rise of eco-
nomics as a discipline and the liberal political challenge to absolutism is 
compelling, particularly as it situates liberal and neoliberal approaches to 
the market in the context of struggles and debate. He provides a potent 
reminder of the fact that attempts to limit the power of the sovereign 
shift over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries from limitations on the 
sovereignty of the king to limitations on the sovereignty of the people. 
This shift displaces our attention from the ways law, legitimacy, and sov-
ereign authority have never been fully grounded in knowledge but have 
to appeal to an addressee capable of responding to and as a collective.
Complexity displaces accountability onto knowledge. In docu-
ments that Goldman Sachs made available to the Senate Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations, the firm stated that it “did not have 
access to any special information that caused [it] to know that the US 
housing market would collapse.”48 It explained that its risk manage-
ment decisions
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were not motivated by any collective view of what would hap-
pen next, but rather by fear of the unknown. The firm’s risk 
management processes did not, and could not, provide abso-
lute clarity; they underscored deep uncertainty about evolv-
ing conditions in the US residential housing market. That 
uncertainty dictated our decision to attempt to reduce the 
firm’s overall risk.49 
It’s hard to know what would count as such special information, informa-
tion that could itself be a cause of knowledge of the future rather than one 
of its multiple possible contents (perhaps predestination understood as 
God’s foreknowledge would be an example of this kind of information). 
The Goldman Sachs’ report presumes a binary of absolute clarity versus 
deep uncertainty, of knowledge of what would happen next opposed to 
fear of the unknown. It’s as if Goldman Sachs’ defense is that it is not 
God. It does not have divine knowledge. Lloyd Blankfein’s testimony that 
the firm does God’s work suggests that a megalomaniacal sense of its own 
importance is part of Goldman’s corporate culture. Absence of absolute 
clarity is no excuse, no defense, but it is evidence of an other-worldly self-
concept, an epic sense of power. Only someone who presumes that oth-
ers think he has absolute knowledge would have to explain that he lacks it. 
Some commentators and analysts have blamed the discipline of eco-
nomics for the financial crisis. One of their arguments turns on one of 
the discipline’s primary assumptions, namely, that economics is a science 
that can and does know that markets are efficient. The efficient market 
hypothesis (EMH) is the supposition of an underlying balance or best 
distribution. It turns on the idea of price, that prices reflect all available 
relevant information. Because this information is built into a price, what 
will happen to that price in the future is impossible to predict. If it were 
possible, the predicted future would already be reflected in the price.50 
So even though no one agent can know the truth of the economy, even 
though this truth eludes the sovereign, market equilibrium (as embodied 
in each price at a given moment) must be presupposed as the sum total of 
the knowledge of each actor. 
The interesting twist here is that if the EMH designates a truth embod-
ied in prices, then it can be measured or, at the very least, modeled with 
a high degree of assurance. This supposition of the accuracy of economic 
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models fueled the calculations of the “quants” or experts in mathemati-
cal approaches to finance who played major roles in hedge funds’ and 
investment banks’ approaches to risk over the last decades. Their mod-
els identify deviations and discrepancies in prices. These discrepancies 
show up as volatility, where volatility designates movement around an 
expected price, that is, more or less probable chances. If gas prices are 
normally between three dollars and three dollars and fifty cents a gallon, 
prices over four dollars a gallon suggest that something is going on and 
this something can then be an opportunity to bet or trade. At any rate, 
the underlying idea here is that contingency in prices admits of predict-
ability. Rather than indexing the incalculable or unknowable, it points to 
states of affairs with varying degrees of probability. Even if we don’t know 
exactly what will happen at a certain point in time, we do know that some 
outcomes are more likely than others.
In the wake of the collapse of the subprime mortgage market (and 
repeating insights ostensibly gained in the wake of similar collapses in 
recent decades), vocal economists and commentators have reasserted the 
falsity of the efficient market hypothesis, its untenable premises, and the 
impossibility of applying it to real existing markets. Blame for the collapse 
rests on economic models’ abstraction from their contexts (for example, 
the divergence of a statistical approach to mortgages from its setting in a 
housing bubble amidst rising inequality). A particularly powerful version 
of the argument comes from Nicholas Taleb’s account of black swans, or 
low likelihood/high impact events capable of setting off chain reactions 
as they cascade through the markets.51 Yet these and similar emphases 
on unknowability end up resonating with the excuses of bank regulators 
and executives: they did not know (what was coming); and, they did not 
know, because they could not know. These accounts, too, get caught up 
in expectations and bubbles. As Charles Prince, then CEO of Citigroup, 
said in July 2007, “As long as the music is playing you’ve got to get up 
and dance.”52 Activity convergences with passivity. Bankers had no other 
choice; they could not do otherwise. Consequently, they offer excuses 
for their inability to act even as they relied, momentarily, on a powerful a 
sovereign capable of rescuing them. 
The back and forth between knowing and not-knowing, the frag-
mentation of knowledge into information that disperses into networks 
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only to be abstracted, aggregated, and amplified and then chaotically dis-
solved at points of crisis, suggests the utility of analyzing neoliberalism 
and its vicissitudes in terms of the oscillations of drive. Partial knowledge 
may be a limitation, but it is more importantly a condition. The partiality 
and fallibility of knowledge, the complexity of its interconnections, does 
not excuse inaction. It is the setting of action (and should be understood 
as its ground). We have to act because we do not know.
Conclusion
I’ve argued that reflexivity and complexity are key components of neolib-
eralism as an ideological formation. Rather than configuring desire, how-
ever, they run a circuit of drive, capturing subjects in patterns and loops 
and practices from which it seems there is no escape. While my focus has 
been on the more obscene components of speculative finance, I don’t 
want to leave the impression that the work of reflexivity and complexity 
in contemporary ideology is somehow pre-political or post-political. On 
the contrary, in our current formation appeals to both support the very, 
very rich and undermine the rest of us. 
First, reflexivity’s displacement of politics into narcissistic circuits of 
self-absorption dominate what passes for political commentary through-
out the tumultuous and varied terrain of contemporary media. Bloggers 
blog and commentators comment on blogs and bloggers comment on 
commentators. A similar transfer of intensity animates Wall Street as the 
never-ending pursuit of profit animates efforts to produce, commodify, 
and bet on risk. The academic version recedes in levels of increasing 
meta-ness, commenting on discourses and practices and alternatives and 
limits until the need to act loses its force and urgency. Freud’s observa-
tion that the objects of the drive can appear in each others’ places, accu-
mulating the others’ intensity, alerts us to the ways that multiple, minor 
achievements (more hits on my blog, a higher daily book value) can well 
be moments in larger circuits of failure and defeat, acquiescence and 
accommodation. Approaches to risk that highlight possible perverse 
effects of regulation demonstrate the same logic. The big banks success-
fully fought against serious regulation of derivatives with the argument 
that banks would just come up with even more complex and dangerous 
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ways to transfer risk from their books and produce new sources of profit. 
The ostensible reality of reflexivity in markets is that agents will incorpo-
rate changes in their setting into the behavior, and so just work around 
any changes (like water going downhill). We should immediately be 
suspicious of such an appeal to reality as indicative of what Mark Fisher 
theorizes as “capitalism realism,” the excuse for capitalist excesses offered 
as if there were no alternative.53 We don’t normally let the fact that mur-
ders occur convince us that murder should not be criminalized, so we 
shouldn’t let the fact that bankers say they will find ways to work around 
regulations prevent us from regulating them.
Second, just as reflexivity displaces politics, so does complexity. 
Invocations of complexity induce us, the people, to think that self-gover-
nance is impossible, too hard, over our heads. It’s like an excuse for avoid-
ing responsibility, an infantile fantasy that somehow we can escape poli-
tics. Global networks, neural networks, financial networks—if it’s all just 
too complex for us to understand we are left off the hook for our abdica-
tion of political responsibility (no wonder the education system has been 
left to rot; no wonder higher education is a major front of political strug-
gle—the more people believe the lie of “too complex to understand,” the 
more they concede). Unfortunately, academics contribute to the ideo-
logical effects of complexity. We emphasize that there is always more that 
needs to be known, that there are unknown unknowns and unintended 
consequences of whatever it is that we end up doing. Complexity’s tag-
ging of the multiplicity of interrelated and unpredictable effects presents 
us as so deeply enmeshed in our situations that we can’t assess them; we 
can only react, and just in time, in a 24/7 ever faster market. 
But notice: at this point, the excuses—we can’t predict what will hap-
pen, we can’t know—turn back in on their reflexive partner: we are com-
pelled to react, not reflect, even as we are enjoined to think more, think 
more thoroughly, consider all the options. We are pushed in conflicting 
directions, with full force, told that each is necessary, unavoidable, real-
istic. These injunctions, impossible to realize, impossible to avoid, signal 
that the neoliberalism entrapping us is ideology, not necessity.
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Chapter 7
Neoliberalism, Risk, and Uncertainty 
in the Video Game
Andrew Baerg
This essay deploys and brings governmentality theory to bear on 
the question of neoliberalism and its expression in the video game. 
Neoliberalism’s naturalization of the free market and the extension of its 
principles into non-economic phenomena have left neoliberal subjects 
responsible for their own well-being and the decisions that need to be 
made to ensure this well-being. Neoliberalism not only establishes the 
conditions of this responsibility, but also shapes how this responsibility is 
to be manifested as subjects deal with the risks attached to freedom.
This paper discusses the relationship between governmentality the-
ory, neoliberalism and risk before exploring how the contemporary video 
game naturalizes a neoliberal decision-making process that is increas-
ingly characterized by an approach grounded in risk and risk manage-
ment. Given the popularity of the contemporary video game, this essay 
demonstrates how neoliberal discourses oriented around risk express 
themselves in leisure spaces and position subjects to approach decisions 
in a specifically neoliberal manner with respect to risk. Given the essay’s 
focus on the video game itself, it does not account for how users respond 
to or take up these neoliberal ideas in practice. After all, video games exist 
as possibility spaces in which users actualize these possibilities through 
a game’s respective rules.1 How these choices in the medium shape their 
choices outside the medium goes beyond the scope of this essay. This 
project’s narrower concentration on the video game itself argues that 
it functions as a technology of neoliberal government, one component 
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within a broader assemblage of forces by which governing authorities 
instantiate desired conduct.2 With the paper’s closer focus on desired 
conduct and its relation to risk, it extends prior work linking neoliberal-
ism to the digital game.3 
Governmentality, Neoliberalism, Risk﻿
One of the ways in which scholars have approached neoliberalism and 
risk has been through governmentality theory. Foucault defines gov-
ernmentality as “the way in which one conducts the conduct of men.”4 
This definition is echoed by others who have followed Foucault in theo-
rizing about government.5 Governmentality theory not only focuses on 
government writ large, but on micro-processes of government as well. 
Governmentality bridges the analysis of a broader biopolitics of gov-
erning the conduct of populations to that of the anatomo-politics of the 
governing of individuals and selves and their conduct.6 As such, govern-
mentality examines how power flows function apart from the State and 
considers governing practices.7 Those who have used governmentality 
theory to address present social and political conditions have concen-
trated on a relatively recent iteration of government, advanced liberal or 
neoliberal governmentality. 
Those subscribing to governmentality theory explain neoliberalism 
by grounding it in an older liberalism and this liberalism’s accompany-
ing preoccupation with the free market. In his examination of the eigh-
teenth century roots of neoliberal governmentality, Foucault8 argues that 
the market became the guiding metaphor for liberal governing. The mar-
ket was understood to obey natural laws, laws that expressed themselves 
in prices that rose and fell with supply and demand. In order for these 
natural laws to play themselves out, those operating within the market 
were to be given as much freedom as possible. This market freedom was 
extended to an evaluation of governmental practice such that the free 
market became the basis for the formation of a governmentality stress-
ing freedom. Government was no longer to impose power, but to manage 
freedom. The free market economy and liberal state ended up recipro-
cally supporting one another in their commitment to managing freedom. 
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These principles of eighteenth century liberalism find a renewal in 
twentieth century neoliberalism. With the advanced liberal or neolib-
eral rationalities of government prominent in the late twentieth and early 
twenty-first century, the power of government finds justification in “arti-
ficially arranged or contrived forms of the free, entrepreneurial and com-
petitive conduct of economic-rational individuals.”9 In this context, the 
governed, free, neoliberal subject becomes what Foucault variously calls 
homo economicus, “an active economic subject”10 and an entrepreneur 
of the self. The economic subject must think about the self and others 
as engaged in competition where choices must be made about scarce 
resources. Notions of supply and demand and investment-costs-profit 
become the way the individual relates to the self and then outward. The 
entrepreneurial self is invited to employ “certain management, economic, 
and actuarial techniques”11 in everyday practice. As such, in neoliberal-
ism, the market is applied to traditionally non-economic social phenom-
ena such that subjects consistently operate through this entrepreneurial 
lens and employ its techniques in their conduct.12 
Neoliberalism and Risk﻿
To function as an entrepreneurial self is to necessarily consider one’s 
future. How this future is understood and how decisions are made about 
this future take on particular contours within neoliberalism. Given the 
neoliberal subject’s freedom to function as an entrepreneurial self, they 
are simultaneously responsible for dealing with the risks of potential dan-
gers and misfortune attached to this freedom as well. How is risk under-
stood within the framework of a neoliberal governmentality? 
Governmentality theorists have argued that risk can be understood 
as a governmental rationality, a particular way of thinking about and 
responding to governmental problematics. These rationalities render 
reality in a particular way so that governing may occur.13 Rendering real-
ity in terms of risk serves as an expression of a specific governmental 
rationality tied to governing the future. Risk management becomes the 
rational response to risk for its “identification, assessment, elimination or 
reduction of the possibility of incurring misfortune or loss.”14 Assessing 
and managing risk engages a precarious future. O’Malley affirms the 
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future orientation of risk in arguing that risk produces “the state to be 
avoided, the state to be achieved, and the acceptability of ways whereby 
the two conditions should be governed.”15 Within neoliberal approaches 
to these future conditions, risk and risk management take on a specific 
shape characterized by an emphasis on individualism, a privileging of a 
scientific, actuarial matrix of expertise and its accompanying bias toward 
a quantitative epistemology. 
First, in neoliberalism, risk is predominantly an individual matter. If 
the neoliberal self is an entrepreneurial self, then this self must neces-
sarily be induced to adopt a particularly individualistic rationality with 
respect to risk. The entrepreneurial self ’s more individualized approach 
to risk contrasts older approaches to risk in the more collectivist welfare 
state. As Rose points out, risk used to be understood as social.16 Early 
forms of statistical reasoning in nineteenth century France and Italy were 
deployed in the service of dealing with collective risks attached to public 
security and public health.17 In the nineteenth century, establishing secu-
rity over and against various forms of risk meant becoming part of social 
organizations like trade associations and, at a broader more compulsory 
level, national social insurance programs. Risk was collectivized within 
these types of social structures.18 
However, in neoliberalism, this collective approach to risk has been 
challenged under the pressure of free markets that require individuals to 
be responsible for their own well-being. As an example, social insurance 
programs have come to be understood to foster a culture of dependence 
and laziness. Neoliberal subjects are encouraged to consider their indi-
vidual futures rather than depend on social entities for what is to come. 
Lazzarato goes so far as to argue that neoliberal subjects exist in a context 
permeated by “permanent insecurity and precarity.”19 As a consequence 
of subjects being left free to address the promise and peril of their respec-
tive futures, entrepreneurial selves are positioned to adopt a rationality 
of risk and risk management. Subjects begin to operate in a context char-
acterized by, what O’Malley calls “prudentialism.”20 This prudentialism 
places the responsibility for managing risk on the individual who can no 
longer rely on larger social collectives to deal with risk. Risk and tech-
niques for managing risk become privatized and individuals are encour-
aged to govern themselves responsibly in addressing risk, i.e. to act with 
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prudence. The rational individual practices a rationality of risk manage-
ment in order to act prudentially and successfully deal with risk. 
A second aspect of the relation between neoliberalism and risk con-
cerns a privileging of what might be deemed a scientific, actuarial matrix 
of expertise. Although the entrepreneurial self is incited to take respon-
sibility for risk without relying on a broader collectivity, neoliberalism 
makes particular forms of expertise readily available. Entrepreneurial 
selves are invited to take advantage of this expertise as a way to be respon-
sible and this expertise becomes one of the ways by which responsibility 
is understood. Governmentality theorists have suggested that expertise 
serves as one of the primary ways in which governmental objectives are 
translated into everyday experience. Experts assert truth claims and dis-
pense pedagogical resources as a way to incite individuals to act in keep-
ing with governmental objectives. For example, experts might teach 
subjects how to achieve greater earning capacity or improved health. 
Expertise makes government possible and legitimizes it by mediating 
governmental objectives such that “self regulatory techniques can be 
installed in citizens that will align their personal choices with the ends of 
government.”21 
In most cases, the power to define what constitutes risk and how 
it ought to be addressed is held by those with social power. In neolib-
eralism, experts who were once respected and subsequently possessed 
relative autonomy in the welfare state have their expert knowledge cri-
tiqued.22 With respect to risk, older forms of expertise become substi-
tuted for a scientific, actuarial matrix of expertise. 
Although Beck does not subscribe to governmentality theory, his 
discussion of scientific expertise and its relation to risk is helpful here. 
Beck asserts that, in the context of risk, one of the foremost sites where 
this social power is expressed is the scientific community.23 For him, risk 
has come to only be detected in the contemporary situation through the 
extended senses of the scientific. Scientific senses render risk visible. 
Beck goes so far as to say that if a risk cannot be scientifically recognized, 
then it ostensibly does not exist. Science has the social power to dictate 
what constitutes risk and how the public perceives these risks. Scientists 
serve as the experts whose expertise is incontrovertible. Proof of risk’s 
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existence and what constitutes and causes risk become the purview of 
these scientific experts. 
In the overwhelming majority of instances, the sciences employ quan-
titative methods to render risk visible. This methodology assumes that 
“scientific methods of measurement and calculation are the most appro-
priate way to approach risks descriptively, explanatorily and prognosti-
cally, and importantly, also politically.”24 With this emphasis on the cal-
culative approach to risk, Beck echoes Foucault’s discussion of a more 
specific kind of scientific gaze, the medical gaze on the body, a quantify-
ing gaze that made “it possible to outline chances and risks; it was calcu-
lating.”25 These quantitative methods applied to risk sit at the core of a 
specific type of science, actuarial science. Actuarial science is expressed 
in practice through actuarialism. This actuarialism can be characterized 
by an emphasis on non-invasive forms of routine surveillance, a greater 
and greater speed in the acquisition of information for the purpose of 
managing populations, an approach to risk that is heavily based in sta-
tistical knowledge, a morality that is grounded in statistical norms and a 
production of risk that engenders increasing numbers of risks.26 Actuarial 
science produces mountains of quantitative data as a way to manage the 
risks that it continuously produces and makes intelligible. 
Because science and actuarial science make risk visible and perpetu-
ate risk, they bring along an attendant epistemological assumption that 
perceives risk through a causal frame. Beck argues that, 
in order to recognize risks at all and make them the reference 
point of one’s own thought and action, it is necessary on prin-
ciple that invisible causality relationships between objectively, 
temporally, and spatially very divergent conditions, as well as 
more or less speculative projections, be believed.27 
As the expertise of science presents these cause-effect relations with 
respect to risk and persuades individuals to believe in these relations, 
this causal perspective necessarily fosters a zone of responsibility for 
those subject to these discourses. If risks are grounded in causes, then 
responsible interventions can occur before deleterious effects ensue. 
For subjects to refuse to perceive risk through this causal lens is to be 
irresponsible. For Beck,28 ordinary citizens are not allowed to question 
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these assumptions or to redefine these questions surrounding risk for 
themselves. They must adopt this causal approach to risk and subse-
quently practice responsibility for managing risk according to the defi-
nitions offered them by said experts. As non-experts with more limited 
knowledge, they have responsibility foisted upon them in the midst of 
myriad variables.
As part of this shift from older forms of expertise toward a neoliber-
ally-inflected, scientific, actuarial expertise, a broader commercial culture 
of risk arises. The risk industry and various professions linked to mini-
mizing, managing and preventing risk feed concerns about risk by cre-
ating and marketing various products that presumably allow us control 
over our own fates.29 The rationality fostered by the risk industry gener-
ates “a relentless imperative of risk management not simply in relation to 
contracting for insurance, but also through daily lifestyle management, 
choices of where to live and shop, what to eat and drink, stress manage-
ment and exercise….”30 The risk industry not only touches the outer 
person, but the inner person as well as it capitalizes on risk management 
techniques linked to self-esteem and empowerment. The risk industry 
encourages subjects to take responsibility for themselves by operating 
within the parameters of efficiency and cost-benefit analysis as a way to 
incite them to a semblance of agency. 
The neoliberal culture of risk becomes amplified and exacerbated 
such that few areas of life remain untouched by its perpetuation of a risk 
management rationality. Personal choices come to be increasingly ori-
ented around risk, a risk that is defined by scientific, actuarial expertise 
and mediated through the risk industry. Risk experts functioning within 
the risk industry adopt an incontrovertible monopoly on risk assessment 
and governance as they incite individuals to responsible action.31 
As the scientific, actuarial matrix of expertise operates in the cultiva-
tion of responsibility, it works in and through a third element of neoliber-
alism’s relation to risk, technologies of government. Risk and techniques 
for risk management are produced by and mediated through technolo-
gies of government. In governmentality theory, technologies of govern-
ment do not necessarily function as direct connections from governmen-
tal authority to individuals and groups. Rather, they exist as part of what 
Rose and Miller perceive as “the complex assemblage of diverse forces” 
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that operate to instantiate the interests of government in those who make 
decisions.32 Technologies of government play an important role in real-
izing governmental thought.33 They serve as the various ways in which 
individual conduct, thinking, and goals are shaped and normalized for 
the purpose of governmental goals.34 These technologies may be more 
formal with respect to forces circulating around law and finance or they 
may be “humble and mundane”35 in operating through the everyday 
mechanisms of things like calculations, surveys and speech communi-
ties.36 Technologies of government are not essentially linked to specific 
forms of governmentality. Rather, technologies only become important 
in their relation to ideas and practices as certain manifestations of gov-
ernmentality facilitate and pattern these various practices within their 
respective techno-social relations.37 What is significant for this discussion 
is “how a given technology or space is combined, at a particular point 
in time, with various discourses, political and ethical ideals and already 
established habits to form a loose assemblage of governmental agency.”38 
Technologies of government become one component within a broader 
governmentality. 
Following from the discussion above, an important part of engag-
ing risk and managing risk in neoliberalism revolves around technolo-
gies of government linked to quantitative or calculative rationality. 
Entrepreneurial selves operating in a neoliberal context function as, “risk-
assessors, performing the felicity calculus in an attempt to plot the prob-
able and possible consequences of their actions.”39 Quantifying technolo-
gies of government allow these selves to determine what is in their best 
interests in the present and for the future. 
Greater reliance on quantification has led to an increasing conscious-
ness of risk.40 As alluded to above, in their deployment within science 
and actuarial science, numbers play a vital role in producing risk and 
dealing with risk within liberal and neoliberal government. They enable 
certain knowledges and the decision-making processes that follow from 
these knowledges. Subsequently, numbers both constitute risk and 
become the basis for managing risk. Numbers are also important for the 
communication of risk. With their ability to momentarily stabilize vari-
ous dynamic processes, numbers allow for a consideration of probability. 
Probabilities invariably connect to assessing various degrees of risk. This 
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kind of thinking renders risk both visible and calculable in the present. 
Risk becomes “disciplined, by means of the statistical intelligibility that 
the collective laws of large numbers seemed to provide.”41 
Numbers typically inform risk assessments. These risk assessments 
become pedagogical tools that not only teach the entrepreneurial self 
which decisions to make, but how to think about decision-making. This 
how is often linked to quantification such that risk assessments further 
what might also be understood as an audit rationality. The audit rational-
ity subsequently becomes an important way that entrepreneurial selves 
govern themselves. To practice auditing and to be made auditable is part 
and parcel of functioning within spaces of risk management.42 Numbers 
also begin to shape the type and nature of choices afforded the entrepre-
neurial self. Under the influence of the economic freedom of neoliberal-
ism, choice is rendered calculable as subjects attempt to rationalize and 
optimize their activity.43 These choices are presented against a backdrop 
of risk that is itself buttressed by quantification. Numbers subsequently 
further the subject who can be “rendered calculable to others and to him- 
or herself in terms of numbers.”44 Numbers transform individuals into 
calculating selves who subsequently calculate, predict and evaluate their 
own actions and the actions of others, especially within the context of 
risk. As such, numbers come to govern individual behavior.45 
To combine the ideas of neoliberalism and the free entrepreneurial 
self, that self ’s relation to scientific, actuarial expertise and technologies 
of government that further shape this self ’s relation to risk is to see the 
pervasive nature of risk in a neoliberal context. Within this context, Rose 
sees the risk industry generating a constant stream of imperatives inciting 
subjects to carefully manage risk in multiple social domains.46 This risk 
industry might be comprised of insurance, security and self-help busi-
nesses. However, discourses of risk also find themselves into leisure space 
as well. In the remainder of this essay, I explore the video game, as one 
“humble and mundane” site within which risk and risk management are 
expressed as the right way to attempt to govern an unknown future.47 The 
essay takes up how the technology of the video game combines with neo-
liberal discourses on risk to serve as one component of a broader, loose 
assemblage of neoliberal governmental agency.
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Quantification and Risk﻿ in the Video Game
Of specific interest to me in this paper are questions addressing how risk 
and risk management are made intelligible through the technology of the 
video game. It would be an exaggeration to argue that all video games 
invoke a specifically neoliberal approach to video games. However, many 
popular video game genres including the music, real time and turn-based 
strategy, first person shooter, and role playing game genres can be more 
deeply understood through this neoliberal lens. In order to illustrate 
how a neoliberal rationality of risk expresses itself concretely, I turn spe-
cifically to another genre where this rationality appears, the sports video 
game genre. More particularly, the remainder of this essay looks at one 
example by analyzing SI Games’ popular soccer management simulation, 
Football Manager 201048 (hereafter FM10), from a critical perspective. 
Although FM10 certainly cannot represent the diversity of video games, 
many of the game mechanics discussed below can be applied to other 
sports games and games in other genres. 
In FM10, the game’s users are not merely football managers, but are 
simultaneously positioned as entrepreneurial selves who must man-
age risk. Users must function as entrepreneurial selves by managing risk 
by deploying various scarce resources to move the club along the road 
to success and by locating important relationships between causes and 
effects. However, not only are users risk managers, but the game also 
positions them as subjects of risk. Users must accomplish these objec-
tives even as they are subject to risk in being under constant surveillance 
from the club’s virtual supporters and chairman. The game subsequently 
naturalizes an existence as a neoliberal entrepreneurial self who must 
deal with risk while simultaneously being subject to risk. 
Users as Risk﻿ Managers
First and foremost, users are positioned as risk managers. In order to 
achieve the game’s goals of winning championships and in some cases, 
generating virtual revenue, users must analyze the quantified attributes 
and performances of virtual athletes to assess present game events and 
plan future in-game choices. As such, the user becomes aligned with a 
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particular approach to risk management characterized by an engagement 
with numbers at nearly every turn. 
Statistical Productivity
The way that FM10 mediates game information mirrors other forms of 
new media in the sports media complex that provide quantitative indi-
ces measuring typical categories linked to either a given athlete’s bodily 
characteristics or production.49 Professional teams will often evaluate 
potential additions to their squads based on heights, weights, and speed 
or on previous statistical performance in another context. FM10 gives 
users access to these kinds of measurements in full force. Every player’s 
profile screen features his height, weight, age, wages and estimated value. 
In addition, FM10’s game engine quantifies myriad statistics that track 
the productivity of individual players as it simulates matches. Among 
these statistics include game appearances, goals, assists, man of the 
match awards, yellow and red cards, tackles succeeded and attempted 
per game, key tackles, passes completed and attempted, pass comple-
tion percentage, key passes, intercepted passes, runs into space, num-
ber of times caught offsides, dribbles per game, shots on target percent-
age, fouls, fouls against, penalties taken and scored, average minutes per 
goal, minutes since last goal, headers won and attempted, key headers, 
total distance covered and distance covered per ninety minutes, mistakes 
leading to goals and total mistakes, and condition percentage. The game 
engine uses these numbers in a given match to come up with a match 
rating. These match ratings are then aggregated and averaged to provide 
the user a sense of that player’s performance over the course of a given 
season. Alongside the average rating, users can find out a player’s lowest 
and highest ratings of the season.
As users play a match, the game continues tracking all of these statis-
tics and makes them readily available at the click of a mouse button. It is 
entirely possible to play the game like a real world manager by watching 
the action unfold over the course of ninety real world minutes. Users can 
literally watch their players move, shoot and pass in a 3D representation 
of the match. Much like real world managers, users can simply observe 
how their players perform and adjust their tactics accordingly. If a user 
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notices shots flying past the post on a consistent basis, that striker might 
become a prime candidate for a substitution. If a user sees a midfielder 
aggressively committing too many fouls, that player’s instructions can be 
modified to make him more cautious. Playing the game this way entails 
observing the action on the pitch and responding accordingly. However, 
for users to play a whole season this way would be incredibly time con-
suming and potentially test any user’s patience. 
Choosing to play FM10 in this pedestrian, real world style ostensibly 
deviates from the implied intention of the game’s design. FM10’s foot-
ball universe includes 117 leagues yielding a massive number of clubs 
for users to potentially manage. The manageable teams range all the way 
from the globally popular such as Spain’s, Real Madrid, to the regionally 
obscure like Singapore’s, Balestier Khalsa FC. FM10 allows for the possi-
bility that a team from, for example, one of the English league structure’s 
semi-pro divisions could one day compete in the same division against 
Premier League giants, Manchester United and Chelsea. Although 
Sports Interactive allows users to manage the world’s biggest clubs, the 
company actively encourages the fantasies of supporters of lower divi-
sion clubs. FM10’s official website features a discussion forum section 
dedicated to so-called lower league managers who can share strategies 
and another sub-section for stories from these managers who have taken 
their clubs from virtual local obscurity to the heights of glory in world 
football. The existence of this dedicated forum area suggests the develop-
ers’ desire to see users achieve successes that would be near impossible 
in the real world. One of the obstacles to this success might be the time 
investment required if users played each match in real time. To adopt this 
approach and make the shift from the sixth tier of English football in the 
Blue Square South to the top tier of the Premier League would require 
users to play at least 222 games (not including exhibition and cup games) 
and work through five seasons of play. For users to achieve this goal by 
managing matches in real time would mean nearly 20,000 minutes or 
upwards of 333 hours playing the game. Putting in this time is certainly 
possible, but highly unlikely, for the overwhelming majority of users. It 
would also make users’ rags-to-riches experiences, experiences that serve 
as official and unofficial marketing material, extremely rare given the time 
investment required. 
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SI has dealt with this time issue by allowing users the chance to 
quickly simulate a large portion of the match. Users have the option of 
managing a match, but limiting what they see in the 3D representation to 
only goals or only key highlights (free and corner kicks, important tack-
les, excellent saves, yellow and red cards, narrowly missed shots on goal 
and the goals themselves). Restricting the visual representation of events 
in each match dramatically reduces the time users need to complete it. 
Rather than requiring ninety minutes in real time, matches can now be 
finished in five or ten minutes of real time. The sharply accelerated clock 
has some consequences for how the user’s experience unfolds. With 
the match’s virtual minutes flying by, users are unable to see what their 
players are doing outside of these key highlights. Accelerating the clock 
means skipping over events the game does not deem highlight worthy. 
In order to make the unseen visible as and help users discern what 
is happening between these visually represented highlights, FM10 con-
stantly tracks the aforementioned statistics and provides users access to 
these numbers. Users see what cannot be seen by looking at the data the 
game produces. As a result, the game positions users to consistently be 
accessing quantitative data as a way to gauge how well their team and 
individual players are performing. Users must attend to team perfor-
mance statistics like what percentage of time the team possesses the ball 
and/or how often they have possession in a given area of the field, overall 
pass completion percentage and how many long shots have been taken. 
Users must also carefully examine individual statistics as well. These sta-
tistics provide greater insight into specific player performances in a given 
match. In addition, users also see a percentage measuring a player’s physi-
cal condition. The percentage slowly falls throughout the match to reflect 
a player’s level of fatigue or suddenly drops to indicate a short term or 
potentially long term injury. Consequently, the numbers mediate events 
that, due to a user’s time constraints, cannot be experienced personally in 
keeping with how numbers function at a more general level.50 
Even though users might not be able to witness various forms of 
potential misfortune and loss to their teams or their players directly, 
the numbers the game generates renders these dangers visible and ame-
nable to intervention. In this respect, the computer becomes the virtual 
quasi-scientific, actuarial expert producing the data users can employ 
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to make decisions. As users engage this data, they invariably perceive 
potential threats to their teams in accordance with the risks produced by 
the computer. 
The highly quantified nature of the match experience furthers the 
instantiation of a neoliberal approach to decision-making. By presenting 
users with an avalanche of numbers, FM10 positions them to function as 
entrepreneurial selves who must manage risk by making constant assess-
ments of the data being presented to them. Invariably, this data repre-
sents the existence of threats or potential threats to the user’s team. Users 
are positioned to engage this data for the causes of the effects that are the 
game events. Users may not be able to see their central midfielder suc-
cessfully breaking up opposition attacks with skillful tackles, but the data 
allows them to make this conclusion. Users may not be able to see their 
club being overwhelmed by the percentage of an opposition’s possession, 
but the displayed percentage that has been calculated by the simulation 
can move the user to switch to a counter-attacking strategy to absorb the 
pressure. Users may not see their team’s lack of success in the attacking 
zone, but they can look at the shot count breakdown and instruct their 
players to work the ball into the penalty area rather than have them take 
longer shots from distance. By checking on scores in other matches, users 
might instruct the squad to adopt a more attacking or conservative men-
tality. These statistics become the causes for making tactical changes to 
the team’s playing style or formation that potentially yield the desired 
effects of victory. 
Potential risks also operate on an individual player level as well. Users 
may check the data to see how many fouls a given defender might be com-
mitting and instruct that player to defend more cautiously. Conversely, 
taking advantage of a poor opposing defender might mean asking a 
winger or a forward to run with the ball more often in hopes of drawing 
more fouls and potential yellow or red cards. Examining how many shots 
on goal a given striker may have successfully put on target could mean 
the difference between leaving him in the game or inserting a substitute. 
One of the most important numbers users engage in a match is the condi-
tioning percentage. As a player’s conditioning percentage drops through-
out a match, he becomes less effective. For users to fail to respond with 
a substitution could mean tired players committing costly mental errors 
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or slightly injured players turning a minor knock into something much 
more serious. All of these risks come together in the potential for a loss, 
a downward step on the league table and the potential threat of a lost 
virtual job.
Quantifying the Body
Although some exceptions exist, like the aforementioned player condi-
tion percentage, the statistical tracking that occurs during matches in 
FM10 mirrors other types of quantitative representation in media across 
the sports media complex. By tracking the production of an athlete’s 
labor, FM10 generates data that looks very similar to that which can be 
found on websites and on television broadcasts. However, differentiat-
ing FM10 from other forms of measurement in these media is the game’s 
preoccupation with quantification beyond a given player’s direct on-field 
productivity. Where the conventional statistical categories still mediate 
a player’s labor production and overall contribution to a squad’s success 
or failure, FM10 quantifies variables that have no real world correlation. 
To quantify that which really cannot be truly quantified is to place a grid 
of intelligibility over the seemingly immeasurable and position it within 
the parameters of risk management to an even greater degree. The user as 
entrepreneurial self must navigate the risks of decisions grounded in the 
quantification of intangibles linked to the athletic body and its potential. 
With respect to individual players, each of the more than 297,000 
football players in the database is represented by a series of attributes 
that mediate that player’s physical composition and talent. Again, the 
computer as expert provides this data to the user. The attributes for 
each player are divided into three categories: mental, physical and tech-
nical. First, mental attributes represent a player’s ability to think on the 
pitch and provide a rudimentary psychological profile. Players with high 
mental attributes will continue to give their maximum effort no matter 
whether the team is favored to take an easy victory or facing near impos-
sible odds. Mental attributes also indicate how players read and react 
to situations as the match unfolds. These attributes include variables 
like anticipation, creativity, determination, positioning and work rate. 
Second, a player’s physical attributes represent his body’s ability to move. 
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Physical attributes include acceleration, jumping, natural fitness, and 
strength. The game’s manual suggests that physical attributes are most 
important stating that if a player has sound physical attributes, “he’ll be 
able to play a competent game and make sure he isn’t embarrassed much” 
and that “he has the required attributes to be a solid footballer.”51 Third, 
technical attributes most directly represent what might be approximated 
as a player’s ‘acquired’ football skills. Technical attributes include drib-
bling, free kick taking, passing and tackling. The manual states that high 
technical attributes differentiate the best players from the above average 
and average players. Elite players will always possess high ratings in tech-
nical attributes. The cumulative effect of these attribute categories means 
that every player in the database is assigned a rating of 1-20 for each of 
the game’s forty-two player attributes. These attributes also combine 
with the level of competition in the player’s league to provide him with 
a valuation. This valuation becomes a guide outlining roughly how much 
a team would have to pay to acquire his services. In order to understand 
how their chosen club is performing, users must engage these different 
attributes and their relationship to the attributes of opposing teams.
The sum total of the way these numbers constitute the reality of 
the game world constructs the athlete as what Rose calls a “calculable 
other.”52 This calculable other becomes a scarce resource users deploy in 
the game. The real world athlete becomes subject to the ratings systems 
in place in digital sports games; the user engages with that athlete almost 
entirely on the basis of that athlete’s enumerative representation. To look 
at the individual player profile screen and its quantification of the athletic 
body is to see a bridge between a scientific cause-effect approach to risk 
and governmentality theory’s connection between the market and an 
entrepreneurial approach to risk. By quantifying the player into a series 
of respective attributes, the athletic body become subject to the purview 
of the scientific, actuarial gaze as its component parts are dissected and 
made available for scrutiny. As stated above, for users to ignore these 
attributes would be to fail to adequately assess potential causes for the 
effects that ensue during matches. 
In order to play the game in a responsible way, the user must engage 
the game world in the same way that Foucault53 describes how liberal 
governments engaged those they managed. In both instances, statistics 
202 Andrew Baerg
allow for surveillance, analysis and intervention into the lives of popula-
tions. Respective virtual and material individual bodies became subject 
to the statistical such that numbers became the basis for distinguishing 
between “the more or less utilizable, more or less amenable to profitable 
investment, those with greater or less prospects of survival, death, and 
illness, and with more or less capacity for being carefully trained.”54 To 
assess whether a given player is more or less utilizable, a sound invest-
ment, has a better chance of thriving on one’s squad, whether he is head-
ing towards the end of his career, might be prone to injury or has the 
potential to be managed successfully is to function as an entrepreneur-
ial self. The virtual athletic body becomes a potentiality from which the 
user must maximize to extract the greatest value. To look at the different 
attributes of various players is to be able to compare them through the 
numbers the game provides. Given that the player serves as a resource, 
and a scarce resource when it comes to the game’s best players, the user 
is positioned to act as an entrepreneur who must responsibly deploy this 
resource for a set of desirable ends. 
In FM10, the entrepreneurial self who is the user is positioned to 
deploy quantitative data to make risk-based decisions that not only 
potentially yield success, but also guard against loss and failure. As a 
result, turning athletes into calculable others renders them subject to risk 
and risk management practices through the mediation of their respective 
abilities in the number. For users to fail to perceive the importance of 
these numbers is to fail to play the game responsibly. Invariably, ignoring 
player performance on the pitch or the players’ respective attributes off 
of it will mean being fired from one’s managerial position and potentially 
without an ability to continue playing the game. 
User as Subject to Risk﻿
Not only does FM10 position users as risk managers, but users them-
selves become subject to risk management. Given their place as manag-
ers functioning between the virtual playing staff and virtual boardroom, 
users are responsible to the authorities above them who have the ability 
to continue to allow them to manage the squad or to dismiss them from 
their managerial position. 
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In FM10, individual players, teams and club finances quantified for 
careful risk management. However, the user’s alter ego is also quanti-
fied as well. Users can examine their manager’s profile for information 
about their existing contract, the virtual wages they are earning and their 
general knowledge of certain areas of the global football landscape. This 
managerial profile is also supplemented by a page dedicated to a manag-
er’s statistics. Data on this screen is aggregated from player purchases and 
sales, the amount the manager has earned over the course of the game, 
match performance, league and cup wins, goals scored and conceded, the 
number of awards won and the time spent at the current club. This screen 
also reveals the user’s Hall of Fame ranking, an in game sorting of man-
agers past and present. Users can compare themselves to managers with 
their chosen nationality, managers in the nation in which they are com-
peting, and managers continent-wide and worldwide.
More interestingly, the user’s manager is rated using the same 1-20 
scale that is employed to rate specific player attributes. However, rather 
than rating the manager’s physical characteristics and talent, the user’s 
manager is rated in the areas of player loyalty, domestic player bias, finan-
cial control, hands on approach, squad discipline and tactical consistency. 
These categories relate to the manager’s mental approach and shift and 
change depending on the decisions the user makes throughout the game 
experience. Although it is difficult to tell whether these attributes play an 
important role in shaping how the game unfolds, it would seem that club 
chairmen would take these numbers into account in deciding whether or 
not a manager should be hired or fired. 
In addition to this quantitative information, at the beginning of each 
game month, users are sent a message from the chairman with a synopsis 
of the previous month’s performance. This message reports on how the 
chairman perceives the club’s position in the league, recent match out-
comes and whether the club turned a profit or suffered a financial loss in 
the preceding period. From this screen, users can click and access infor-
mation about their overall performance with respect to competitions, 
transfers, individual match performance, individual player performance 
and finances. Within each of these categories, a horizontal bar graph iden-
tifies how well the user is performing over and against the expectations 
established by the club’s chairman and fans. These performance graphs 
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are subsequently used to determine whether users keep their jobs or are 
relieved of their duties. The reasons for a firing might be anything from 
poor match results to unwise financial decisions to irresponsible appeals 
to the chairmen for more resources of various kinds. 
For FM10 to quantify the user in this way is to constitute the user as 
an entrepreneurial calculable self within a broader context of quantifica-
tion and risk. With the ascendance of quantitative methods employed in 
neoliberal governing, Rose notes that we see the rise of the person oper-
ating within these boundaries—one who can be “rendered calculable to 
others and to him- or herself in terms of numbers.”55 Dean agrees with 
Rose’s contention in suggesting that technologies of performance linked 
to numbers transform professionals into “‘calculable individuals’ within 
‘calculable spaces’, subject to ‘calculative regimes.’”56 From Dean’s per-
spective, the calculated self performs in keeping with the standards estab-
lished under regimes of calculation instead of freely acting as they wish. 
This appears to hold for FM10 as users come to understand themselves as 
subject to risk through their managerial profiles and performance graphs. 
Users cannot evaluate players and their own performances based on their 
own criteria. Rather, they are positioned to make decisions in accordance 
with their status as calculable selves who, by virtue of the quantified 
nature of the experience, are themselves subject to risk management. 
As such, not only do users virtually responsibilize the players under 
their managerial purview, but they themselves become responsibilized 
through the numbers assessing their performance. Numbers move peo-
ple to be responsible for their own conduct in that “they turn the individ-
ual into a calculating self endowed with a range of ways of thinking about, 
calculating about, predicting and judging their own activities and those of 
others.”57 Managers working from these principles rationalize employee 
performance via quantification while employees working under these 
managers attempt to maximize their production quantitatively. In FM10, 
this internalization of a calculative rationality functions both ways. 
In some respects FM10’s managerial profile feature completes a circle 
that began with the quantification of the athlete into a series of ratings. 
Whereas prior digital sports games enumerated only the athletes and 
their performances, to have the user’s virtual managerial self quantified 
extends this enumeration to users themselves. As they submit themselves 
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to being measured and assessed, users become virtual athletes in their 
own right subject to the same quantitative discourses and their atten-
dant links to risk and risk management as the athletes being represented. 
As such, users not only govern through discourses of risk, but are also 
positioned as potential risks themselves. By positioning users to make 
decisions based on quantitative information, FM10 naturalizes an entre-
preneurial self who must deploy a risk management approach to future 
outcomes. By positioning users as quantified information, FM10 natu-
ralizes an entrepreneurial self who is responsibilized and subject to risk 
management. 
Even as FM10 quantifies all of this information and positions the user 
as an entrepreneurial self engaging risk, it also seems possible that the 
grid of rationality placed over this virtual football world may be eliding 
any potential failure of neoliberal political rationalities. FM10’s persis-
tent imperative to feed the user numbers cloaks the idea that some things 
cannot be understood apart from quantitative information. Through the 
numerical assessment of a player’s mental abilities or the user’s loyalty 
as a manager, FM10 transforms the subjective into the apparently objec-
tive via enumeration. As such, playing the game becomes an exercise in 
engaging both calculable risk and believing the notion that the incalcu-
lable can always be rendered calculable. This constant calculation affirms 
Beck’s insistence on the contemporary “compulsive pretense of control 
over the uncontrollable, whether in politics, law, science, the economy or 
everyday life.”58 FM10 illustrates this pretentious control as it positions 
users to conduct themselves through calculation on multiple levels.
Although it is certainly possible for users to engage in “counter con-
ducts”59 and favor a given virtual athlete as a consequence of an emo-
tional attachment to his/her real world counterpart, these kinds of inter-
actions would appear to be infrequent. It is also entirely possible to play 
FM10 against the intentions of the virtual universe’s chairmen, coaches 
and players. Some users do find great pleasure in creating a managerial 
profile, appointing themselves as manager of one of their most hated 
rival teams with this profile and then running the despised club into the 
financial and footballing ground. These users then turn around and create 
a new managerial profile, appoint themselves as manager of their favor-
ite squad and enjoy taking advantage of that defanged rival. Other users 
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might attempt to create teams made up of only a certain nationality, to 
sign players from specific countries or form a squad from players with 
interesting names. 
Still others may resort to decision-making based in uncertainty rather 
than risk. Where governing through risk attempts to render the future 
objective through quantification, governing through uncertainty focuses 
on the “singular, infrequently recurring or unique.”60 Uncertainty differs 
from risk in that it does not employ quantitative measures as evidence 
in rational decision-making. Instead, professional judgments, rules of 
thumb, and experience take precedence over the statistically-based mea-
sures more conventionally associated with rationalities of risk. O’Malley 
is careful to argue that spaces of uncertainty are increasingly discursively 
absorbed into risk, but maintains that uncertainty still plays a major role 
in grounding practice. Even as the game positions users to make deci-
sions in accordance with risk management, they may mix uncertainty-
based and risk-based decision-making approaches in hybrid configura-
tions as they play.
Conclusion
To be sure, the video game does not provide a totalizing expression of 
neoliberalism nor does neoliberalism provide a totalizing explanation of 
the video game. Rather, video games serve as a space in which specific 
neoliberal ideas manifest themselves. Any neoliberal ideas that appear 
in a given video game may be combined and recombined with other 
types of governmental rationality depending on the game in question. 
However, at a general level, a governmental approach to the video game 
reveals neoliberalism’s cultural work within some of its common game 
mechanics, especially with respect to assessing and dealing with risk 
through discourses of calculation.
For the video game to naturalize a risk management oriented around 
calculation is to naturalize broader neoliberal discourses of scientifically 
and actuarially-inflected risk management. The video game mediates 
this cause-effect understanding of risk and justifies this understanding 
throughout multiple layers of its gameplay. Beck locates the conse-
quences of this understanding by arguing that it enables the domination 
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of “the ‘mathematical morality’ of expert thought,”61 a morality that, 
when combined with a public discourse informed by it hides itself mor-
ally and politically. This mathematical morality implies that right ethical 
decisions are those informed by quantitative data provided only through 
expertise. Additionally, by rendering the overwhelming majority of infor-
mation in the game through a quantitative lens, the video game positions 
the user as homo economicus. Foucault62 argues that serious problems 
derive from an economic approach to life. He questions why the scarce 
resource model should be consistently applied to a diversity of non-eco-
nomic situations. Even more problematic, for him, is the idea that ratio-
nal conduct is only rational when articulated to this economic conduct.
Even as neoliberal risk management appears most prevalent in the 
contemporary video game, one wonders how video games could change 
as a consequence of increased social networking, social networking that 
Terranova63 characterizes as production occurring outside of market 
mechanisms. This non-market production becomes oriented around 
cooperation rather than the competition that has characterized neoliber-
alism. She argues that social relations in this space revolve around treat-
ing others as human beings instead of actors within a market. Terranova 
positions these forms of production as a potential check on neoliberal 
governmentality. Perhaps the individual approach to risk in neoliberal-
ism will be superseded by the cooperation afforded by social networking 
technologies.
However, even if cooperation should become the hallmark of future 
video games as a consequence of social networking, it would seem that 
vestiges of the neoliberal governmentality discussed here would remain, 
at least in some capacity. As such, it would appear that video games could 
continue to be situated within a “diagram of post-disciplinary logics of 
control … based upon a dream of the technocratic control of the acci-
dental by continuous monitoring and management of risk.”64 
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Chapter 8
Neoliberalism in Publishing
A Prolegomenon
Jeffrey R. Di Leo
Neoliberalism has been eating away at publishing culture for a long time 
now. Its ascent in the publishing world is one of a gradual intensification 
of market considerations over aesthetic or scholarly ones—a story that 
holds to varying degrees both within the corporate publishing indus-
try and now within the university and small press publishing world. 
However, it is not one that has been widely considered—though it needs 
to be. The aim of this chapter is to provide a prolegomenon to neoliberal-
ism in publishing and to encourage others to consider the connections 
between the publishing world and the legacies of neoliberalism. The 
hope is that an understanding of the destructive powers of neoliberalism 
within the publishing world will empower and encourage authors and 
scholars to work to disrupt its further development and continued ascent 
through acts of resistance.1 
The rise of neoliberalism within the publishing world has displaced 
many of its traditional ways of operating. For example, today most 
authors do not deal directly with large presses anymore, rather this is 
left to their agents2; market data rather than aesthetics drives most large 
press decision making; the large presses essentially “own” the major book 
review outlets; multinational publishing corporations control the distri-
bution of books to the majority of stores; and the advances offered by 
large presses many times exceed the lifetime income of many authors. 
These and other factors centered upon increased control of the book 
market have created a disbalance in the publishing world wherein the big 
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presses keep getting bigger, more powerful, and fewer in number, and the 
smaller presses either get absorbed by the bigger ones or get smaller and 
more marginalized.
Moreover, the recent shift from a print to a digital book culture has 
only intensified the effects of neoliberalism in publishing. Not only are 
presses—both large and small—increasingly refusing to publish books 
that they fear will lose money or only appeal to a limited share of the 
market, but the number of physical venues to purchase these books 
is decreasing. As it becomes increasingly possible to find and purchase 
just about any book you are looking for through an online vendor such 
as Amazon.com, it becomes increasingly impossible to run a bricks-and-
mortar bookstore. Not only are private bookstores gradually disappear-
ing from towns and cities across America, so too are the large chain book-
stores that hastened the decline of the private bookstores. Bookstores 
like public libraries should be treated as public spaces where people can 
gather and seek out written entertainment, edification, and enlighten-
ment, or, if you will, infotainment. They are also often the site of read-
ings, book signings, discussion groups, and other activities grounded in 
dialogue and critical inquiry—two of the cornerstones of democratic 
culture. The demise of the bookstore is a major setback for democratic 
culture, and an example of the way in which public spaces are privatized 
under neoliberalism. 
“Neoliberalism,” writes Alfredo Saad-Filho and Deborah Johnston, 
“straddles a wide range of social, political, and economic phenomena at 
different levels of complexity.”3 Inquiry into the ways in which it strad-
dles the publishing world will reveal some of the ultimate constraints 
neoliberalism places on the marketplace for creativity and ideas. If profit 
generation and market considerations are the primary drivers of the 
publishing industry, and the publishing industry controls a major sec-
tion of information and creative dissemination including major book 
review outlets and other media, then there is not much hope that het-
erodox, innovative, and transformative thinking will be supported by it. 
Furthermore, the monopoly of this industry on knowledge dissemina-
tion threatens to render silent major avenues of creative innovation and 
critical dissent. In a way, small presses today are our best hope for over-
coming the neoliberal publishing stranglehold, but they are also the most 
Neoliberalism in Publishing 217
vulnerable, particularly as external support for them from agencies such 
as the National Endowment for the Arts and state-sponsored arts-coun-
cils declines. But how did the publishing world get here? What follows 
are a few snapshots from the story—a story that oddly enough can be 
said to begin with arguably the greatest—and most innovative—book of 
the twentieth-century: James Joyce’s Ulysses. 
The Rise of Corporate Publishing 
In 1932, when Random House sought to legally publish Ulysses in the 
United States, it was Bennett Cerf, one of the co-owners of the publish-
ing house that contacted the Irish novelist. After receiving Joyce’s consent 
to publish, Cerf had a copy of the book sent from Paris to New York, and 
then arranged for customs officials to seize it at the docks so that he could 
prepare for a court battle over it. Ten minutes after Judge John Woolsey 
of the New York district court delivered his verdict that the book was not 
legally obscene, Cerf had the typesetters at Random House working on 
Joyce’s masterpiece.4 
To many, Cerf, who co-founded Random House in 1925 with 
Donald Klopfer, and whose press also published Sinclair Lewis, William 
Faulkner, Gertrude Stein, Truman Capote, and John O’Hara, is one of 
the heroes of American publishing. Though Joyce’s book had been pub-
lished some ten years earlier by Sylvia Beach’s Shakespeare & Co. in Paris, 
because it was banned in the English-speaking world, Joyce did not profit 
from it until Cerf stood up for it in court. The legal publication of Ulysses 
by Random House finally allowed Joyce—rather than the Ulysses boot-
leggers—to reap more of the financial rewards of its publication. 
In hindsight—and from a less flattering perspective—moves like 
Cerf ’s acquisition of Ulysses and the building of a top-tier list of authors 
by his press can be seen as laying the groundwork for the rise of contem-
porary corporate publishing. That is to say, it foreshadows a publishing 
world where Simon & Schuster is a subsidiary of CBS, and HarperCollins 
is owned by News Corporation, the multimedia conglomerate founded 
by Rupert Murdoch; where twelve publishers out of approximately 
85,000 account for almost two-thirds of US trade and mass-market book 
sales5 ; where 90% of active publishers account for less than 10% of total 
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book sales6; where Random House alone accounts for over 13% of all 
US book sales and has world-wide sales revenues of almost 2.4 billion 
dollars7; and where Random House alone almost sells more books than 
58,795 US trade and mass-market publishers combined.8 How did this 
happen? How did it come to be that a few publishing corporations now 
control the majority of book sales in the United States? And what does it 
mean for the 58,795 “small” presses that reside in the shadows of corpo-
rate publishing giants like Random House?
In the case of Random House, by the 1950s, the co-owners began 
to worry about what would happen to the company if one of them died. 
Cerf said, “Donald and I knew that the real value of the company had 
increased each year, but nobody knew by how much.”9 He continued, 
“If its value was too high, how could the survivor afford to buy the other 
half, and how could the widow of the one who died raise enough cash to 
pay the estate tax?”10 Worries about the future of their company if one of 
them died led Cerf and Klopfer to sell 30% of their stock to the public in 
1959. “From then on,” writes Cerf, “we were publishing with one eye and 
watching our stock with the other.”11 “Instead of working for yourself and 
doing what you damn please, willing to risk a loss on something you want 
to do, if you’re any kind of honest man, you feel a responsibility to your 
stockholders,” wrote Cerf.12 
Going public opened the door to expanding the business, which it 
did shortly after going public by acquiring both Knopf13 and Pantheon.14 
Soon Time-Life took an interest in merging with Random House—a 
deal that eventually fell through when it became clear that the US 
Department of Justice would most likely oppose the merger on anti-trust 
grounds.15 In 1965, however, Random House was sold to RCA for 40 
million dollars, at which point Cerf stepped down as president. Cerf said 
they accepted RCA’s offer because “it was one of the great corporations 
of the country.”16 And who would disagree—the sale even allowed one 
of RCA’s writers, Truman Capote, to become one of its recording artists, 
releasing an album of readings from scenes from In Cold Blood in 1966.
By the time Random House was acquired by RCA, it was a much dif-
ferent publishing house from the one where Cerf wrote to Joyce about 
publishing Ulysses. Further acquisitions and mergers followed including 
its sale in 1980 from RCA to S.I. Newhouse, a wealthy businessman and 
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owner of a range of television stations, newspapers, and magazines, to its 
sale again in 1998 to Bertelsmann.17 Today “Random House” consists of 
over 60 imprints, divisions, and groups in the US and UK alone—with 
one of the imprints of “Random House” called “Random House.”18 
Random House is a perfect example of the effects the rise of a ruth-
less new form of market capitalism that activists and scholars have been 
warning us about for years. “It reifies and glorifies the reign of what are 
called the financial markets,” comments Pierre Bourdieu, “in other words 
the return to a kind of radical capitalism, with no other law than that of 
maximum profit, and unfettered capitalism without any disguise, but 
rationalized, pushed to the limit of its economic efficacy by the introduc-
tion of modern forms of domination, such as ‘business administration,’ 
and techniques of manipulation, such as market research and advertis-
ing.”19 Moreover, Random House’s recent merger with another of the 
largest publishing houses in the world, Penguin, is only further evidence 
of the continuing ruthlessness of this new form of market capitalism.20 
On October 29, 2012, a day that will go down in neoliberal publish-
ing history infamy, the two largest trade-book publishing corporations 
in the world—Random House and Penguin—announced that they will 
be merging. If approved by government regulators, the new Penguin 
Random House will account for about one in four books sold world-
wide. Worldwide revenues from this new publishing company will be in 
the neighborhood of 4 billion dollars. However, the annual revenues of 
Penguin’s parent company are even larger.21 
Pearson, the UK corporation which owns the Penguin Book Group, 
is by far the largest publishing corporation in the world with annual reve-
nues of nearly 8.5 billion dollars. It has 41,000 employees in 70 countries, 
and publishes over 4,000 fiction and non-fiction books per year. Pearson 
Education is the source of 75% of its revenues, whereas the remainder are 
divided between Penguin (18%), and the Financial Times (7%).22 
Though roughly a quarter the size of Penguin, Random House is the 
eighth largest publishing company in the world. Owned by Germany’s 
Bertelsmann AG, Random House had annual revenues in excess of 2.2 
billion dollars in 2011. However, with revenues in excess of 3.8 billion 
the previous year, one wonders what role this revenue loss played in their 
merger with Penguin.23 
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To put these revenue and publishing numbers in some context, 
remember that of the 85,000 publishers in the Bowker database, twelve 
of them account for almost two-thirds of US trade and mass-market book 
sales—and now one of them will account for one-quarter alone. Also 
recall that the annual revenues of Penguin Random House will be more 
than the combined revenues of 58,795 US trade and mass-market pub-
lishers, that is, over 95% of all US publishers.24 
This enormous financial and market-share advantage has created a lot 
of concern—and both companies are working hard to contain it. Markus 
Dohle, Random House chairman and CEO, who will assume the posi-
tion of CEO of the new combined publishing company, wrote to his 
Random House colleagues that he aims “to retain the distinct identities 
of both companies’ imprints.”25 Distinct identities? Who is he kidding? 
That world was lost when Random House went public and started swal-
lowing up publishing houses back in the 1960s.
It bears remembering that both Random House and Penguin have 
already absorbed much of their competition over the past fifty years. In 
the United States alone Random House includes the imprints Alfred 
A. Knopf, Anchor, Ballantine, Bantam, Broadway, Clarkson Potter, 
Crown, Delacorte, Dell, Del Rey, Dial, Doubleday, Everyman’s Library, 
Fawcett, Fodor’s Travel, Golden Books, Harmony Ivy, Kids@Random, 
Main Street Books, Nan A. Talese, One World, Pantheon, Random 
House, Schocken, Shave Areheart Books, Spectra, Spiegel & Grau, 
Strivers Row Books, The Modern Library, Three Rivers Press, Villiard, 
Vintage, and Wellspring, and Penguin Book Group includes Ace, Alpha, 
Avery, Berkley, Current, Dial Books, Dutton, Firebird, Frederick Warne, 
Gotham, G. P. Putnam’s Sons, Grosset & Dunlap, HP Books, Hudson 
Street Press, Jeremy P. Tarcher, Jove, New American Library, Penguin, 
Penguin Press, Perigee, Philomel, Plume, Portfolio, Price Stern Sloan, 
Puffin, Putnam, Riverhead, Sentinel, Speak, Tarcher, and Viking. Add to 
this list the UK imprints of both companies, and the combined Penguin 
Random House company will result in over 100 different imprints in the 
US and UK alone. The only distinctive difference that will come out of 
this new company are its profits—which will be the largest ever by one 
company in the history of trade publishing. 
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There is also worry that authors will lose more of their creative auton-
omy and will be reduced even more to merely equations or numbers 
by the new mega-corporation. To assuage this fear, Dohle wrote in the 
same letter that “authors remain the center of everything we do” and that 
“creative autonomy” “will be a defining hallmark” of Penguin Random 
House.26 It is one thing for Dohle to say it, but quite another to realize it 
in a publishing environment where capital—not creativity—is the prime 
directive, and where autonomy must be cleared by the accounting office. 
Of all the things in Dohle’s letter, the least controversial is his claim that 
the other defining hallmark of Penguin Random House will be “great 
resources.” We know what this will mean for shareholders, but what will 
this mean for authors, agents and readers?
A major fear of course is that reduced competition between Random 
House and Penguin will result in lower advances and profits for authors 
and agents, and fewer publishing options for writers—now that the two 
of the Big Ten are One. Both Dohle and John Makinson, who is slated to 
become Chairman of the new company, and who is currently Chairman 
and CEO of Penguin, try to calm these concerns. In fact, Makinson 
writes in his letter to the global Penguin Group that “exactly the opposite 
will happen,” namely that the “publishing imprints of the two companies 
will remain as they are today, competing for the very best authors and 
the very best books.”27 But again, it is hard to believe that the merger will 
result in more choices and more competition in the book industry. So are 
we really to believe that the imprints of this company are going to com-
pete vigorously against each other for titles? I don’t think so but let’s hold 
off on this question for a moment.
Make no mistake: this merger and other mergers like it are not about 
protecting creative autonomy or bringing about more opportunities for 
authors and options for readers. Rather, it is about maximizing profit in 
an industry that is rapidly changing. In fact, it may be more about the 
digital transformation of the publishing world than anything else. And 
the competition may not be from within the publishing world, but rather 
from the distribution and sales world. 
Amazon reports that it sells 114 e-books for every 100 printed books.28 
And it has been predicted that it will soon account for 50% of US trade 
sales in all formats.29 Dohle’s letter indirectly confirms their worries about 
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the challenges presented by Amazon when he says that the merger “will 
accelerate our digital transformation, while ensuring a strong future for 
print.” He also says that it will put them in a better position “to provide 
copyright protection, and to support our authors’ intellectual property.”
There is no doubt that the publishing industry has been forever 
changed by the rise of neoliberalism. This form of unfettered capital-
ism, says Bourdieu, “sets up as the norm of all practices, and therefore as 
ideal rules, the real regularities of the economic world abandoned to its 
own logic, the so-called laws of the market.”30 While it has its roots in the 
classical liberal economic theories of Adam Smith and David Ricardo, 
it is more closely associated with the neoliberalism of Friedrich Hayek 
and Milton Friedman. As a consequence, it has resulted in among other 
things, the rise of authoritarianism, the suspension of civil liberties, the 
privatization of public spaces, the upward distribution of wealth—and 
in our case, the disfigurement of the book publishing industry. Again, as 
Henry Giroux succinctly puts it, “neoliberalism is an ideology and poli-
tics buoyed by the spirit of a market fundamentalism that subordinates 
the art of democratic politics to the rapacious laws of a market economy 
that expands its reach to include all aspects of social life within the dic-
tates and values of market-driven society.”31 The case of publishing is yet 
another sad chapter in the subordination of social life by neoliberalism—
as the books that we read are an integral part of it.
To be sure, there is no aspect of the publishing world that has not 
been affected by its economic control and cultural domination of the 
market. What though does the rise of neoliberalism and corporate pub-
lishing mean for the 58,795 “small” presses32 that reside in the shadows of 
corporate publishing giants like Penguin Random House? Is their posi-
tion any different than it was before Random House went public and was 
purchased by RCA or merged with Penguin? And what is the effect of the 
rise of neoliberalism in the publishing on fiction writing, reading habits, 
and bookselling? Is writing for Cerf and Klopfer any different than writ-
ing for Rupert Murdoch or RCA? These and related questions go straight 
to the foundation of book and creative writing culture in America and 
have a significant impact on the shape and future of our critical and cre-
ative legacies.
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The Aesthetics of Profit
The rise of neoliberalism has forever changed mainstream fiction writing, 
reading habits, and bookselling in America. Writing fiction in the age of 
corporate mega-publishing is now more than ever a business affair, not a 
creative one. In Acts of Resistance, Bourdieu writes “neo-liberal ideologues 
want us to believe that the economic and social world is structured by 
equations.”33 In terms of the publishing world, they likewise want us to 
believe that it too is structured by equations. 
Now that reading habit data can be tracked through data mining of 
e-books, publishers can determine everything from how long it took you 
to read a page to specifically what you read.34 What then will stop them 
from feeding this data back into their publishing equations to determine 
things like the economically optimal narrative aesthetics? How far are we 
from aesthetics being more than just influenced by market-fundamental-
ism, but rather determined by it? After all, this and other data determined 
the books stocked by the fistful of chains that dominated the national 
landscape (though, see below, where it got them). Using data now to 
determine the shape of narrative seems like a logical next step.
Nearly three-quarters of active publishers in the US have annual rev-
enues between zero and $50,000; roughly another twenty percent put 
their annual revenues between $50,000 and one million dollars. In total, 
these figures represent the annual revenues of almost 60,000—or 95%—
of US publishers.35 Considering the large percentage of publishers with 
annual revenues less than 50 thousand dollars, it could be argued that 
small press publishing populates the national landscape though corporate 
publishing controls it. How else can you describe the difference between 
a Penguin Random House that will now produce one in every four new 
books and a small press like the Fiction Collective Two that only pub-
lishes six books per year total?
One might argue that what separates a corporate publisher from 
a small press publisher is that the former want people to buy books, 
whereas the latter want people to read them—or even believe in them. 
In a way, the American political landscape mirrors the publishing land-
scape. Namely, a case could be made that political power is concentrated 
among the wealthiest 5% percent of our nation, whereas the remaining 
95% dominate in numbers. Whereas in American politics wealth yields 
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a disproportionate amount of political power, in American publishing, 
capital yields a disproportionate amount of market control.
The great myth of American publishing is that it is controlled by aes-
thetic values. This might have been the case years ago when the Random 
House of Bennett Cerf pushed to publish a novel which opens with the 
line “Stately, plump Buck Mulligan came from the stairhead, bearing a 
bowl of lather on which a mirror and a razor lay crossed.” It is not the case 
when its contemporary neoliberal instantiation outbid itself to publish 
the next novel of the author whose first novel began with the line “At the 
first gesture of morning, flies began stirring.”36 Yes, outbid itself. Which is 
either like tripping over your own shoelaces—or tripping over the out-
stretched foot of the editor in the cubicle next to you. 
The novel that got Random House tripping over their own feet was a 
first novel whose hardback sales in the late 1990s had exceeded 1.6 mil-
lion copies. Such things capture the attention of market-driven corpo-
rate publishers—“At first gesture of a market, calculators began stirring.” 
Based on what is said to have been a one-page proposal, one of Random 
House’s 60 imprints, divisions, and groups offered an advance of over five 
million dollars to the author. However, not to be outdone by one of their 
co-division rivals, another division of Random House offered over eight 
million dollars.37 The name of the novelist and whether the advance paid 
off for Random House are irrelevant to the conditions that they exem-
plify: the effects of neoliberal-based decision-making in the publish-
ing world.38 
A climate of publishing where the advance for a second novel exceeds 
by eight times the annual publishing revenue of 95% of American pub-
lishing houses—or roughly 60,000 publishers—presents a sad state for 
American letters. If Random House was willing to offer the author of 
this second novel an eight million dollar advance, one can only imagine 
how much they were willing to invest in marketing the book. That is, for 
example, in purchasing mainstream media interest in this author and 
their work as “essential summer reading” or buying national distribution 
support to ensure that  “the next great American novel” is available for 
purchase in your local Wal-Mart or Borders. To say that hearing this book 
news over and over again in major media outlets, and seeing this book 
prominently displayed in every big box bookstore in America doesn’t 
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affect reading habits and impact sales would be naïve. However, to say 
that it fashions reading and buying behavior would be closer to the truth.
American publishing in the age of neoliberalism is controlled by mar-
kets, equations, and calculators—not aesthetic value, literary contribu-
tion, or scholarly impact. The more that mega-publishers invest in large 
market fiction and avoid small market fiction, the more that aesthetic 
innovation and narrative diversity will flourish among small presses. In 
the neoliberal climate of corporate publishing, it is not surprising to see 
a rise in small press publishers devoted to diversity and innovation—and 
a widening of the financial gap between small presses and the corporate 
giants. Moreover, even among the big house publishers, one is beginning 
to see more capital distance among them. 
Of the 4,000 publishers that have annual sales over one million dol-
lars, less than twenty percent have annual sales over fifty-million dollars39 
—and only 12 have annual sales over 150 million.40 And among the Big 
12, the twelfth largest has only one-tenth of the sales of the largest. This 
kind of concentration of publishing capital entails a type of power akin to 
that held by the Bush and Kennedy families in American politics. Again, 
that Random House alone sells more books than 76,500 US trade and 
mass-market publishers combined and that the newly merged Penguin 
Random House will only increase this number is as much a cause for 
celebration among writers as is the fact that McDonald’s serves more 
hamburgers than any other restaurant in America. So, would you like to 
supersize that novel?
The Decline and Fall of the Book﻿store
One of the more visible signs of neoliberalism in publishing has been the 
decline of independent booksellers—and the corresponding rise of the 
book superstore. While corporate publisher mergers, market-based edi-
torial decision-making, and multi-million dollar author advances are less 
visible to the general public, huge book megastores—often near boarded 
up independent bookstores—are a part of the American landscape. Book 
superstores are as common now to American strip malls as Wal-Mart and 
Target, and in some cities are even found among luxury stores such as 
Louis Vuitton and Tiffany’s.
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Fifty years ago, three quarters of trade books were purchased at inde-
pendent bookstores. Thirty years ago, competition from mall bookstores 
slashed this number in half. The meteoric rise of superstores like Barnes 
and Noble and Borders cut this number in half again five years ago.41 
What’s not to like about cappuccino machines, cozy leather chairs, and 
a mountain of the Tom Clancy novels? But now it seems even the mega-
stores have overreached their rise. 
One half of the contemporary book-superstore dynamic duo recently 
filed for bankruptcy. It seems that while everyone did enjoy the cappuc-
cino machines, cozy chairs, and free reading materials, this didn’t neces-
sarily translate into the actual sale of books. And while Borders’ recent 
filing for Chapter 11 might be sweet revenge to those who ran and loved 
the independents, don’t expect a renaissance of the independent book-
store. Consumers increasingly prefer to shop for books online, where 
they can find big discounts and take advantage of immediate download.
The demise of Borders only strengthens online bookselling giant 
Amazon, which again will soon account for half of all US trade sales. To 
get a perspective on this number, consider that only five years ago, all of 
the superstores and chains in the US combined only accounted for 45% 
of the US book retail market.42 Soon Amazon alone will be responsible 
for half of all book sales in the US—with and without cappuccino.
If there is a silver lining to this development, at least Amazon makes 
available many more small-press books than Borders and its corpo-
rate companions—and easily fills your order for a title by Raymond 
Federman or Cris Mazza. Shopping at the chains never did that (I make 
a habit of looking for my favorite innovative and small press authors in 
every bookstore I visit). Much like Random House, whose transforma-
tion from premier literary publishing house to market-fundamentalist 
mega-corporation can be linked to its going public and its corporate take-
over by RCA, the metamorphosis of Borders from darling of the inde-
pendent bookstore world to its pariah can be associated with its purchase 
by another large corporation—in this case, Kmart.
In 1971, Tom and Louis Borders opened a small bookstore in the col-
lege town of Ann Arbor, Michigan. Its success over the years encouraged 
the owners to open a second store in 1985 in nearby Detroit. When this 
store did well, they opened others. The stores were known throughout the 
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Midwest and Northeast for their wide selection of new titles, but Borders 
stores retained their roots as academic booksellers. At any Borders, one 
could find piles of bestsellers alongside thousands of individual copies 
of scholarly titles—something unusual at the time for a bookstore chain. 
Kmart, renowned for its “blue-light specials” on underwear and soap, 
acquired Borders in 1992, and merged it with Waldenbooks, the mall 
bookstore staple that it had acquired in 1984. The merger, called Borders 
Group, went public in 1995.43 
While the acquisition of bookstore chains by a department store might 
sound strange, it seems fitting given that at one point department stores 
in the US were among the leading sellers of books. Shortly after they first 
starting selling books in late nineteenth century, department stores likes 
Macy’s of New York became national leaders in book sales. And by the 
early 1950s, it has been estimated that between twenty to forty percent 
of trade books were sold by department stores. These businesses favored 
books in their inventory because they were believed to raise the class of 
the store, and appealed to a more cultured—and wealthy—clientele.44 
One of the consequences of this corporate merger with Kmart was 
that Borders Group started closing many of its Waldenbooks, and open-
ing up more Borders superstores. From 1993 to 1994 alone, Borders 
went from 44 to 85 superstores—whereas Waldenbooks was reduced 
by nearly 60 stores during the same period.45 And Borders was not the 
only bookstore increasing its number of superstores at the time: so too 
was Barnes and Noble, which had bought the other mall chain bookstore 
staple, B. Dalton Booksellers, in 1986. By 2006, the number of Borders 
superstores rose to nearly 500 in the US alone—often in prime locations 
such as on Chicago’s Magnificent Mile or Market Street in San Francisco. 
But Borders’ fall has turned out to be faster than its rise.46 
To be sure, Borders Group’s failings were not just about books. A poor 
real estate strategy, over-investment in music (another anguished indus-
try), and inefficient inventory management contributed to the decline. 
When the company filed for bankruptcy on February 16, 2011, Borders 
hadn’t been profitable for five years. In 1994, Borders Group operated 
almost twelve hundred bookstores. Just before filing for bankruptcy, 
there remained one half that number—and another thirty percent were 
set to close.47 Fittingly, the vacant shells of these large stores in prominent 
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locations like Michigan Avenue in Chicago are as much a visual reminder 
to all who pass by them of the shortcomings of market-fundamentalist-
based decision-making as are the piles of remaindered book-mountain 
titles. These vacated stores are a highly visible sign of the emptiness of 
neoliberal practices in publishing. 
So what now for the independent booksellers? The difference 
between the book superstore and an independent bookseller ends with 
the common trait that they both stock and sell books. Whereas indepen-
dent bookstores are defined for their eclectic and idiosyncratic invento-
ries, mall bookstores like B. Dalton and Waldenbooks, and superstores 
like Barnes and Noble and Borders are characterized by the consistency 
and homogeneity of their inventories. While each independent book-
store makes its own inventory decisions, department stores and cor-
porate chains have a few people making purchasing decisions for all of 
their stores. 
The recent rise of chains aimed to simulate the appearance of high-
end independent bookstores by having rows of beautiful bookcases with 
ladders alongside plush chairs and gourmet coffee, but in the process 
destroyed the aura of the bookstore. By regulating and standardizing 
the appearance and stock of the corporate bookstore in the same way 
that McDonald’s regulates and standardizes its appearance and menu, 
they in effect deconstructed the notion of the bookstore they sought 
to emulate. Just as independent restaurants don’t look alike or have the 
same menu—let alone food that tastes exactly the same—independent 
bookstores don’t all sell the same books or look alike. That’s the beauty of 
independence.
Browsing an independent bookstore for the first time can be an unset-
tling experience. The unfamiliarity with the layout and organization of 
titles, and with the stock itself, lends an element of adventure. At their 
best, independent books are unique assertions of aesthetic tastes. Mass 
market chain stores, however, sacrificed adventure for familiarity. Their 
over-reliance on bestsellers and reluctance to embrace valuable back-
list titles led to a homogenizing of offerings. But now even this strategy 
is failing. 
As the industry undergoes a painful contraction, booksellers and pub-
lishers will need to reexamine their relationship in a changing market. 
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It’s unfortunate that a number of jobs will be lost, and that there will be 
fewer places to physically browse for books. But perhaps there is a posi-
tive element for small-press authors. Perhaps with the decline of the 
mass-market chains, the lure of “big” books for quick bucks will be some-
what lessened. Perhaps booksellers and publishers will reinvest in a long-
standing relationship of developing authors and promoting backlist titles, 
as they did before mass merchandising changed the process. Well-written 
manuscripts from lesser-known authors might have more of a voice in an 
environment less dependent on mounds of bestsellers. And who knows, 
writers and readers just might benefit from some of the recent failures of 
corporate publishing.
The Disappearing University Press
If the fall of the decline and fall of corporate and independent booksell-
ers has been one of the more visible signs of neoliberalism in publishing, 
then one of the least visible signs is the gradual fall and disappearance of 
university presses. Of all of the consequences of neoliberalism in publish-
ing, this is the most devastating to academic culture. While there are only 
just over 130 university presses in the United States, these presses are the 
lifeblood of scholarly publishing in the United States.48 The scourge of 
neoliberalism in higher education has led to a spate of downsizing and 
closures. The latest university press to face closure is the publisher of The 
Collected Works of Langston Hughes and The Complete Sermons of Ralph 
Waldo Emerson. Starting July 2012, the University of Missouri Press 
began to phase out operations.49 The press, which was founded in 1958 
by a University of Missouri English professor, William Peden, has pub-
lished approximately 2,000 titles over the course of its history.
Eclectic in its reach, the press has an impressive catalogue50 that 
includes offerings in women’s studies, African-American studies, cre-
ative nonfiction, journalism, and American, British, and Latin American 
literary criticism. It serves its region with series such as the Missouri 
Biography Series and Missouri Heritage Readers Series, and American 
letters in general with series such as the Mark Twain and His Circle Series 
and the Southern Women Series. The press’ catalogue is deep and rich, 
and holds gems for both the serious scholar and general interest reader. 
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In addition to the seminal collections of Emerson and Hughes, my own 
recent favorites are Gail Pool’s Faint Praise: The Plight of Book Reviewing 
in America (2007) and Ned Stuckey-French’s The American Essay in the 
American Century (2011).51 
One of the measures of a great university is the strength of its press. 
Press strength is determined by its catalogue, and its catalogue by the 
choices of its editors and the impact of its authors. Still, not every pres-
tige indicator is marked in this direction. For example, the existence 
of a great university press is neither sufficient nor necessary for mem-
bership in the prestigious Association of American Universities. Last 
year, University of Nebraska, which operates one of the best university 
presses in the country, was ousted from the AAU; and Georgia Institute 
of Technology, which does not run a press, was recently admitted. The 
University of Missouri will neither be ousted nor even punished by the 
AAU for closing its press. The AAU criteria favor competitive research 
financing, not competitive catalogues; faculty in the National Academies, 
not award-winning university press titles.
University presses are nonprofit enterprises. Though these presses 
may reach a level of financial self-sufficiency in their operation, they are 
by and large underwritten by their host universities. This is part of the 
investment of higher education. Most of the monographs produced by 
scholars have a limited audience—and very few make their publishers 
any money. However, their publication is still an important aspect of 
scholarly activity and knowledge dissemination. 
The University of Missouri system afforded its press a $400,000 
annual subsidy.52 To gain a perspective on this figure and the value of 
the press to the university, one only has to consider that the head bas-
ketball coach at Mizzou makes $1.35 million per year—and the head 
football coach makes $2.5 million per year.53 The interim director of the 
press makes just under $75,000—less than an assistant baseball coach.54 
The acquisitions editor makes just under $35,000—less than an athletic 
trainer. Closer to the cost of subsidizing the press are the salaries of the 
assistant head football coach and the linebacker coach/defensive coor-
dinator, who each make just over $340,000 per year.55 How does one 
compare a football season to a publishing season? Is an 8-5 season more 
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valuable than 30 books published?56 Is running a press worth losing an 
assistant coach or two?
In total, the University of Missouri employs over 17,500 individu-
als. Currently, the press employs 10 people though in 2009 it was nearly 
twice that number. The economic crash of 2008 forced many state uni-
versities such as the University of Missouri to reassess priorities and scale 
back.57 Mizzou made their priorities clear: in 2010, the University of 
Missouri’s head football coach received a $650,00 raise.58 Louisiana State 
University, another football powerhouse, slated its university press for 
closure in 2009. Somehow, this press survived the state budget crisis.59 
However, given that it is nowhere near as popular as their football team, 
I’m sure that it sleeps with one eye open, waiting for the day that univer-
sity officials have to decide between a subsidy for the press—and a pay 
raise for the coach. Other presses were not so lucky. Eastern Washington 
University, Southern Methodist University,60 and the University of 
Scranton61 all closed their presses. And even the celebrated University of 
California Press tightened its belt by discontinuing a poetry series.62 
University of Missouri administrators are said to be “hashing out ways 
to create a new and sustainable model to operate a university press.”63 
They also assure us that “any future press won’t look like the current oper-
ation.”64 “We believe the publication of scholarly work is important,” said 
the president of University of Missouri. “We’re working very diligently 
on what” the new press “will look like.”65 While there is no indication 
where the University of Missouri administration will go with this, the 
options here are limited. The most obvious, however, is to go digital. And 
here there is some precedent.
Though Rice University closed its traditional press in 1996, it 
reopened in its wake an all-digital press in 2006. According to a 2010 
interview with Eugene Levy, who helped finance the revived press during 
his term as provost at Rice, the all-digital press was costing Rice $150,000 
to $200,000 per year. “This was intended as an experiment,” said Levy.66 
Coming from the Andrew Hays Buchanan Professor of Astrophysics at 
Rice the word “experiment“ gains even more gravitas. Rice hoped to save 
money by not printing books. Comments Levy, “The hope was that, with-
out the burden of having to maintain a print inventory, the press might 
sustain itself largely on revenues from print-on demand sales.” What the 
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university found out was that there “are base costs that are irreducible”—
“and that printing is only one of them.”67 By 2010, it was determined 
that there would be no way to recover even the minimal cost of opera-
tions. Combine this with slow sales and a fiscal crisis—and the result is a 
failed experiment. Rice shut down its all digital press in the fall of 2010.68 
However, the decision was not without its detractors.
One of the board members—who wished to remain anonymous—
commented that new models of academic publishing are not going to be 
derived from a sales model. “We’re moving to a different era of scholarly 
communication where it’s more accessible to more people, and where 
we don’t have to worry about commercial viability,” said the anonymous 
board member. Scholarly publishing is being killed by placing emphasis 
on commercial viability—“there is no commercial viability,” added the 
board member.69 No matter what the form and how diligent the work, 
a university press requires resources. Just as it takes resources to run a 
successful athletic program, so too does it take an investment to run a 
university press. And comparatively speaking, the costs are negligible: an 
editor makes less at Mizzou than an athletic trainer, and even the assis-
tant baseball coaches make more than the press director.
Perhaps the solution is not to compare athletic salaries to press sala-
ries but to treat university presses on the same level as athletic programs. 
Both are auxiliary operations subsidized by the university, and both play 
an important role in American letters. Perhaps we need to measure the 
scholarly impact of the books published by the press in the same way we 
measure the impact of the gymnastics or baseball team winning a game 
or their division. Or think of the cultural capital and prestige generated 
by the press as akin to the bowl victories or NCAA titles. And just as 
we don’t scrap athletics if one of our teams loses games or money, we 
shouldn’t scrap university presses if they don’t generate enough revenue 
to cover their operation. While it may not be the most popular decision 
for the University of California Press to take one type of book off of their 
list, if it makes their press more viable in some way, it is akin to downsiz-
ing or closing down a sport to make an athletics program stronger. Think 
of the $200,000 invested by Rice or the $400,000 at Mizzou as the cost 
of being a strong university—a cost that in the big picture is most likely a 
fraction of the cost of one athletic coach.
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What does it mean when a university press fails? It means not that 
its authors are not successful or that its press was not run well. Rather it 
means that its university has abandoned part of its academic or scholarly 
mission: namely, supporting the publication of books that are the warp 
and woof of academic culture and democratic culture. 
Conclusion
So, can neoliberalism in publishing get any worse? Is it possible that the 
publishing industry will soon mirror the auto and steel industries? Would 
a Big Three Book-Maker industry be good for authors and readers? The 
spate of recent mergers and acquistions like the one between Penguin and 
Random House indicate that we won’t have to wait very long to find out. 
To be sure, the path for the world’s largest book publishers will con-
tinue to be bigger and bolder mergers. And soon, the publishing indus-
try will probably need to be renamed the “infotainment” industry when 
suitors like Walt Disney and Time Warner come knocking. This is pub-
lishing in the age of neoliberalism. Again, a world, in the words of Pierre 
Bourdieu, with “no other law than that of maximum profit.” It is “unfet-
tered capitalism without any disguise,” writes Bourdieu, “a very smart 
and very modern repackaging of the oldest ideas of the oldest capitalist.”
Though Makinson, the new chairman of Penguin Random House, 
may try to make the case that this extreme concentration of publishing 
capital is going to benefit “creative and editorial independence,” and will 
allow them “to take risks with new authors,” don’t believe it. It will be 
about as much risk as the market analysis of radical capitalism allows—
which won’t be much. I’m certain that a William Gaddis or Djuna Barnes 
would not get very far in the world of neoliberal publishing risk.
That being said, the rise of a corporate publishing monopoly opens 
a huge opportunity both for acts of aesthetic resistance by the small and 
digital publishing worlds. As the larger presses become more monolithic, 
homogenized and profit-driven, the smaller presses can thrive as sites of 
aesthetic and editorial heterogeneity. And direct access to digital distribu-
tion systems such as Amazon and recognition networks such as Facebook 
provide unprecedented support and visibility to publications that might 
have otherwise gone unseen in warehouses or small press catalogues. Let 
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the Penguins of the world continue their march toward monopoly. In the 
end, however, it is most likely a march toward extinction—and a boon 
for small press publishing.
The missteps and failures of the neoliberal publishing regime are rea-
sons to be hopeful that there will be a backlash to McPublishing. There 
is also a hopeful coda to the University of Missouri Press saga: public 
outcry over the announcement of the closing of the press resulted in a 
stay of execution for that press.70 So there is hope that thoughtful critical 
resistance can result in a reversal—or at least a reprieve—in neoliberal 
decision-making in the publishing world.
In the end, it may be the acts of resistance of writers, teachers, and 
readers that determine the fate of neoliberal publishing. If teachers, for 
example, refuse to utilize the overly priced textbooks of corporate pub-
lishers that are re-released every two years in a new edition, this could 
help derail a very profitable aspect of the publishing industry; if writers, 
for example, choose to publish their work with small presses rather than 
corporate presses, this can help cut off the supply of their creative sup-
ply chain; if people vociferously refuse to accept the closure of university 
presses, this can perhaps change the behavior of neoliberal administrative 
decisions; and so on. The story of the growth of neoliberalism in publish-
ing can become one of rise and fall more quickly if and only if we refuse 
to regard the fruits of our creative labors as commodities. This can be 
accomplished one author at a time through the choices we make relative 
to the intersection of our creative interests and our publishing needs.71 
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Chapter 9
The Post-Political Turn
Theory in the Neoliberal Academy
Christopher Breu
Neoliberalism has cast a long shadow over the US academy. Mirroring 
the flexibility championed by the economic ideology, neoliberalism’s 
impact on the academy in the last thirty years has taken a number of dif-
ferent forms and provoked a number of different responses. In the field 
of literary and cultural studies, these responses have taken forms both 
material and ideological, from the growth of non-tenure track labor, the 
reduction of tenure line positions, the emergence and then attenuation of 
the academic star system, the destruction of employee benefits, the ratio-
nalization of teaching based on FTEs (or faculty time equivalents), the 
preoccupation with conceptions of subjectivity and culture that are flex-
ible and in continuous transformation, and the growth and then partial 
retreat of politicized scholarship, including scholarship that takes neolib-
eralism itself as an object of critique. 
While each of these areas of neoliberalism’s influence deserves anal-
ysis, and indeed have been analyzed by a range of different scholars, 
including the other contributors to this volume, in what follows I want 
to take up the last: the growth and partial retreat of politicized scholar-
ship in the academy. The transformation of academic theory over the past 
thirty years is one way to chart this political movement and its relation-
ship to neoliberalism. The responses to neoliberalism in academic theory 
have ranged from the conscious to the unconscious, the symptomatic to 
the quietistic, and the resistant to the compliant. Indeed, the theoretical 
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responses have been almost as varied as the ideological and material 
transformations produced by neoliberalism itself. 
In what follows, then, I want to trace a certain dominant trajectory 
of contemporary theory from the politicization of culture and language 
in what Philip Wegner terms the “long nineties” to the potential depo-
liticization emerging in our own present moment.1 In contrast to this 
worrying de-politicizing trend, I will posit the hopeful emergence of 
counter-trend of newly materialist scholarship that takes up the politi-
cal engagements of the long nineties, but in a more materialist direction 
that holds the potential to challenge the dematerializing ideology of neo-
liberalism itself, with its emphasis on financialization and what Michael 
Hardt and Antonio Negri term “biopolitical” or so-called “immaterial” 
labor (i.e. affect, service, and intellectual labor).2 Thus, the signifier “post-
political” in this paper has an ambiguous valence: it can either describe 
a retreat from politics altogether or the possibility of a materialist theo-
retical politics that moves beyond the largely cultural politics of the 
long nineties. 
Before developing this argument further, however, I should pro-
vide a quick account of how I am conceptualizing neoliberalism. My 
account of neoliberalism is influenced equally by Michel Foucault’s The 
Birth of Biopolitics and David Harvey’s A Brief History of Neoliberalism. 
Foucault’s prescient genealogy of neoliberalism, delivered as series of 
lectures in 1978 and 1979 and posthumously published in 2004, traces 
its emergence out of German “ordoliberalism” in the immediate postwar 
moment.3 In his account, neoliberalism represents the most recent mani-
festation of what he calls biopolitics, or the political-economic manage-
ment of “man-as-species,” consisting in “making live and letting die.”4 This 
power emerges alongside political liberalism in the nineteenth century 
as a form of what Foucault terms governmentality, but it is transformed 
within the workings of neoliberalism, such that the market, rather than 
political governmentality, becomes the privileged domain of measur-
ing and regulating human worth. Central to this new calculus of human 
worth is the category of “human capital,” which quantifies and rational-
izes all human activities and human life itself.5 
If Foucault charts the long trajectory of the political economic trans-
formations that lead to neoliberalism and its calculus of human worth, 
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Harvey’s account emphasizes neoliberalism as a conscious and class-
inflected ideological and political-economic project in the present. This 
project has had two aims: to reorganize contemporary capitalism, “by 
liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an insti-
tutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, [and 
what are imagined to be] free markets, and free trade”; and to “re-estab-
lish the conditions for capital accumulation and to restore the power 
of economic elites.”6 Central to this second goal is the dynamic of what 
Harvey, reworking Marx’s account of primitive accumulation, calls “accu-
mulation by dispossession,” or the appropriation of various forms public, 
private, and commonly held wealth by corporations and economic elites.7 
Thus neoliberal accumulation not only works through wage suppression 
via the so-called freeing up of markets but also by the wholesale appro-
priation of wealth via privatization of public goods and services, of what 
Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt call the “common” (or wealth that is 
collectively and directly owned, outside of the reach of both the state 
and corporations), and by redefining waged work as unwaged work.8 
Drawing on both Foucault’s and Harvey’s account enables me to theorize 
neoliberalism as both a subjectifying, social calculus on one hand, and an 
ideological and political-economic project on the other. 
Academic Knowledge in the Neoliberal Present
These neoliberal dynamics have taken on a specific form in the US acad-
emy. For those humanists and social scientists who experienced the 
relative privilege of tenure, the key enemy in the long 90s appeared to 
be neoconservatism rather than neoliberalism. The wars were primarily 
cultural, and the struggle was around the content of knowledge within 
and against various disciplines, rather than the political-economic orga-
nization of higher education itself. As Marc Bousquet has demonstrated, 
for the growing academic proletariat (the ever growing ranks of adjunct 
professors), the material war being waged on the public university by 
neoliberalism was evident much earlier than it was for those of us who 
have been sheltered by the relative protections of tenure and tenure-line 
positions.9 It has only been with what I want to call the second phase of 
neoliberalism in the last ten or so years (a phase in which the dynamics 
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of accumulation by dispossession function not only by the privatizing of 
public jobs and public services but even more by the destruction of wage-
labor and the concomitant growth of unwaged work) that it is clear to 
all but the most privileged actors that the basic threat to academic work 
is not cultural but economic. And yet, we let the cultural be thoroughly 
subordinated to the economic only at our peril. While we need to resist 
the economic on its own terms, we also need to hold out for the partial 
autonomy of the cultural and the scholarly, if only to maintain a cultural, 
intellectual, and scholarly position from which to not only critique the 
present but also to imagine and begin the work of constructing a different 
economic and cultural future. 
Before attending to the way in which the notion of political scholar-
ship has changed and been partially replaced by what I am calling post-
political scholarship in this second phase of neoliberalism, I want to 
quickly define the major features of the neoliberal university in the pres-
ent. These are: 1) the war against university professors and tenure itself as 
part of the more general war against teachers (this war has both cultural 
dimensions, such as right-wing populism that mixes anti-intellectualism 
with a worship of so-called market solutions, and directly economic 
ones, such as the destruction of employee benefits and protections, like 
the ones we are experiencing right now in Illinois); 2) the redefinition of 
the public university system as a whole along the lines of skills training 
and uncritical vocationalism (as opposed to a critical or workerist voca-
tionalism), which goes hand-in-hand with the redefinition of teachers as 
customer-service workers; 3) the redefinition of the work of scholarship 
as unpaid labor that is owned by the university and by various corpora-
tions or, alternately, as the generation of free content for the work speed 
up produced by what Jodi Dean describes as “communicative capital-
ism”; 4) The casualization of the labor force as part of a more general 
drive towards casualization, unwaged labor, and the complete blurring of 
the lines (and not in a utopian way) of labor and leisure.10 
Cultural Politics in the Long Nineties
Now that I have briefly discussed neoliberalism and its impact on the acad-
emy, I am in a place to chart the transformations of politically-engaged 
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theory and its relationship to neoliberalism in the humanities and social 
sciences in the last thirty years. Politics, and its closely related cognate, 
the political, have been central signifiers within theoretical work done in 
the last thirty or so years in the academy. In the heyday of the culture 
wars of the 1980s and 1990s, the signifier “political” often represented 
a shorthand for the kind of engaged scholarship and academic activism 
that was central to struggles around canons and cultures that character-
ized the era. Christopher Connery argues, in his Introduction to The 
Worlding Project, that this was a moment marked by the canon wars, the 
advent of postcolonial criticism, and the emergence of cultural studies in 
the US. He asserts that cultural studies in particular inflected the specific 
manifestation of the political central to academic work in the 80s and 90s: 
“In its US incarnation, Cultural Studies represented the political turn, but 
eclectically: it included the turn to popular culture and identity politics of 
various kind and was, as Jameson suggested, a ‘desire’ more than a field.”11 
The Worlding Project itself, edited by Connery and Rob Wilson, feels like 
a late and compelling expression of this political turn, combining a cul-
tural studies attention to popular cultures and political movements with a 
more recent engagement with globalization and transnationalism. 
The specific meaning of the signifier, political, in the moment of the 
political turn enabled a lot of important work to be undertaken in the 
academy, not the least of all was the hard-won notion that all scholar-
ship is indeed political (whether consciously or unconsciously so) and 
that the engaged or activist scholar should be conscious of the political 
import and effects of her work. As a product of the literature program at 
UCSC that produced The Worlding Project, with its emphasis on world lit-
erature and cultural studies, the kinds of work undertaken by the authors 
in the volume hold special places in my heart and my scholarship. Much 
of my own work is informed by the kinds of politicized cultural analysis 
enabled by the political turn. If what Connery names the political turn 
is one designation for the fusion of culture and politics that reached, 
perhaps its apex in the mid-nineties, other names for it are what Fredric 
Jameson’s has deemed the cultural turn, what Richard Rorty designated 
the linguistic turn, and what Jameson, along with many others, has also 
termed postmodernism.12 
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While each of these designations carry slightly different resonances, 
and emphasize different aspects of the work of theory and scholarship, 
together they suggest the parameters of engaged scholarship in the long 
nineties. This was scholarship that privileged culture and language as key 
terrains of political struggle. Even the Marxism of this moment advanced 
an understanding of the economic as newly cultural and semiotic, argu-
ing that, in Jameson’s words, the base and superstructure “collapse back 
into each other.”13 Central to this moment was the practice of critique, 
for even as Adorno was often dismissed by cultural studies practitioners 
for his elitism, a version of his practice of critique, as necessarily separate 
from praxis, became the default mode for cultural criticism. 
The work enabled by the political turn was both valuable and nec-
essary. Indeed, much of this work, when not disenabled by neoliberal 
pressures within the current academy, continues to do vital work in the 
present. In terms of the politics of subjectivity, signification, and repre-
sentation, such forms of cultural critique are indispensable. Yet, as this 
description suggests, the political turn of the 1990s had limitations as well 
as advantages. As Marxist critics of postmodernism such as Jameson and 
Harvey as well as well as new materialists such as Diana Coole, Samantha 
Frost, and Levi Bryant have pointed out, the politics of the long nine-
ties was often confined to or at least imagined through the frames of cul-
ture and language.14 This emphasis on culture and language as exclusive 
spaces of political and social struggle disenabled all forms of materialist 
politics and even materialist inquiry other than the weak materialisms 
represented by cultural materialism and the materiality of the signifier. 
Thus, for work that wanted to explore the material dimensions of ecosys-
tems, political economy or the political shaping of biological life itself, 
the version of politics enshrined by the political turn was as constrain-
ing as it was liberating. Indeed, the cultural turn itself, can be read as a 
symptom of the first phase of neoliberalism in two distinct ways: 1) the 
emphasis on language as constructive echoes the turn towards financial 
speculation as a seemingly parthenogenetic form of wealth generation; 
2) the malleability of subjectivity celebrated by social construction, as 
Harvey notes, echoes the flexibility of just-in-time production practices 
in post-Fordist neoliberalism.15 
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Still, in situating the epicenter of this cultural version of political work 
in the long 90s, I do not want to unintentionally participate in the very 
process of depoliticization that this essay critiques. As we know from 
the forms of knowledge enabled by the political turn, descriptive his-
tories, like all narratives, can become subtly prescriptive, enforcing the 
very dynamics they mean to critique. Yet, as the twin legacies of Marxist 
and Foucauldian thought teach us, there can be no effective politics or 
political struggle without a careful attention to the material and discur-
sive circumstances in which we find ourselves thinking, working, and 
acting. Thus, the history I offer in this paper is meant to trace historical 
tendencies rather than absolutes, and attend not only to the attenuation 
of certain formations or possibilities but also the opening up of oth-
ers. Moreover, to resist the logic of neoliberalism, which began in the 
moment of the political turn but has become ever more pervasive and 
violent in our so-called age of austerity (i.e. abundance for the rich and 
austerity for everyone else), the point is not to celebrate each new the-
oretical or academic development as an epochal shift that renders what 
came before so much used up human capital. Such a commodified view 
of knowledge is one of the dangers of the recent language of “turns” if 
not used carefully. Indeed, the proliferation of the very language of turns 
(the turn turn if you will!) may be one symptom of academic production 
under the second phase of neoliberalism and communicative capitalism. 
Given the pressures of instant communication and the ever more imme-
diate obsolescence of commodities under communicative capitalism, it is 
not surprising to find academia itself becoming part of the general speed-
up that dictates the movement of life in the present. Rather than surren-
dering to the logic of this speed up, we need to preserve what was best 
from earlier moments even as we attend to the transformed situation and 
possibilities of the present. 
The Post-Political Turn in the Present
The most immediate intellectual symptom of the full-scale neoliberal 
assault on the academy is the turn away from political work (especially 
the cultural version of politics that I described earlier). This turning away 
from the political has both negative and potentially positive valences. 
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Much of how we interpret the turn away from the political hinges, of 
course, on how we define the political itself. Taking the broad definition 
of politics as encompassing all political work, and not just the under-
standing of cultural politics enshrined in the long nineties, the turn away 
from politics can only be interpreted dispiritingly as a negative effect of 
the second phase of neoliberalism in the academy.
Such a negative version of the post-political turn (what might more 
accurately be called the “apolitical turn”) is evident everywhere in con-
temporary scholarship, from Stephan Ramsay’s mantra that the digital 
humanities “involves moving from reading and critiquing to building and 
making,” through the invocation of a scholarship of “wonder” as an anti-
dote to critique advocated by object-oriented ontologist Ian Bogost, to 
the wholesale substitution of the concept of the ethical for the political 
and the ecological for the economic in a range of recent scholarship.16 All 
of these theoretical moves, as dialectical correctives, have something to 
recommend them. Indeed, as Bruno Latour has argued in his ambiguous 
piece of the same name, “critique has run out of steam,” at least as an iso-
lated and non-dialectical practice.17 Moreover, it is important to engage 
the ethics upon which our political commitments are grounded, even as 
the category of the ethical as a discourse has to be interrogated, in turn, 
by the political with its attention to power, exploitation, and inequality. 
Similarly, academic theory, for too much of its history, has remained dis-
engaged from the ecological, even as what Latour and Jane Bennett term 
“political ecology” has to be understood as distinct yet intertwined with 
political economy, if we are to provide effective accounts of the violence 
of ecological degradation and economic exploitation.18 
Yet the versions of this “post-political” work being advocated by writ-
ers such as Ramsay and Bogost rarely see themselves in such dialectical 
terms. Bogost’s chapter, entitled “Wonder,” from Alien Phenomenology, 
is perhaps the most symptomatic version of the apolitical turn, with its 
account of how the Food Network’s Ace of Cakes, which chronicles the 
production of specialty cakes for folks who can drop a hundred grand 
on a cake, manifests more satisfying materialism than HBO’s celebrated 
chronicle of the class and race stratified United States, The Wire.19 This 
version of Bogost’s scholarship thus represents one of the dangers of the 
explosion of posthumanist scholarship in the present. If the promise of 
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posthumanism is an expanded conception of the political, one that, in 
Latour’s account and in the account of more political OOO scholars such 
as Bryant, takes into consideration nonhuman as well as human actors, 
then the danger it represents is a symptomatic turning away from the 
human altogether as a way of warding off any reckoning with the degra-
dation of human possibility and knowledge under neoliberalism. If the 
work of Bogost and some other posthumanists seems like a defensive 
formation in relationship to the neoliberal assault on the academy, the 
work of some digital humanities seems, typically, much more affirma-
tively neoliberal. Indeed, the shift from critique to making and building 
(rather than a dialectical or even discontinuous emphasis on both as they 
challenge and transform each other) feels very much like the shift that 
the forces of neoliberalism are asking the humanities as a whole to make: 
no more preoccupation with citizenship (global or otherwise), critical 
thought, or imagining a different social or economic order; we need to 
just make and do. Knowledge should be purely applied rather than mix-
ing the applied with the theoretical and speculative.
If such an “apolitical turn” threatens to replace the cultural version of 
political scholarship that was central to the long 90s (even as the latter 
work continues, though, in less prestigious and more embattled ways), 
the signifier, political, has interestingly begun to migrate into a more spe-
cific usage, one associated with another body of theory and scholarship 
that has gained interdisciplinary prominence in the new century: this is 
the work associated with theories of “the political.” Spearheaded by the 
return to prominence of political theory in philosophical thought in the 
last twenty years, from the revaluation of older theorists like Hannah 
Arendt and (most ambiguously) Carl Schmidt through the emphasis 
on the political in theories of biopower and the biopolitical proffered 
by Giorgio Agamben, Roberto Esposito, and the posthumous Foucault, 
the international prominence the version of Deleuzian Marxism asso-
ciated with Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt, Franco Berardi and and 
Maurizio Lazzarato as well as to the new work done under the signifier 
of communism by Alain Badiou, Slavoj Žizek, Jodi Dean, and Bruno 
Bosteels, this newer deployment of the political emphasizes a philosoph-
ical approach to matters political, often moving beyond specific political 
programs to inquire about the very constitution of the political itself.20 
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Bosteels describes the “‘return of the political’ in European philosophy 
in the last few decades” in the following way: “Precisely what is at stake 
… is the very question of the relation between politics and philosophy, 
which is but one instance among others of the relations between the real 
and the thought of the real.”21 Thus, the turn to the political is less about 
immediate political struggle and more about theorizing the conditions 
under which philosophy can be adequate to the political present. The 
work primarily takes the form of a meta-theoretical speculation on the 
possibility of a political philosophy itself. Still, to the degree that such a 
“thought of the real” takes the material force of the real (I’m assuming 
here that the usage of the signifier in this case is not strictly Lacanian) as 
its site of engagement it holds real promise as well. 
To broadly and problematically generalize about writers who are very 
distinctive in their approaches, this work, while perhaps representing 
the reduction of the signifier “political” to a specific field, holds advan-
tages over the more culturalist understanding of politics that was central 
during the long 90s. These include: 1) an understanding of politics that 
extends beyond symbolic and cultural struggle and toward the political-
economic transformation of global society as such; 2) in the work of the 
theorists of biopolitics, an understanding of life itself as an object of theo-
rization and political-economic intervention, one that, as I have already 
shown, can open out to a critical engagement with neoliberalism; 3) an 
affirmative (as well as critical) vision that moves beyond the paralysis that 
can be produced by pure critique and cultural relativism; 4) in the case of 
Dean and Hardt and Negri, an engagement with new forms of symbolic 
and affective labor and the way in which they betoken the return of accu-
mulation by dispossession as a central dynamic of neoliberal capitalism. 
Yet, while much of this work advances an important political vision 
and represents some of the political possibilities that open up as we move 
beyond the cultural and linguistic turns, too much of it is preoccupied 
almost exclusively with the categories of the subject and the political as 
severed from the material and the political-economic. Indeed, Badiou’s 
work is particularly marked in this regard. His emancipatory vision, as 
articulated in The Communist Hypothesis and in his different essays in 
the two Idea of Communism collections, is organized largely around the 
twin categories of the Subject (understood as a category that “cannot be 
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reduced to an individual”) and the Idea (which Badiou defines as “an 
operative mediation between the real and symbolic”).22 Thus, Badiou’s 
revolutionary vision (what Bruce Robbins’ nicely calls his “millenarian 
Marxism,” although I’m not sure how much Marxism there finally is in 
it) tends to privilege ideas (in an explicitly Platonic register) and the sub-
ject pole of the subject/object dialectic (“Balibarism!”). Indeed, Badiou’s 
materialism, in contrast to his idealism which is everywhere central to 
his vision, is relegated primarily to the category of the State, which he 
defines in the present as being made up of “the capitalist economy, the 
constitutional form of government, the laws (in the judicial sense) con-
cerning property and inheritance, the army, the police.”23 Even Badiou’s, 
most celebrated category, the “event” is more transfigurative than materi-
alist. It is the counterfactual production of a “glorious body.”24 
Badiou’s collapsing of the economy into the state is telling. His vision 
thus emphasizes a largely political definition of both capitalism and com-
munism, where the economy (and its relationship to various material 
ecologies) is a distant afterthought. For all of their differences, Hardt 
and Negri’s accelerationist vision of the transformation of biopolitical 
capitalism into a communism of the multitude shares with Badiou this 
privileging of administrative forms, what they term “Empire,” as the site 
of appropriation and oppression (I hesitate to say exploitation, since 
to my mind this is a concept tied to economics rather than politics).25 
While Hardt and Negri’s vision in other ways has much to recommend 
it, from the detailing of biopolitical capitalism and so-called immaterial 
production, to a much more thoroughly political-economic account of 
the development of the productive forces under neoliberalism, it is strik-
ing that their revolutionary vision is entirely focused on the dismantling 
of a political entity.
The question of the state is certainly a pressing one under neoliberal-
ism and as it has become increasingly allied with the corporate and finan-
cial sectors over the past twenty years to form what Harvey describes 
as the “state-finance nexus” or “state-corporate nexus” in most places 
around the world.26 It makes sense in such a context to situate the state, 
and not just the economy, as a locus of struggle. Yet, the disdain of the 
state shared by both Badiou and Hardt and Negri (as well as by resurgent 
forms of anarchist theory in the present) can itself be read as a symptom 
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of neoliberalism: in providing a radical critique of the state such theo-
ries unintentionally contribute to the neoliberal destruction of the 
social democratic state, the welfare state, and of other versions of state-
based socialism. 
The Materialist Opening
Given the subjectivist and idealist limits to much of this recent theorizing 
about the political, perhaps our post-political moment in the academy 
can be understood not exclusively as a closing-down or a silencing, but 
also as opening up a space for the possibility of a new kind of materialist 
work, one not entirely circumscribed by the linguistic, and the cultural, 
and, indeed, the political as conceptual place holders. While, these cat-
egories are crucial and indeed we need to continue to fight for their valid-
ity for any socially committed scholarship, they have also done as much 
to circumscribe scholarship as enable it in the past thirty years.
This at least has been the argument advanced by a range of recent work 
in what Diana Coole and Samantha Frost term the “new materialisms,” 
from the material feminism championed by Stacy Alaimo and Susan 
Hekman, to the object-oriented ontology of Levi Bryant and Graham 
Harman, the political ecology of Bruno Latour and Jane Bennett, the 
speculative materialism and realism championed by a range of new con-
tinental philosophers, work in affect studies by Lauren Berlant, Kathleen 
Stewart, and others, as well as ongoing work in political-economy by 
David Harvey, Immanuel Wallerstein, Aníbal Quijano, Saskia Sassen, and 
the theorists of economic production published in Another Production is 
Possible, edited by Boaventura de Souza Santos.27 While these writers are 
extremely diverse and share as many (if not more) disagreements as they 
do points of convergence, as well as, in the case of some of the speculative 
materialists and realists, a wavering commitment to politics, their shared 
commitment to materialism suggests the possibility for a new organizing 
principle for politically engaged theory in the present. Central to these 
different forms of materialism is a commitment to pushing beyond the 
limits of language and culture as placeholders for the social as such in 
order to engage the impact that ecological, political-economic, bodily, 
and object-based materialities on our ecologically and economically 
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crisis-ridden present. Or as Coole and Frost put it: “We share the feel-
ing current among many researchers that the dominant constructivist 
orientation to social analysis is adequate for thinking about matter, mate-
riality and politics in ways that do justice to the contemporary context 
of biopolitics and global political economy.”28 Such a materialism might 
help to counteract the ideology of dematerialization (what I elsewhere 
call avatar fetishism) that is one of the central logics of neoliberalism and 
communicative capitalism.29 A politics based around this new material-
ist opening would move beyond symbolic struggle and toward a politics 
that takes the insistence of the material itself as its political measure. 
Thus, at its best, this new materialist work, when grounded in a care-
ful attention to both political economy and political ecology, enables 
us to imagine the relationships among bodies, affects, subjects, objects, 
ecologies, and the world economy (as well as of course, among culture 
and language as in part different registers of the material) in ways that 
move past pure critique and toward a project of building a new politi-
cal, economic, and ecological future. Thus, the emphasis in the digital 
humanities on building and making is not wrong, but it cannot be at the 
expense of critiquing and analyzing. These are different parts of a dialec-
tic that are only separated from each other at the peril of the possibilities 
represented by both poles. Such a reactivated dialectic would not only 
take into consideration the way in which various materialities exceed, 
exist in tension with, and place limits on (as well as interpenetrate with) 
the domains of culture and language, but also refuse to turn the material 
turn into an argument for either a new vitalism or a new determinism. 
Such a reactivated dialectic would also take the depredations of neoliber-
alism in the academy as its first target, even as it also tries to imagine and 
enact alternate political and economic forms of praxis that move beyond 
the endgame of pure critique. 
This political economic praxis might take some of the forms chron-
icled by Boaventura de Souza Santos in his innovative edited volume, 
Another Production is Possible, which examines new forms of labor inter-
nationalism, including forms of successful cooperative production in 
Portugal and India, the solidary economy in Brazil, and other alternative 
production systems. As de Souza Santos himself recognizes, these often 
local movements of counter-production need to be linked up to larger 
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and more global transformations: “In such case, only the interconnection 
of local action and alternative strategies of incorporation or resistance at a 
regional, national, or global scale can save local initiatives faced with cap-
italist competition.”30 It is here where the global political economy pio-
neered by world-systems economists such as Wallerstein, Quijano and 
Giovanni Arrighi, as well as social geographers such as Harvey become 
crucial. We need to think collectively and globally if we are really going 
to challenge the economic and ecological devastation of the present. It is 
towards such a collective vision that Badiou in his reactivation of the sig-
nifier communism is perhaps pointing, but I am less concerned with the 
signifiers around which such a collective vision might be oriented and 
more concerned with the political, social, and theoretical labor needed 
to produce real material economic, ecological, and social change on both 
local, regional and global levels. 
Such, to me is the promise of the materialist opening in the present 
moment of theory. In order to make this materialist opening matter, we 
will have to build links between political economy and what Latour terms 
“political ecology” (even though Latour himself problematically wants to 
replace the former term with the latter), or the recognition of all actors 
in any given collective, human and nonhuman. We will also have to do 
the theoretical work of linking theories of matter to materialisms of the 
political economic and political ecological sort. This work is beyond the 
scope of this essay, but it is one of the genuinely progressive possibilities 
represented by the material turn. The materialist opening, then, is per-
haps the moment of dialectical possibility within the otherwise dispirit-
ing prospect of a truly post-political academy. 
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Chapter 10
Neoliberalism, Post-Scarcity, and 
the Entrepreneurial Self
Uppinder Mehan
The main character of the first part of Charles Stross’ novel Accelerando, 
Manfred Macx, makes his living by “essentially coming up with whacky 
but workable ideas and giving them to people who will make fortunes 
with them. He does this for free, gratis. In return, he has virtual immu-
nity from the tyranny of cash; money is a symptom of poverty, after all, 
and Manfred never has to pay for anything.”1 Near the beginning of the 
novel Manfred receives a plea from an AI looking for asylum. “If survival 
is what you’re after,” he tells it, “‘you could post your state vector on one 
of the p2p nets: then nobody could delete you __’. ‘Nyet!’ The artificial 
intelligence sounds as alarmed as it’s possible to sound over a VoiP link. 
‘Am not open source! Not want lose autonomy!’”2 
Manfred’s desires to be free from the bonds of cash and attempt to 
move to a high tech version of a gift-economy ends up employing the 
convenient fiction of the production of knowledge as the equivalent of 
the production of physical goods and services via the notion of intel-
lectual property. As a good entrepreneur, or a large corporation that 
headquarters in tax-sheltered locales, Manfred is a hero in IP geek cir-
cles because “he’s the guy who patented the business practice of moving 
your e-business somewhere with a slack intellectual property regime in 
order to evade licensing encumbrances.”3 Yet this is the same character 
who finds a gulf between himself and his parents who are “still locked 
in the boringly bourgeois twen-cen paradigm of college-career-kids.”4 
His parents are of a generation doomed in the new economics because 
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they follow the thought of “Marxist dialectic and Austrian School eco-
nomics: they’re so thoroughly hypnotized by the short-term victory of 
global capitalism that they can’t surf the new paradigm, look to the lon-
ger term.”5 To be fair to Manfred’s parents, and to Manfred and Charlie 
Stross, the last bit about Austrian School economics is directed toward an 
uploaded lobster neuronal network that has gained AI through a meshing 
with older Expert Systems.
On the one hand, Manfred fits the neoliberal ideal of the autonomous, 
entrepreneur who is constantly exploring business opportunities; on the 
other hand, Manfred sees himself as a different creature than those whose 
lives were lived under neoliberalism. The difference between the two may 
be that Manfred’s parents lived as the objects of neoliberalist practice or 
as incomplete subjects whereas Manfred has so completely internalized 
neoliberal ideals that he is no longer aware of them. But such speculation 
leads me to step outside the formative processes of the unproblematized 
self constructed by neoliberal idealism and toward the complete identifi-
cation between work and self that is as much a part of the capitalist, reli-
gious utopian conception of being in the world as it is the Marxist ideal of 
the unalienated worker. 
It may also be that Manfred is in a confused state in the world of the 
novel because he himself is caught in a transitional state between Stross’ 
extrapolation of the current economic and political shape of this world 
and the next. Most futurologists at the beginning of the 21st century give 
computing and technology a central role in their forecasts. They typically 
call for greater interconnectedness leading to greater efficiencies of all 
sorts. The future for most of them is only quantitatively different from 
the present. There are, however, those who think our scientific and tech-
nological progress is leading us to a qualitatively different future. A small 
number of science fiction writers have begun to explore the contours of 
life after the singularity. No one is quite sure what life will be like after the 
singularity but all are certain that we will finally have moved into a post-
scarcity world. The singularity, according to Ray Kurzweil, is a “future 
period during which the pace of technological change will be so rapid, 
its impact so deep, that human life will be irreversibly transformed.”6 The 
sciences and technologies which will bring this about are already here 
and getting us closer every year. The speed and capacity of computing 
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power is growing exponentially so that soon Kurzweil hopes to be able 
to convert his brain into software; nanotechnology is on the verge of real-
izing the dreams of alchemy; and the recasting of biology into a branch of 
information technology will lead to the complete control over our bod-
ies and our environments. Implicit in such a vision is the understanding 
that each one of us will never have to suffer from any physical want. The 
populating of the “us” has given some science fiction writers pause as 
they see little reason for the dynamics of technology transfer to change 
in the foreseeable future. The response to the worry of the unequal dis-
tribution of resources is that one, technology always produces cheaper 
iterations of itself; two, since much of the new technology is information-
based attempts at controlling its spread will fail; and three, the nature of 
information will force us to abandon the iniquities of classical econom-
ics which struggles with the allocation of resources under conditions 
of scarcity.
In the post-singularity world we may be able to full realize the self 
promised by neoliberal rhetoric: an autonomous, entrepreneurial self, 
free to make rational choices about every aspect of life. While Manfred 
in Stross’ Accelarando may be struggling to be born into a new world, his 
daughter is fully a creature of a post-singularty and post-scarcity world. 
Manfred’s daughter begins as the flesh and blood product of the union 
on Manfred and his ex-wife but quickly becomes something other than 
a daughter in our contemporary conventional sense of the word. Amber 
describes herself thus to another character in the novel: “I ran away from 
home. Mom owned me—that is, she had parental rights and Dad had 
none. So Dad, via a proxy, helped me sell myself into slavery to a com-
pany. The company was owned by a trust fund, and I’m the main benefi-
ciary when I reach the age of majority. As a chattel, the company tells me 
what to do—legally—but the shell company is set to take my orders. So 
I’m autonomous.”7 
In her examination of the move from analog to digital culture N. 
Katherine Hayles proclaims at one point, “I certainly am not the autono-
mous liberal self that located identity in consciousness and rooted it in 
my ability, first and foremost, to possess my own body…. I am a distrib-
uted cognitive system composed of multiple agents that are running the 
programs from which consciousness emerges, even though conscious-
ness remain blissfully unaware of them.”8 In blithely dismissing the liberal 
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notion of the self-possession of the body she elides monumental strug-
gles that are still with us in securing that very right to self-possession. As 
damaging to her position is the reductionist core of her emergent self, for 
there is once again the I, the I that says, thinks “I am a distributed cogni-
tive system.” If Hayles really is a distributed cognitive system, then she 
should be addressing herself in the royal We; we am a distributed cog-
nitive system.
I do find myself in general agreement with Hayles with her fervent 
wish that soon “Operating in the economy of information, one can dream 
that social position and economic class will cease to matter, dream even 
of loosening the constraints of living in a single body located at a single 
position in space and time.”9 Such a wish though is what post-scarcity 
after the singularity promises.
On the one side the dream of freely flowing information 
strains to escape scarcity, restricted phusical space, class, gen-
der, embodiment, time, and mortality; on the other side the 
claims of corporate profit, stratified social structures, physical 
confinement, gender inequalities, marked and failing bodies 
re-assert their inevitability.10 
Hayles correctly points out the two sides of the dream, although I find it 
curious that on the nightmare side of the dream she places the “problem” 
of gender inequality, “marked” and “failing bodies” as being inevitable as 
corporate profit. She probably does not mean that gender, being marked, 
and having a failing body are the same sort of problem as corporate 
profit. What she may mean is that when it comes to the dream of being 
free of the body (disembodiment) gender could be as much a problem 
as being marked or feeble. So the question arises, whose body is it that is 
the subject of the “dream” of disembodiment? Which body is it that one 
can be free of in the utopia of space and time unbound? What kind of 
body is it that can best take advantage of life in the post-scarcity world? 
Obviously, one that is free of gender inequality, read “male”; a body that 
is not marked, read “white”, a body that is not failing, read “young.” In the 
final analysis the utopia of unlimited information and goods is threatened 
by corporate greed, women, non-white people, and the elderly.
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What is wrong with autonomy? Who does not want to be free from 
the influences of others, especially others who would hold us back from 
activities and projects that enable us to spend our social and cultural and 
monetary capital as we would see fit? The individual autonomy that is 
important to classic liberalism is not the same autonomy we find under 
neoliberalism according to Baez and Talburt.11 They argue, following 
Foucault, that neoliberal autonomy is a technique of governmental-
ity. Subjects, parents of schoolchildren in the case of Baez and Talburt’s 
analysis, are empowered to act responsibly, to choose to act responsibly, 
by extending the life of the school into the life of the house and thereby 
ensuring success for their children. “Neoliberal rationality positions sub-
jects as actors who are “free to” and “responsible for” the administration 
of their own lives. Parents and children as lifelong learners are “free” to 
continually recreate the self through a life that “becomes a continuous 
course of personal responsibility and self-management of one’s risks and 
destiny—the autonomous learners who are continuously involved in 
self-improvement.”12 
Self-improvement and lifelong learning are transformed under neo-
liberalism from an active exploration of fields of knowledge to a nec-
essary re-calibration of skills attuned to the shifting demands of the 
marketplace.
The autonomous self under Neoliberalism is also being burdened 
with responsibility when it comes to health care. The discourse of mak-
ing the delivery of health care efficient is centered on cutting costs. A 
number of aspects of the health care equation are available for furthering 
the reduction of costs, various expensive tests requiring exotic machin-
ery and specialized labor, newer medication invented by Big Pharma, fees 
charged by physicians, and administrative costs of insurance companies, 
among others; however, the emphasis in neoliberal critiques falls most 
heavily on reducing the services available to the patient. 
A more insidious neoliberal approach echoes the personal responsi-
bility trope offered above in Baez and Talburt’s application of the notion 
of governmentality to schoolchildren and their parents. The patient 
is “empowered” in neoliberalist ideology to manage his or her health, 
choose the best insurance plan, and select the best physician. As Evans et 
al. point out no other aspect of health care responsibility has been shifted 
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to patients in contemporary culture more completely than obesity.13 It 
falls on the patient to manage his or her obesity not only for a better qual-
ity of life but also to aid in the effort to rein in national healthcare costs. 
The focus is less on the delivery of healthcare and more on the regimen 
required to be an ideal patient. I’m not arguing that it is not in the best 
interest of the individual to manage weight within reason but the onus on 
the responsible individual self ignores the market and structural dimen-
sions of inexpensive, high-caloric food made readily available through 
heavy subsidies to large agriculture corporations.
Should the neoliberal self either not be interested in managing his or 
her weight then there is the option of surgery. Currently, lap band surgery 
at $12,000 is covered by health insurance plans, including Medicare, if 
the patient has a BMI of at least 35 (80 to 100 pounds over the recom-
mended weight), a history of related health problems (diabetes, joint-
pain, and heart disease), and repeated attempts at dieting.14 If the patient 
has difficulty qualifying under the above conditions, then one website for 
a Bariatric Surgery center advises that “there may be a way to have some 
of the tests covered, or perhaps have another (approved) abdominal sur-
gery done simultaneously thereby covering some of the anesthesia and 
hospital fees.”14 The FDA is under pressure, as of mid-January 2011, by a 
maker of lap band devices to approve the surgery for people who are only 
slightly obese.
A number of meanings overlap from almost the beginning of the uses 
of the word autonomy. According to the OED, the earliest uses of the 
word come to us from its political usage. So H. Cockeram in 1623 defines 
autonomy as the “liberty to live after one’s own law,” but just a few years 
later More is cited using it in a more inclusive sense, making the move 
from the individual to a collective. In a biblical history More, in 1681, 
says that the Jews were granted autonomy, “viz. liberty of living according 
to their own laws.” The editors of the OED choose an interesting example 
in their attempt to illustrate the fuller meaning of autonomy as the “lib-
erty to follow one’s will, personal freedom.” Here is the example in full: 
“1803 W. Taylor in Ann. Rev. 1 384 The customers of a banker can desert 
to a rival at will, and thus retain an autonomy of conduct.” Given such 
an entangled beginning it is less surprising that we have such conflicting 
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meanings today. The conflicting meanings also carry into conflicting and 
contradictory values given to autonomy.
Autonomy, of course, has a much longer philosophical history and it 
is beyond the scope of this essay (and my expertise) to give other than 
a brief caricature of sorts. Both Plato and Aristotle hold that personal 
autonomy as self-determination is an ideal for humanity and for both this 
ideal is associated with rationality. The Stoics continue this preference 
and autonomy develops in the Enlightenment into Rousseau’s concept 
of autonomy as moral liberty undergirded by the twin notions of mastery 
over oneself and civil liberty. For Kant moral autonomy resides in having 
one’s will determine its own guiding principles rather than having them 
dictated by external figures such as religious authorities and imposed leg-
islation. Rationality still serves as a keystone in Enlightenment ideals and 
acts as a break on autonomy as the fulfillment of idiosyncratic desires. 
But what Rousseau and Kant see as the workings of universal reason 
and the rational in the human the Romantics see as the stultifying of 
the emotional truth of the self. Particularity and individuality drive the 
emphasis placed upon the passions over reason in search of the complete 
self rather than the incomplete wizened rational self. John Stuart Mill 
agrees with the Romantics that the “person whose desires and impulses 
are his own—are the expression of his own nature, as it has been devel-
oped and modified by his own culture—is said to have a character. One 
whose desires and impulses are not his own has no character, no more 
than a steam engine has a character.”16 And it is with Mill that autonomy 
can be said to be associated with liberalism. Would Mill, however, associ-
ate “impulses and desires” with the wildness of the Romantics? A careful 
reading suggests he would not. “Desires and impulses” are for Mill nature 
modified by the person’s own culture by which I take him to mean a kind 
of comprehension, discernment and control developed by experience. 
The autonomous self for Mill is an expression of individuality and diver-
sity in a social setting.
It is this linking between liberalism and autonomy, and its exten-
sion into neoliberalism, that is of interest to me in this paper and Bhiku 
Parekh’s criticism of Mill serves as a turn in the criticism of autonomy 
that has gained ground over the second half of the twentieth century. 
Parekh holds that “since Mill’s theory of diversity was embedded in an 
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individualist vision of life, he cherished individual but not cultural diver-
sity, that is diversity of views and lifestyles within a shared individualist 
culture but not diversity of cultures including the nonindividualist.”17 
While Parekh’s point is well taken from a multiculturalist perspective, 
feminist scholars such as Carol Gilligan wonder whether autonomy may 
be a gendered value, and contemporary philosophers such as Levinas 
recommend heteronomy over autonomy. 
The criticism of autonomy that I want to take up in its neoliberal itera-
tion is that offered by communitarians who argue that the liberal empha-
sis on the autonomy of the self inadequately recognizes the self in its 
social and political embeddedness. Communitarians, according to Cha, 
argue that “neo-liberalism is simply revived old-fashioned, economic lib-
eralism, and it means unbridled individualism in the market place, and in 
the political arena where unfettered individualism allows the economi-
cally elite to effectively maintain a position of power.”18 
Cha’s dismissive phrase equating Neoliberalism with economic liber-
alism has some merit in that it underscores the linkage between the two 
forms. But the qualifying “simply revived” is too facile. To begin with 
there is an older European Neoliberalism and a more recent American 
Neoliberalism from the 1980s. The earlier continental Neoliberalism 
is the one associated with the Austrian School of Economics and then 
later with the Chicago School and Pinochet’s Chile. This is also the 
Neoliberalism of David Harvey’s A Brief History of Neoliberalism, who 
extends it include Thatcher’s England and Reagan’s America. The 
American Neoliberalism of Charles Peters, Gary Hart, and Robert Reich 
begins with Reagan’s term.
In the May 1983 issue of The Washington Monthly Charles Peters 
published “A Neoliberal’s Manifesto” as a call to liberals in America to 
re-examine closely held ideas of governance. As he relates in an inter-
view on the Washington Monthly website in 2007, “In the late seventies, 
there was this stagnation, and you desperately needed a rebirth of entre-
preneurship. The neoliberals can’t take complete credit for this rebirth, 
because it was happening right as we were calling for it. It began to hap-
pen with people like Bill Gates and the Apple guy in their garages. Things 
were ready to explode. But as in so many revolutions that are desirable, 
it went too far.”19 A measure of the distance between European and 
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American Neoliberalism is that Charlie Peters supports a nationalized 
health care system.
In addition to the writers at The Washington Monthly, Peters’ introduc-
tion to his manifesto names reporters from The Atlantic, Texas Monthly, 
and Newsweek, along with academics such as Robert Reich and Lester 
Thurow, and politicians such as Gary Hart, Paul Tsongas and Bill Bradley 
as fellow travelers. The opening move of the manifesto is to frame 
Neoliberalism as an attempt to start thinking again rather than respond-
ing automatically to the problems of the country. So neoliberals do not 
want to automatically “favor unions and big government or oppose the 
military and big business.”20 In addition to economic stagnation, neolib-
erals see a crumbling infrastructure, inefficient public agencies, a top-
heavy military, and selfish politicians beholden to special interest groups. 
The liberals lack of solutions come from having fallen prey to four prin-
ciples: Don’t Say Anything Bad about the Good Guy, Pull up the Ladder, 
The More the Merrier, and lastly Politics is Bad and Politicians are even 
Worse. All of which necessarily lead to the unquestioning acceptance of 
the status quo: public schools, the civil service and unions are not to be 
alienated, the more beneficiaries a program has the more likely it is to 
survive politically, and public institutions such as the Post Office are to 
be free of government control and influence. American neoliberals focus, 
instead, on “encouraging entrepreneurship” not by adopting “Reaganite 
policies that make the rich richer” but by providing a more inviting envi-
ronment for investors and customers and by increasing competition. But 
such actions are to take place with the understanding that “on the matters 
of health and safety … there must be vigorous regulation, because the 
same capitalism that can give us economic vitality can also sell us Pintos, 
maim employees, and pollute our skies and streams.”21 
The more details Peters provides in his manifesto the less certain I 
am there is that much difference between American Neoliberalism and 
the European Neoliberalism which sees its ideas turned into policies that 
are most significantly first put into effect in Latin and South America. 
Perhaps, there is one significant difference between the two neoliberal-
isms, Peters’ manifesto is silent on the issue of free trade. The importance 
of free trade to the Neoliberalism inflicted on southern countries makes 
it central to most of its other positions on the economy, government, 
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and understanding of the individual self; perhaps, it is that missing piece 
in American Neoliberalism that makes it possible for Democrats in the 
1980s (some would say including the Clinton and Obama administra-
tions) to view their actions as corrections rather than capitulations. 
Hayek and Friedman’s Neoliberalism (European Neoliberalism) 
believes that “the individual is generally the best judge of his or her 
interests, and that economic ends are generally best pursued through a 
market system involving private ownership and contractual exchange.”22 
Economic ends may have been the beginning of Neoliberalist concerns 
but the ends have multiplied and now seem to reach into every aspect 
of human (and non-human) life: or as David Harvey puts it, “the com-
modification of everything.”23 The ethics of neoliberalism frame the free 
market transaction as both duty and consequence. Neoliberal thinking is 
manifest in higher education primarily through the on-going attempt to 
turn universities into enterprise systems in which the student/consumer 
is sold a quantifiable good by the entrepreneur/teacher and the whole 
process can be assessed for its accuracy, validity, and efficiency. The stu-
dent and the teacher are partners in an exchange in which both of them 
are tasked with making choices. The capacity to make rational choices 
figures as highly in education as it does in health care where the onus is 
on the individual to become the shaper of his or her body. The discourse 
of health care increasingly mimics the discourse of management. The 
rational self assesses the performance needs of the body, purchases the 
products and knowledge necessary to maintain the body in good work-
ing order, and adopts the required pharmaceutical and “lifestyle” regimes. 
Such a perspective on health is not new with neoliberalism but it has cer-
tainly acquired a greater market share than ever before. 
The student, the teacher, the health consumer, the worker are all entre-
preneurs in neoliberal thought. Each individual a company of one that 
enters into contractual engagements with other companies. An entrepre-
neur, by definition, responds to market forces by assessing the needs of 
the marketplace and supplying those needs. As the market forces change 
so too does the entrepreneur in response. The original capitalist under-
standing of the entrepreneur is the individual as investor. According to 
BusinessDictionary.com, an entrepreneur is a “Person who exercises ini-
tiative by organizing a venture to take benefit of an opportunity and, as 
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the decision maker, decides what, how, and how much of a good or ser-
vice will be produced. He or she supplies risk capital as a risk taker, and 
monitors and controls the business‘ activities as a manager. The entre-
preneur is usually a sole-proprietor, a partner, or the one who owns the 
majority of shares in an incorporated venture.” BusinessDictionary.com 
is owned by Web Finance Inc., “an internet company that strives to pro-
vide educational tools in a wide range of subject areas.” The site informs 
us that the company’s “goal is to help as many people as possible, and for 
this reason everything [they] provide is free.” In case you are wondering 
Walden University and Chase Bank were the two advertisers on the web-
page offering me easy credit and the opportunity to make a difference in 
my community (I leave it to you to match advertiser and offer).
At the heart of the vision of the entrepreneur is the necessity of con-
tracts, and the arguments Plato gives to Socrates for the necessity of 
contracts with their basis in enlightened self-interest have been echoed 
throughout history. People come together and are ruled by giving con-
sent to the state. Alongside such an understanding, however, is also an 
awareness that, at root, the consent is based on force. Hume’s thoughts 
on the original contract lead him to pronounce that “Almost all the gov-
ernments which exist at present, or of which there remains any record 
in story, have been founded originally, either on usurpation or conquest, 
or both, without any presence of a fair consent or voluntary subjection 
of the people.” The promoters of neoliberalism would respond by point-
ing out that that inequality is exactly the problem that entrepreneurship, 
that contracts entered into freely, are best at combating. As Hart and 
Holmstrom point out, however, contracts always spell out enforcement 
issues. They do sketch a case of the parties to a contract behaving respon-
sibly toward each other, honoring the terms of their contract without 
recourse to legally binding penalties: “a party may behave “reasonably” 
even if he is not obliged to do so in order to develop a reputation as a 
decent and reliable trader” (102). But Hart and Holmstrom emphasize 
that such behavior depends on a shared understanding of the terms of 
the contract, shared norms of behavior, and equally shared information. 
The free exchange between parties that freely enter into an agreement is 
the utopian dream of contemporary capitalists from Adam Smith’s liber-
als to Milton Friedman’s neoliberals. However, “Adam Smith’s economic 
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agents are not just isolated individuals, they are property owners, and 
it is because they are the owners of property that some have the power, 
embodied in legal right, to profit from the labor of others” (Clarke 52).
I began this essay with a brief look at Charles Stross’ Accelerando and 
ended with the main character of the second half of the story, Amber, the 
daughter born in a post-singular, post-scarcity world. At a key point in 
her psychological development she rebuffs a “traditional” understanding 
of family and relationships when she interrupts a homily about “a moth-
er’s love,” “Fuck love … she wants power.”24 The rest of the novel in which 
she and her band of explorers upload versions of themselves into a tin can 
of a spaceship, heading out to meet alien info-traders, follows the same 
trajectory that Hayles’ points out in her analysis of three fictions cover-
ing a span from the end of the nineteenth century to the 1970s. New 
information first allows the protagonist to escape from her known limita-
tions but then a realization sets in that the escape is actually a new “arena 
in which the dynamics of domination and control can be played out in 
new ways.”25 
I’ll end with making use of Appiah’s useful distinction between strong 
autonomy and weak autonomy. Neoliberal idealists value strong auton-
omy which sees the individual as fully capable of making rational deci-
sions about all aspects of his or her life. Communitarians recognize all the 
ways in which the self is both a problematic on-going construction pulled 
in various directions by internal and external forces to such an extent that 
the boundary between external and internal ceases to register. Appiah’s 
suggestion is that weak autonomy, “an availability of options, an endow-
ment with minimum rationality, an absence of coercion”26 may actually 
be what those who think of autonomy as a value may be advocating. Such 
a sense of autonomy seems to me something most of us can work with. 
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